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ABSTRACT 
This thesis assesses the impact of the 1991 health care reforms on the British National 
Health Service with respect to one specialist service, coronary revascularisation, and 
examines the ways in which greater improvements in social welfare could be achieved. 
It is divided into three broad sections. The first section outlines the background to the 
reforms, the assessment criteria against which the reforms are to be measured and the 
service to be evaluated. The second section measures the impact of the reforms on 
efficiency and equity, the chosen assessment criteria, by means both of quantitative 
and qualitative analyses. The analyses describes the changes which had occurred since 
the introduction of market mechanisms into the NHS in 1991. Variations in the 
availability and use of coronary revascularisation services decreased and the 
contracting process became more sophisticated which suggested the reforms had been 
instrumental in increasing efficiency and equity. However, large variations remained 
and market mechanisms continued to cause a series of problems which signified that 
the reforms were still a long way off achieving an efficient allocation of resources. 
The third section considers how greater social welfare could be achieved. A strategy 
for improving social welfare involved managing the market for coronary 
revascularisations more effectively. An audit of waiting list management in three 
hospitals demonstrated that patients were often not treated within an appropriate time. 
The potential to improve efficiency and equity by more effective management of 
demand for coronary revascularisations therefore existed and the development of 
guidelines was recommended. Such guidelines were developed with the aim of 
prioritising patients according to their urgency of need. Finally, the thesis discusses 
the implications both for health care policy and future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
20 
The fundamental goal of any health care system is to maximise social welfare. Given 
the inevitability of scarce resources the aim is to maximise the benefits derived from 
health care within the resources available. Failure to achieve this leads to inefficiency. 
In the late 1980's there was growing concern regarding a crisis in the funding and 
performance of the NHS, predominantly due to the increase in demand for health care. 
There were large variations in the use of medical and surgical procedures between 
hospitals and regions therefore it was likely that much inefficiency existed. Reform 
of the British National Health Service (NHS) set out to improve efficiency by 
introducing market mechanisms into the health care system. The reforms created a 
competitive market on the supply side of the health service within the framework of 
public finance. 
The introduction of the reforms in 1991 caused particular concern among health care 
professionals about the ability of market mechanisms to preserve and develop highly 
specialised services. I t was feared that these high cost services, which are only 
provided in a small number of provider units would be put in jeopardy by the effects 
of the reforms. While the theoretical literature on the potential effects of introducing 
market mechanisms into health care systems is extensive, empirical evidence is largely 
lacking, predominantly due to the difficulty of evaluating the reforms in the short-
term. Despite these difficulties it is important to understand what impact the reforms 
have had on these specialist services and to identify strategies for improving social 
welfare. 
The aim of the thesis was to assess the impact of the 1991 health care reforms on the 
21 
British National Health Service with respect to one specialist service, coronary 
revascularisation, using an economic framework and to examine the ways in which 
greater improvements in social welfare could be achieved. 
The objectives were: 
(1) to describe the 1991 reforms of the NHS; 
(2) to select relevant economic criteria for assessing the impact of the reforms on 
social welfare; 
(3) to apply these criteria to coronary revascularisation services III a large 
representative sample of the UK; 
(4) to assess how the contracting process has influenced any observed changes; 
(5) to determine whether and how the management of demand for coronary 
revascularisation services could be improved; 
(6) to make recommendations to improve social welfare; and 
(7) to suggest a future research agenda. 
The thesis is presented in three parts. Part one outlines the background. First, in 
Chapter 2, the 1991 reforms of the National Health Service are reviewed, outlining the 
financing and structure of the health service before and after the reforms. Then, in 
Chapter 3, the assessment criteria against which the reforms are to be measured are 
discussed. Methods of measuring changes in social welfare are presented. The two 
dimensions of social welfare, economic efficiency and distributional justice (equity) 
are assessed in relation to health care, concluding with operational definitions of the 
22 
assessment criteria, and finally, using these criteria, the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the reforms are reviewed. Chapter 4 describes the service to be 
evaluated. Trends in the provision of coronary revascularisation services, the need for 
these services, what is known about their effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, and the 
recent developments in monitoring revascularisation outcomes and improving the 
quality of patient care are reviewed. 
Part two measures the impact of the reforms on social welfare, using the assessment 
criteria, by means both of quantitative and qualitative studies. In Chapter 5 the 
quantitative analysis assesses the patterns and trends in availability, utilisation and cost 
of these specialist services. The qualitative analysis, reported in Chapter 6, assesses 
the views of purchasers and providers over the first three years of the reforms and thus 
helps to provide explanations for the quantitative findings. 
Part three considers how greater social welfare could be achieved. Chapter 7 
discusses the evidence from the quantitative and qualitative analyses and considers a 
strategy for improving social welfare. It reports on a study to assess how providers 
currently manage demand and the potential improvements in efficiency and equity that 
could result from improved management, through the use of guidelines. In Chapter 
8, the early development of guidelines for prioritising patients according to their 
urgency of need is described. Finally, in Chapter 9, the implications both for health 
care policy and future research are considered. 
23 
CHAPTER 2 
HEALTH CARE REFORMS IN THE UK 
24 
2.1 Introduction 
The most radical reform of the National Health Service (NHS) since its inception in 
1948, outlined in the White Paper 'Working for Patients' [1] came into legislative 
force on 1 April 1991. It had been initiated in the late 1980s when there was growing 
public concern regarding a crisis in the funding and performance of the health service 
[2,3]. Critics of the government argued that despite the increase in expenditure on the 
NHS during the 1980s it was not sufficient to meet the growing demand brought about 
by demographic change, new costly medical techniques, growing public expectations 
and planned improvements in the service. 
The ideology behind 'Working for Patients' had been set by several other preceding 
government initiatives. The first was the growth in managerialism brought about by 
the Griffiths Management Enquiry in 1983 [4]. The second was the introduction of 
schemes of income generation [5] when health authorities were freed from restrictions 
of selling services for profit. Third was the policy of contracting out. In 1983 a 
Department of Health circular required health authorities to set up programmes of 
competitive tendering for their cleaning, catering and laundry requirements [6]. Later, 
this initiative was spread to other non-clinical and clinical services such as transport 
and diagnostic services. Finally came the growth of the idea of health care markets. 
Introducing market mechanisms into health care systems had been discussed in 
academic and policy literature during the 1980s and in 1985 Enthoven suggested that 
to achieve greater efficiency in the NHS the roles of purchasers and providers should 
be separated [7]. He envisaged that purchasers would choose the best value care for 
25 
their resident population from a number of alternative competing providers, including 
private hospitals. 
Despite these changes there was growing concern that the financing of the NHS should 
undergo major reform. In the face of growing unpopularity the then Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher, set up a working group to review the alternative methods of 
financing the NHS including a health tax, national insurance with or without an 
entitlement to contract out and private insurance encouraged by means of vouchers or 
tax relief. It was later decided by the group not to consider different methods of 
financing the NHS other than through general taxation but to consider different ways 
of providing health care that would ensure a more efficient use of resources l . The 
model chosen to achieve this aim was that proposed by Enthoven in 1985 [7], though 
the changes were far more radical than his original ideas. The aim of the reforms was 
to introduce: 
'A funding system in which successfol hospitals can flourish. .. will encourage local 
initiatives and greater competition. All this in turn will ensure a better deal for the 
public, improving choice and quality of services offered and the efficiency with which 
these services are delivered' [1]. 
Private insurance was however encouraged for the elderly by means of tax 
breaks 
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2.2 The NBS before the 1991 reforms 
Before April 1991 the NHS provided a system of comprehensive health care without 
any prior contribution requirement, and almost entirely free of user-charges, although 
user-charges did exist for drugs, dental and ophthalmic services. The NHS was 
financed primarily from general taxation with a contribution from the National 
Insurance Fund. The total NHS budget was voted annually by Parliament and 
allocated between on the one hand the hospital and community health services and on 
the other hand primary care (Figure 2.1). The hospital and community health services 
were financed by regional health authorities (RHAs) and managed by district health 
authorities (DHAs) which had the dual role of meeting the health care needs of their 
resident popUlation and of providing hospital services. Regional resource allocation 
was made on the basis of a formula, known as the RA WP formula (Resource 
Allocation Working Party) designed to reflect the relative health care needs of each 
region [8]. Its objective was to achieve equalisation of funding for equal needs. The 
RHAs then allocated resources, on the basis of existing facilities and expected costs 
of hospital provision, to the separate DHAs within each region. Hospitals received a 
budget from their DHA. 
Primary care was the responsibility of local Family Practitioner Committees (FPCs), 
who's allocation was based on a mixture of capitation and fee-for-service. FPCs were 
responsible for general practitioner (GP) services, pharmacists, dentists and ophthalmic 
services. Finally, the private sector before the reforms was relatively small and was 
27 
tv 
00 
Figure 2.1: Financing of the NHS pre-reforms 
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NHSME=National Health Service Management Executive. RAWP=Resource Allocation Working Party 
FFS=Fee for Service. HCHS=Hospital and Community Health Services. RHA=Regional Health Authority. 
DHA=District Health Authority. FPC=Family Practitioner Committee. GPs=General Practitioners 
mainly financed by insurance rather than by patients directly. 
2.3 The NHS after the 1991 reforms 
The main concept behind the reforms was the creation of a competitive market within 
the framework of public provision and finance brought about by the separation of 
responsibility for funding and providing health services. This concept followed that 
initially proposed by Enthoven. Two further changes not derived from Enthoven, were 
the creation of self-governing hospitals and practice budgets for GPs. On the demand 
side of the new NHS were the purchasers, which included DHAs and general practice 
fundholders (GPFHs). On the supply side were the providers, which initially included 
NHS Trusts, directly-managed units (DMUs), Special Health Authorities (SHAs) and 
independent hospitals. The idea was that a competitive market would be created on 
the supply side and that competition would take place between existing providers for 
contracts offered by purchasers (Figure 2.2). 
2.3.1 The Purchasers 
Funding the NHS continued to be through taxation and national insurance 
contributions and no significant increase in the use of user-charges was envisaged. 
The responsibility of the RHA and DHA for finance was separated from that of 
provision of services (Figure 2.3). RHAs were allocated resources on the basis of a 
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Figure 2.2: Demand and supply in the reformed NHS 
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Figure 2.3: Financing of the NHS post-reforms (1991/92) 
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NHSME HQ=National Health Service Management Executive Head Quarters. FFS =Fee for Service 
HCHS=Hospital and Community Health Service. RHA=Regional Health Authority. GPs=General Practitioners 
DHA=District Health Authority. FHSA=Family Health Service Authority 
new capitation formula weighted according to the age and health distribution of the 
regional population and the relative costs of providing services locally. The overall 
effect of the new formula was a redistribution of resources between regions creating 
winners and losers. North East Thames was the main beneficiary and Oxford the 
biggest loser [9]. 
DHAs assumed the role of purchasing agencies. Their budget was decided on the 
basis of the new weighted capitation funding formula and distributed through the 
RHA. Their new responsibilities were to assess the health care needs of their resident 
population, to determine the most cost-effective means of meeting such needs and to 
prioritise the pattern of health care delivery by deciding how much should be spent on 
each aspect of secondary and tertiary care. Hospitals received funding from DHAs on 
the basis of agreed contracts or service agreements (Table 2.1). In theory, the 
contracts set out the quantity, quality and cost of services to be provided through the 
year. 
General practices with at least 11,000 patients were given the opportunity to become 
fundholders for a defined range of services. This included 110 specific hospital 
treatments (mostly elective surgery, including coronary revascularisation), most 
outpatient care, community services, drugs and practice staff. They therefore had the 
responsibility of providing primary care to patients on their practice list and purchasing 
secondary and tertiary care from providers. This created a large number of small 
purchasers adding extra stimulus to competition between providers for their business. 
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Table 2.1: Contract type definitions 
Type Definition 
Simple Block Purchasers pay the provider a fixed sum for access to a 
defined range of services or facilities. Such contracts 
may include some form of indicative workload 
agreement or fixed volume. 
Sophisticated Block Purchasers pay providers a fixed contract sum for access 
to a defined range of services or facilities. Indicative 
patient activity targets or thresholds with 'floors' and 
'ceilings' are included in such contracts as well as 
agreed mechanisms if targets are exceeded. Some 
elements of case-mix may be included. 
Cost and Volume This contract specifies outputs in terms of patient 
treatment rather than inputs in terms of services or 
facilities available. Purchasers do not purchase fixed 
volumes but will develop contracts with a fixed price 
being paid up to a certain volume of treatment and a 
price per case being paid above it, up to a volume 
ceiling. 
Cost per Case The hospital agrees to provide a range of specified 
treatments in line with a given contract price. 
Source: NHS Executive, Purchasing Unit (1994) [10] 
2.3.2 The Providers 
The new NHS had four types of provider. First were the self-governing hospitals 
which 'opted out' of DHA control and were established as NHS Trusts. They are 
independent, non-governmental organisations and are directly accountable to the 
Secretary of State for health. In order to gain self-governing status hospitals had to 
demonstrate they had an efficient management structure. Once a Trust they had the 
power to manage their own assets. The Government (eventually, though not initially) 
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allowed them some influence as to the pay and conditions of their staff, to accumulate 
surpluses, borrow, and dispose of their assets. The Government hoped that these 
freedoms would provide the necessary incentives for Trusts to provide services which 
were cost-effective and responsive to consumer needs. In addition to Trusts were three 
other types of provider. First, the DMUs, which remained under the direct control of 
their respective DHA. Second, the private providers, which comprised only a small 
but increasing part of the market. Third, the SHAs, which received direct funding 
from the Department of Health for their activities and remained under the direct 
control of the Secretary of State. 
Primary care became the responsibility of local Family Health Service Authorities 
(FHSAs), who adopted similar responsibilities to the DHA, and were regulated by 
RHAs. Regions began to set indicative drug budgets for each practice based on 
assumptions of average prescribing costs, in an attempt to reduce, or at least control, 
drug expenditure. 
2.4 The evolution of the market economy 
The introduction of market mechanisms into the NHS did not occur instantaneously 
mainly due to the fact that there had been no precedent for health care markets in the 
UK and experience of the system elsewhere was limited. The new structure of the 
NHS was therefore introduced in stages so as to minimise disruption to the service. 
34 
In the first year the National Health Service Management Executive (NHSME) decided 
that a steady state should be maintained. This required DHAs to secure contracts in 
the first year which reproduced existing patterns of activity and referrals. For this to 
occur it was also necessary not to change the overall distribution of resources. 
Consequently, the introduction of weighted capitation was held back during the first 
year of the reforms. Purchasers and providers were given a year of preparation. After 
the first year purchasers were free to change existing referral patterns and activity 
levels and weighted capitation was introduced. Weighted capitation caused greater 
shifts in resources between districts than had occurred at regional level. Providers in 
districts that lost a substantial amount of resources had to implement cost cutting 
strategies, for example reducing the numbers of acute beds. 
Within the first four years a number of structural developments took place aimed at 
increasing efficiency by advancing the creation of the health care market (Figure 2.4). 
The introduction of contracting had caused a number of problems for DHAs mainly 
because most DHAs were too small to form viable purchasing units and because they 
lacked the appropriate purchasing skills. Many DHAs therefore decided to purchase 
health care services jointly with other DHAs. A series of mergers subsequently took 
place forming a smaller number of purchasing agencies. 
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Figure 2.4: Financing of the NHS post-reforms (1995/96) 
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By April 1994 the process of transforming the hospital and community service 
provision was almost complete with about 90% of hospital and community health 
service spending being used to purchase services from around 400 NHS Trusts. In 
theory this should have had the effect of promoting greater competition between 
providers as it reduced the chance that a purchaser would favour their own DMU. 
The degree of competition was also enhanced by the increasing number of GPFHs and 
the abolition of SHAs (in April 1995). By 1994 the number of GPFHs increased to 
about 8,000 general practices serving around 36% of the population. There was 
however no prospect of all GPs becoming fundholders because some did not qualify 
(for example, single-handed practices) and some did not want to participate in the 
scheme. 
Provider units rapid uptake of Trust status caused a number of administrative changes. 
NHS Trusts were not accountable to the RHA. Instead the NHSME set up a number 
of regional outposts to supervise them. As it became apparent that most provider units 
would eventually become NHS Trusts the role of the RHA was put into question. The 
government decided to make two administrative changes. First, to abolish RHAs in 
favour of a smaller number of middle tier organisations which combined the roles of 
RHA and outposts and second, to merge FHSAs and DHAs. The merger of FHSAs 
and DHAs had been expected due to previous confusion over the responsibility for 
primary health care between the two authorities. From April 1996 DHAs and FHSAs 
will be merged to form new, unified, commissioning bodies. 
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2.5 Other policy changes 
There were several other policy changes which took place at around the same time as 
the implementation of the 1991 NHS reforms that were of relevance to the subject of 
this thesis. First, the publication of 'The Health of the Nation; a Strategy for Health 
in England' [11] marked a shift in policy intent from a concern about health care to 
a concern about better health. The document outlined key areas where health 
improvements could be made. They included coronary heart disease (CHD), cancers, 
mental illness, HIV / AIDs and sexual health, and accidents. Objectives and targets 
were set for purchasers to achieve in these areas through the contracting process. The 
relevant targets concerning CHD are outlined in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: Specific targets relating to coronary heart disease 
Prevention Treatment 
Reduce rates for CHD in people By 1997 all emergency ambulances should 
under 65 by at least 40% by the have at least one paramedically trained 
year 2000 crew member 
Reduce rates for CHD in people To achieve a target of "door to needle" 
aged 65-74 by at least 30% by the time (for intravenous thrombolysis in 
year 2000 suspected acute myocardial infarctions) 
following arrival at hospital of 30 minutes 
Second, the Government's strategy of shifting the emphasis of health care from 
hospital to community based services led to a review of London's acute hospital 
capacity in 1992 by Sir Bernard Tomlinson. He recommended that there should be 
a substantial reduction in hospital capacity in London which would release resources 
38 
to be used to build up London's primary care base [12]. As the Tomlinson report 
offered little guidance about how to carry out the recommendations, a team were 
appointed in 1993 to review acute services and put forward recommendations about 
how they should be rationalised. The team, known as the London Implementation 
Group, conducted a series of studies into six specialities (including cardiac surgery) 
where rationalisation was thought to be necessary. The Group concluded that there 
were too many small specialist units in London and that improvements in the quality 
and efficiency of services could be achieved by shutting down a number of units and 
merging others. Implementation of these recommendations was to be largely through 
the market place. Indeed purchasers had already started to shift their contracts from 
inner to outer London providers as a result of the Tomlinson Report. Similar reviews 
took place in other major cities throughout the UK. 
Finally, in 1991, the Patient's Charter [13] was introduced which outlined the rights 
ofNHS patients (Table 2.3). In addition to these rights the Government also included 
their commitment to setting specific service standards in the form of maximum waiting 
times for out-patient services and for specific elective procedures. The Secretary of 
State for Health [14] announced in April 1994 a standard for patients requiring 
coronary revascularisation, of admission within 12 months of being placed on an 
inpatient waiting list. This standard was applied from April 1995 in addition to a 
guarantee of admission within 18 months for all specialities and a standard for first 
outpatient appointments that will require 9 out of 10 appointments to be within 13 
weeks of GP referral and all to be within 26 weeks of referral. 
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Table 2.3: The Patient's Charter Rights 
1. To receive health care on the basis of clinical need, regardless of ability to 
pay 
2. To be registered with a OP 
3. To receive emergency medical care at any time, through your OP or the 
emergency ambulance service and hospital accident and emergency 
departments 
4. To be referred to a consultant, acceptable to you, when your OP thinks its 
necessary, and to be referred for a second opinion if you or your OP agree 
this is desirable 
5. To be given a clear explanation of any treatment proposed, including any 
risks and any alternatives, before you will agree to the treatment 
6. To have access to your health records and to know that those working for 
the NHS are under a legal duty to keep their contents confidential 
7. To choose whether or not you wish to take part in medical research or 
medical student training 
2.6 Summary 
Reform of the NHS in 1991 was brought about by a growing concern regarding the 
financing of the NHS. It was the provision of health services however, that became 
the subject of major reform rather than the method of funding the NHS. A 
competitive market was created on the supply side within the framework of public 
finance by separating the responsibility for purchasing and providing health care. The 
aim was to encourage competition between existing providers for contracts offered by 
purchasers of health care. The introduction of market mechanisms occurred in stages 
alongside other policy changes which aimed to shift some resources to primary care 
services and to give patients more rights regarding the quality of the health care they 
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received. In order to assess what impact these reforms have had it is necessary to 
outline the assessment criteria to be used, the subject of Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3 
WELFARE ECONOMICS 
AND 
THE ASSESSMENT CRITERIA 
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3.1 Introduction 
The fundamental economic problem faced by society is how best to allocate resources 
given that there are not enough to satisfy all needs. Such scarcity implies that any 
change in resource allocation will take into account opportunity costs2• For example, 
if the government chooses to devote more resources to health care then there will be 
less for other services. There are many different opinions on how society's resources 
should be divided between the various services. The fundamental goal of any health 
care system is to maximise social welfare, that is, to allocate resources efficiently. Not 
surprisingly, the idea of increasing efficiency was behind the introduction of market 
mechanisms into the NHS. It was and remains the Conservative government's belief 
that market mechanisms, if regulated appropriately, will produce a more efficient 
allocation of resources than central planning. 
Welfare economics is a branch of economics which is concerned with the optimal 
allocation of society's resources. To assess whether the changes brought about by the 
1991 NHS reforms will lead to improvements in social welfare, it is necessary to 
identify criteria against which the changes will be measured. Welfare economics has 
a long tradition of considering social welfare as having two dimensions, those of 
economic efficiency and distributional justice (equity). It is these criteria that were 
adopted for the purposes of this study. 
2 An opportunity cost is a measure of the economic cost of using scarce 
resources to produce a particular service in terms of the alternatives thereby 
forgone. 
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This chapter will (1) describe how economists propose to measure changes in social 
welfare brought about by a reallocation of resources, (2) assess the welfare objectives 
of economic efficiency and distributional justice in relation to health care, concluding 
with operational definitions of the two objectives, (3) discuss the theory of markets 
and market failure in health care and (4) review the literature assessing the impact of 
introducing markets into health care on the objectives of efficiency and equity. 
3.2 Measuring changes in social welfare 
3.2.1 Economic efficiency 
The aim of government policy is to maximise social welfare, which implies that 
resources should be allocated efficiently. In welfare economics, the generally accepted 
definition of efficiency is that of Pareto optimality, named after the Italian economist, 
Vilfredo Pareto, who constructed the model. He argued that any reallocation of 
resources could be considered an improvement if it made some people better off 
without making anyone else worse off. A Pareto optimum exists at a point where it 
is impossible to make one person better off without simultaneously making another 
worse-off. There are many Pareto optimum points associated with different 
distributions of initial endowments. The major problem with this concept is its limited 
applicability to most policy proposals which benefit some individuals and harm others 
in the pursuit of increasing social welfare. 
To overcome this problem, Kaldor and Hicks [15,16] introduced a test of relative 
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efficiency known as the compensation principle (or the potential Pareto improvement 
criterion). The compensation principle proposes that if a policy creates winners and 
losers the policy would be acceptable if the end result was an overall increase in social 
welfare. Hypothetically, it would be possible for the gainers to compensate the losers 
and still come out ahead. Consider a policy which set out to build a new hospital 
which would change the state of the world from State 1 to State 2. The new hospital, 
according to the compensation principle would increase efficiency if the increase in 
welfare in State 2 could be redistributed in such a way that the total welfare of all 
individuals would be at least equal to the total welfare of individuals in State 1 and 
for one or more individuals it would be greater. 
The compensation principle is the main analytical tool in applied welfare economics. 
However, it is not possible either to measure or to compare individual welfare simply 
because it is not possible to identify the relative satisfaction levels of each individual. 
There is no meaningful scientific way to measure or compare the relative satisfaction 
levels of an individual receiving a hip replacement with one receiving a heart 
transplant. How then can the principle be used to judge changes in resource allocation 
brought about by government policy? Hicks and Kaldor proposed that monetary 
values could be placed on individual's welfare which is both measurable and 
comparable. This is the foundation of cost benefit analysis (CBA). 
CBA aims to assess the effects of policy changes on the welfare of society as a whole. 
Fundamental to the approach is the concept of cost. The costs of a policy change that 
CBA attempts to measure are the opportunity costs which are the value of the 
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resources forgone by not using them in the best alternative activity. The relevant costs 
are therefore those that are incurred by the change in resource allocation and those that 
would not be incurred if no change in resource allocation took place. 
Willingness to pay can be used as a method of deriving monetary values. Benefits can 
be expressed as the amount individuals are willing to pay for the results of a proposed 
policy and costs can be expressed as the amount they are willing to pay for the 
benefits forgone as a result of the proposed policy. These costs and benefits are 
summed to produce a social cost and a social benefit. If the net social benefit is 
positive the proposed policy should be implemented. Measurement of individuals' 
willingness to pay is predominantly through market prices. However, where market 
prices do not directly reflect individuals' valuations then other methods have to be 
used. For example, extending Heathrow's permitted flight times will make quietness 
less available for those living near the airport, however there is no market for 
quietness and therefore no market price for it. 
There are some limitations to cost benefit analysis which should be noted. First, it is 
argued that individual valuations (or preferences) of policy changes cannot be summed 
to produce an aggregate valuation (social preference) [17]. Second, it is difficult to 
quantify all aspects of welfare. For example, can a monetary value be put on human 
life? Third, because it is based on the existing distribution of resources within society 
regardless of whether it is considered equitable, individual valuations may not always 
be appropriate. For example, consider a policy aimed at providing a breast cancer 
screening service. Just because a rich person may be willing to pay more for the 
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service than a poor person it should not mean that providing a breast cancer service 
for the rich is of more value than providing it for the poor. CBA therefore cannot tell 
us anything about the value of distributional effects of a policy change. 
3.2.2. Distributional justice 
Distributional justice, or equity, is often defined as fairness in the distribution of goods 
and services among the people in an economy. However, there is no unique definition 
of equity. It is an ethical judgement and the means of achieving it differ with the 
theory of justice a government supports. (It is not possible to discuss these theories 
here as they would take up a separate thesis on their own). Cost benefit analysis, as 
outlined above, tells us little about the distributional effects of policy changes in an 
economy. It's use should be restricted to determining what policies offer the greatest 
efficiency gains and leave the judgement of distributional justice to be made separately 
by the decision-maker (government). 
Trade-offs may have to be made between the two objectives. A policy may be shown 
to cause a decrease in economic efficiency. Under the cost benefit criteria the policy 
should not be implemented. However, if the decrease in economic efficiency is 
outweighed by an improvement in distributional justice, implementation of the policy 
may be justified. Alternatively, if a policy caused an increase in economic efficiency 
but a decrease in distributional justice the decision-maker would have to make the 
choice between more/less efficiency for less/more equity. 
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The objectives of economic efficiency and distributional justice will now be defined 
in the context of health care in order to develop operational definitions that can be 
used to judge the effect of the reforms. 
3.3 The assessment criteria 
3.3.1 Efficiency 
There are two levels of efficiency, productive and allocative efficiency. Productive 
efficiency addresses the issue of how an intervention (of proven effectiveness) can best 
be provided so as to achieve maximum output for a given level of resources. A 
process is said to be efficient in the productive sense if it is impossible to produce the 
same output using fewer inputs or if it is impossible to produce more output using the 
same level of inputs. 
Allocative efficiency addresses the issue of how best scarce resources are allocated 
between various effective and productively efficient interventions. It therefore focuses 
on the optimal configuration and scale of services in order to maximise the potential 
gains in health of society as a whole. Services are considered worthwhile if the 
benefits exceed the costs and should be implemented and expanded up to the point 
where marginal benefits equal marginal costs3• As this thesis assesses the impact of 
the reforms only on one specialist service, the definition of allocative efficiency 
J Marginal costslbenefits relate to the incremental costsibenefits of an 
intervention. They measure how much of an intervention is worthwhile. 
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adopted relates to the optimal spacial distribution of this service. To achieve allocative 
efficiency would therefore require coronary revascularisation procedures to be 
expanded in all areas to the point where marginal benefits equal marginal costs. The 
question of whether coronary revascularisation services are considered worthwhile 
relative to other interventions will not be addressed in this thesis. 
3.3.2 Equity 
Equity can be considered both at the level of financing health care services and at the 
level of provision. Presently a significant measure of financial equity is achieved by 
funding the health service from general taxation and, since the 1991 NHS reforms did 
not change the way the NHS was financed, the merits of this method of achieving 
financial equity will not be discussed. The reforms, however, did change the way in 
which health care services are provided. At the level of provision situations in which 
there are grounds for making trade-offs between equity and efficiency are rare. There 
are few circumstances where more equity is accepted for less efficiency as this will 
mean less extension or improvement in quality of life. In addition, it is common for 
situations which appear inequitable also to be inefficient. In such situations a 
redistribution of resources to achieve maximum gains in health at least cost will 
improve both efficiency and equity. For these reasons equity was not adopted as an 
explicit criterion in this thesis. Thus, while the possible effects of the reforms on 
equity will be described, the focus of this thesis will be on efficiency. 
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In order to describe the distributional aspects of the reforms a definition of equity is 
required. There are two types of equity, horizontal and vertical. Horizontal equity is 
about the equal treatment of equals and vertical equity is about the unequal treatment 
of unequals. Vertical equity, although an appropriate concept in the provision of 
health care, is difficult to measure. It requires judgements to be made about how 
unequally patients with different diagnoses should be treated. Horizontal equity is a 
more practical concept. The equal treatment of equals can be defined as equal 
treatment for equal need4• It can be expressed as equality of health, resources, 
utilisation or access. 
The idea of using equality of health as an equity goal can be rejected as it could never 
be guaranteed or achieved. For example, diseases which have been inherited would 
make it impossible to achieve this equity goal. Equal expenditure for equal need is 
of limited use as it only describes resource use rather than what services were received 
or how those services affected health status. Equal utilisation for equal need relies on 
standardisation of medical practice for a given condition and on equal patient 
compliance. As clinical practice for any condition varies between practitioners and 
patient compliance cannot be assumed to be the same for all patients, the use of this 
concept to describe the equity effects of the reforms is also limited. Equal access for 
equal need does not have these problems as it simply refers to individuals having an 
equal opportunity to use the services they need. Equal access for equal need is 
measured in relative terms. In this study the aim was to assess whether access had 
4 Need can be defined as the populations ability to benefit from an element of 
health care [18]. 
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changed since the 1991 NHS reforms. Measures of access included geographical 
distance and waiting times. 
3.4 Markets 
The British government introduced market mechanisms into the NHS because it 
believed that appropriately regulated markets achieve a more efficient allocation of 
resources. Economic theory does indeed state that a perfectly competitive market will 
reach a Pareto-efficient allocation without the need for government intervention. 
A market is where goods and services are exchanged between consumers (demand 
side) and producers (supply side). A market equilibrium is reached when, at a given 
market price, producers maximise their profits by selling as many products as they 
desire at that price and consumers maximise their welfare by purchasing all the 
products they desire subject to their income constraint. Price has an important part to 
play in this process. Price is determined by the interaction of supply and demand and 
is the information used both by consumers and by producers when making decisions. 
Price acts as a signal to both sides of the market. Producers use it to determine the 
level of output and consumers use it to determine at which level to purchase. 
Under the model of perfect competition, goods and services are exchanged costlessly 
through the market via price signals without the need for government intervention or 
central regulation. The idea that, under certain ideal conditions, markets will achieve 
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an economic efficient allocation on their own, was proposed by Adam Smith, the 
eighteenth century economist. He stated: 
"Every individual .... generally .... neither intends to promote the public interest, nor 
knows by how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that 
of foreign industry he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in 
such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own 
gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an 
end which was no part of his intention" [19] 
He claimed that prices act as an invisible hand which guide consumers and producers 
to an allocation of the economy's resources that is Pareto-efficient. Markets however 
will only achieve an efficient allocation of resources if certain ideal conditions exist. 
First, consumers and producers are price takers, which means that there are a large 
enough number to prevent any from affecting the market price by their own actions. 
Second, the service is homogenous, that is producers supply a reasonably standard 
product. Third, there is perfect information on the part of the consumer as to the 
quality and price of the services provided and the options available. Finally, there 
exist no barriers to market entry or exit so that there are no incentives for existing 
producers to collude. 
The question that remains is, do these ideal conditions hold true for health care 
markets? The simple answer is no. Thus, an unregulated market in health care will 
deviate from first-best allocations. The need for government intervention in the 
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market for health care to achieve second-best allocations can therefore be justified 
purely on economic grounds as Barr (1987) stated: 
"[Government intervention} does things which private markets for technical reasons 
either would not do at all or would do inefficiently. We need a welfare state of some 
sort for efficiency reasons, and would continue to do so if all distributional problems 
had been solved" [20]. 
The technical reasons that Barr was referring to are the sources of market failure. 
They can be divided into two groups, the lack of the preconditions required to achieve 
market efficiency and weaknesses inherent in the market. 
3.4.1 Lack of preconditions 
(a) Information asymmetry. 
Consumers do not have perfect knowledge either about their own health care needs or 
about the most efficient way there is of meeting those needs. Indeed, in health care, 
it would be inefficient for consumers to pursue perfect knowledge given the 
complexities and size of the medical information required to make a rational decision. 
Consumer choice would therefore be inefficient. However, the ignorance brought 
about by imperfect information is a characteristic of the consumer (the patient) not the 
producer (the practitioner). Practitioners therefore act as an agent on the patients 
behalf. If practitioners were perfect agents there would be no need for government 
regulation because practitioners would supply patients with all the relevant information 
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necessary for the patient to make an informed choice which would maximise their own 
welfare. There is evidence, however, that practitioners are not perfect agents [21], a 
fact that will cause an inefficient allocation of resources. There are two reasons why 
practitioners are not perfect agents. First, they have their own welfare function to 
maximise which may be in conflict with their patients. Second, they are not perfectly 
informed about the patient's health status or about the treatment options available. 
(b) Natural monopoly. 
Perfect competition requires producers to compete with each other on the basis of 
price. This conditions breaks down in health care where there are only a small 
number of producers who can affect the market price, known as a natural monopoly 
(that is, economies of scale can sustain only a small number of hospitals in the 
market). This can lead to high prices and inefficiency. 
(c) Barriers to market entry. 
In order to practice within health care a license must be obtained. This prevents 
unqualified practitioners from entering the market. If no such regulation existed 
unqualified practitioners would be allowed to practice, which could or would result in 
serious mistakes. This is further constrained by the existence of the medical 
profession who are able to control the market by limiting the number of entrants to 
their profession. 
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3.4.2 Weaknesses in the health care market: 
(a) Externalities. 
Externalities are the consequences, adverse or beneficial, of actions taken by 
individuals on others which are not accounted for in the market. A beneficial 
externality, for example immunisation, will benefit individuals other than those 
immunised because it will protect them from communicable diseases (an external 
benefit). However this external benefit is not taken into account in the market, which 
considers only private costs and benefits. Beneficial externalities will therefore be 
undersupplied. Adverse externalities, on the other hand, impose external costs on 
society which are again not taken into account in the market place. For example, a 
producer of a good that creates large quantities of pollution will sell the good at a 
price that does not include the external cost of those affected by the pollution. If this 
cost were taken into account in the price, less of the good would be produced. 
Adverse externalities will therefore be oversupplied in the market place. There are 
potentially a number of beneficial externalities in health care because people benefit 
from other individuals' consumption of health care. For example, consumption may 
prevent the spread of disease (a selfish externality) and some individuals would be 
willing to pay for poorer or sicker individuals to consume health care (a caring 
externality). A market will not take into account individuals' willingness to pay for 
these external benefits and this, therefore will lead to an undersupply of health care. 
Government intervention is required to take account of all costs and benefits, thereby 
maximising social welfare. 
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(b) Uncertainty. 
Consumers are uncertain as to when they will get ill, what type of health care they 
will need and how much that health care will cost. The market solution to risk is 
insurance. The problem however is that health care insurance markets fail for two 
reasons, moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard relates to the reckless 
behaviour of individuals brought about by insurance. Insured individuals face no 
direct costs of consuming health care as it is free at the point of use. This can lead 
to overconsumption of scarce resources and therefore high social costs. 
Adverse selection results from lack of information and information asymmetry in the 
insurance market. The insurance company is not aware of the risk category of the 
buyer and therefore will set a premium reflecting the 'average' risk level of the 
insured population. The low risk individuals will consider this premium as being too 
high and will therefore not take out insurance. This will cause the average risk of 
those insured to rise, and therefore the premiums to rise which will force lower risk 
individuals out of the insurance market. This process will continue, causing all the 
'best' risks to be selected out of the insured group. Again the market has failed to 
allocate health care resources efficiently [22]. 
Given that markets fail to allocate resources efficiently in health care what is the most 
efficient way to organise health care: through the market; through central regulation; 
or a combination of both? Donaldson (1993) states: 
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"The basic reasoning underlying extensive government intervention in health care, 
however, is that none of the ideal assumptions of perfect markets work in the case of 
health care. Thus, market failure in the allocation of health care is so complete that 
extensive government intervention is more likely to result in the achievement of societal 
objectives than are market forces supplemented by minimal government intervention" 
[23]. 
The answer appears to be to maximise government intervention and minimise market 
forces. Countries do, however, differ in their opinion as to the extent of government 
intervention. Some countries have opted for public production of health care which 
to a large extent supersedes the market. Others have opted for subsidies which aim 
to correct market failure but allows the market still to operate. Before the 1991 NHS 
reforms, the health service was financed and provided as a public institution. This 
protected individuals from imperfect knowledge by the provision of services free at 
the point of use, provided by informed practitioners paid by the government and 
therefore having no incentives to overtreat. With the 1991 NHS reforms, the financing 
of health care is still provided publicly largely through general taxation but market 
forces have been introduced into the provision of health care. What effect has this 
had? 
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3.5 Economic evaluation of the reforms 
While the theoretical literature on the potential effects of introducing provider 
competition on the efficiency and equity of health care systems is extensive, empirical 
evidence is largely lacking despite the 1990s becoming the decade for radical health 
care reform in many industrialised nations [24]. This is predominantly due to the 
difficulty of evaluating the effects of provider competition in the short-term. It is 
considered that in order to assess the impact on efficiency and equity a longer-term 
perspective is required. In addition, the British government has hindered evaluation 
of the reforms. They not only introduced provider competition into the NHS without 
piloting it first but they also denied the need to set up national monitoring systems to 
evaluate systematically the reforms. 
I t is not surprising therefore that when market forces were introduced into the NHS 
it provoked a wide ranging debate. Some observers suggested that if the environment 
was one of managed provider competition and the right balance between competition 
and regulation was struck then efficiency and equity would be enhanced [25-29]. 
Others contradicted this tenet, stressing that a health service which combined 
characteristics of a market with those of central regulation risked getting the worst of 
both worlds [30,31]. Others highlighted the fact that the characteristics required for 
a competitive market were not likely to be found in health care, and that therefore the 
theoretical benefits of increased efficiency brought about by a market-based system 
would not accrue [32-36]. They criticised the way in which the theory of provider 
competition was translated into the health care system. The speed of implementation 
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was thought to be over-ambitious and the lack of experimentation harmful. 
The reason for such diverse opinions has partly been the lack of empirical evidence. 
Results of studies evaluating the reforms started to emerge only two years after their 
inception and, inevitably, many reported little actual change [37]. The evaluations of 
the reforms that have been carried out to date will now be reviewed, from the point 
of view of assessing the effect of introducing provider competition on productive 
efficiency, allocative efficiency and equity. 
3.5.1 Productive efficiency 
One of the primary objectives of the reforms was to increase competition between 
providers in the hope of obtaining services at reduced cost. It was envisaged that the 
necessary incentives to improve efficiency would be brought about by the separation 
of responsibility for purchasing (demand side) and providing (supply side) health 
services [38]. Prices would act as a signalling devise to both purchasers and 
providers, as in all markets, to determine the optimal allocation of society's resources. 
Prior to the implementation of the reforms there were large variations in the use of 
beds and other resources [39]. The potential for achieving efficiency gains through 
the contracting process was therefore thought possible [33]. However, any potential 
for enhancing productive efficiency seem to have been counterbalanced by market 
failures and the government's misguided attempts at regulation [40]. 
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As stated above, there are various forms of market failure in health care which prevent 
the optimal allocation of health care resources including imperfect competition, 
imperfect information and barriers to market entry and exit. Productive efficiency will 
only increase if relatively high cost providers face the necessary incentives to improve 
their cost-effectiveness. In a perfectly competitive market this is achieved by the 
existence of a large number of buyers and sellers, none of whom can control the 
market price. However, in the NHS local monopolies may exist because of traditional 
NHS service planning, which was deliberately designed to avoid the duplication of 
services and take advantage of economies of scale. 
Despite the characteristics of perfectly competitive markets not being present in health 
care, Baumol has suggested that the benefits of perfect competition could still be 
achieved if the market was at least contestable [41]. A contestable market is one 
where there is a potential threat of new entrants into the market. It was considered 
unlikely that contestability exists in health care markets because of the presence of 
large sunk costsS, specific assets6 and associated set-up costs which create barriers to 
market exit and entry [42,43]. It has been suggested that a way around this problem 
would be to apply the concept of contestability to hospital management teams rather 
than the hospitals themselves. Contracting would take the form of bidding for a 
franchise to run the hospital, though this could have a disruptive effect on clinical staff 
and long-term patient care if there was a high turnover of management teams [43]. 
5 Sunk costs are any expenditure on inputs, such as machinery, which are 
irretrievable. They cannot be used for any other purposes or easily resold. 
6 Specific assets are defined as those assets which are to a large degree non-
redeploy able and therefore cannot be used for other purposes. 
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It was assumed that for provider competition to be successful in enhancing productive 
efficiency purchasers must be able to make cost and quality comparisons between 
providers to ensure providers are operating efficiently. Those who are operating 
inefficiently and charging an excessive price for their services will be forced out of 
the market. However, information on the costs, quantity and quality of the service 
required for the contracting process to work effectively is far from complete. If 
purchasers cannot distinguish an efficient provider from an inefficient one through data 
on costs and quality then there is scope for providers to cut costs at the expense of 
quality [43]. 
The government recognised that the health care market was unlikely to enhance 
productive efficiency without some form of government intervention. They decided 
that the best way to control for monopolistic tendencies in the health care market and 
the lack of accurate information was to set a number of guidelines around the costing 
and pricing of contracts [44-48]. They imposed several regulations on the market. 
First, NHS providers were to be non-pro fit-making organisations and were therefore 
governed by an explicit break-even constraint. Second, NHS providers were subject 
to the requirement that contract prices must equate with average cost. 
These rules aimed both to prevent providers from making excess profits and to 
improve the quality of information by standardising cost accounting procedures used 
in setting prices. However, it was argued by Dawson (1994) that the government had 
set regulations that were not appropriate to health care markets [49]. She stated that 
the framework chosen 'is one of suppliers setting unique prices for each procedure 
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and buyers choosing the quantity to purchase at that price. This model is appropriate 
in markets with large numbers of buyers who are price takers. This is clearly not the 
type of market to be found in the NHS and it is doubtful if regulators could enforce 
behaviour that is so contrary to the incentives generated in competitive markets with 
small numbers of participants'. It was also argued that if providers were in a 
monopoly position in the market then the regulation would do nothing to prevent 
providers from internalising any surpluses in the form of inefficiencies (X-
inefficiency), for example inefficient management of resources. Incentives to enhance 
productive efficiency would therefore be absent [50]. 
The existence and measurement of the extent of monopoly power therefore became a 
crucial issue. One method used by the National Association of Health Authorities and 
Trusts to assess market structure was the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index [51,52]. They 
applied this index to general surgery in the West Midlands and found that the market 
was far more competitive than had been expected. General surgery is, however, 
universally provided in all acute general hospitals. The extent of competition for a 
speciality like cardiac surgery which is provided only in a small number of tertiary 
centres cannot be expected to be as high. Edwards and Townsend (1980) suggested 
the need to define the degree of market concentration for each service rather than for 
the provider as a whole [53]. Instead of providers not facing the threat of potential 
new entrants, due to large sunk costs and set up costs, there may be a threat from 
those providers setting up alternative services. They would be a substitute for rather 
than complementary to services provided by existing providers, such as GPs offering 
primary care based services. 
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Observers of the reforms reviewed the impact of other factors which may have 
affected productive efficiency in the NRS. These included the problems of clinical 
compliance and the lack of contractual obligations. It was envisaged that clinical 
decision-making and compliance with the contracting system would determine 
productive efficiency [32]. The Resource Management Initiative and the growth of 
medical audit were thought to be central to achieving greater awareness in practitioners 
regarding the costs and benefits of their clinical decisions and in this way efficiency 
would be increased. 
The fact that contracts are not legally binding has been argued to be a severely 
debilitating factor in the pursuit of greater efficiency [30] as it can lead to opportunism 
[54]. One survey showed that 38% of DRAs renegotiated contracts because hospitals 
over-performed [52]. Another found that in 90% of contracts, actual volumes varied 
from contracted volumes. In those that over-performed 72% renegotiated the contract 
[10]. The lack of contractual obligations can lead to either side trying to 'game the 
system' which is made possible because of the existence of information asymmetry. 
Providers are able to select patients who are low risk and therefore low cost. 
Purchasers can refer high risk (and therefore high cost) patients to providers within 
block contracts. There are many other forms of opportunism. Providers can attempt 
to shift costs from competitive services (e.g elective surgery) to non-competitive 
services where costs are guaranteed (e.g accident and emergency services). Providers 
also have the incentive of using services for which they enjoy a monopoly to cross-
subsidise other less profitable, competitive services. The lack of adequate monitoring 
makes these 'illegal' manoeuvres possible. 
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One solution to this problem pursued by the government has been the development of 
a system for coding and pricing groups of treatments. The National Casemix Office 
has developed a set of Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs) which group data on 
treatments into comprehensive "iso-cost" packages of care. By 1997 all DHAs should 
be pricing specialities at HRG level and this will allow a more accurate understanding 
of providers' service costs. The danger of shifting costs would however still exist in 
the form of HRG creep, which would involve the provider shifting the patients to the 
most profitable category. 
3.5.2 Allocative efficiency 
The reforms sought to improve allocative efficiency by separating purchasing from 
provision. Many of the issues discussed above regarding market failure hindering the 
achievement of greater productive efficiency will also impede improvements in 
allocative efficiency. For example, the potential existence of monopoly providers and 
the lack of comparative price and quality information will cause market prices to 
become distorted. Purchasers will not therefore be in a position to choose the most 
efficient provider. Under these circumstances prices cannot act as a guide for 
determining an optimal allocation of health care resources. 
The reforms, by separating purchasing from provision and by allowing GPs to hold 
budgets, created a purchasing function that encouraged concentration on the health 
needs of the population. This, it was argued, would make resource allocation 
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decisions more explicit and would make purchasers more critical about the care they 
bought [33]. An improvement in allocative efficiency was thought to be possible if 
purchasers were successful in avoiding 'bad buy's (health care which is inappropriate) 
rather than avoiding 'bad risks' (health care which is expensive) [32]. However, the 
reforms created a system which was initially concerned largely with cost, in which the 
scarcity of resources became more apparent. In theory, the incentives to avoid 'bad 
risks' was high, especially in the case of OP fundholding [55]. A recent study 
concluded, however, that there was no evidence of OPFHs only accepting healthier 
patients on to their practice lists (cream skimming), mainly because they are not 
responsible for paying for treatments which exceed £6,000 [56]. 
Improvements in allocative efficiency require a redistribution of resources to achieve 
greater improvements in health with the limited resources available. However 
resources are largely immobile. If a purchaser switches a contract for a particular 
service from one provider to another, it reduces the workload in the initial provider 
which can have the effect of raising the average cost [57]. In one example when non-
local purchasers decided to place their contracts elsewhere, average costs in the local 
provider escalated and the financial viability of the service was jeopardised, even 
though local purchasers were still having to use the service due to a lack of alternative 
providers [58]. 
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3.5.3 Equity 
Improving equity was not one of the explicit objectives of the reforms. It was 
intended that the introduction of provider competition would improve equity indirectly 
by increasing efficiency and by tailoring services to population needs. There is little 
evidence to suggest that greater equity has or will be achieved. 
The fundamental equity problem that has arisen is due to GPFHs. Providers have 
found it increasingly difficult to treat patients equally on the basis of clinical need. 
For example when funds for block contracts have been exhausted and cost and volume 
contracts completed, providers have found they were unable to treat those patient on 
the waiting list even if they had a high clinical urgency, but they were able to treat 
patients in less need who came from GPFHs or purchasers whose contracts were not 
yet completed [59]. This then seems to have created a system where access is on the 
basis of ability to pay not on the basis of clinical need. As resources could be 
redistributed to produce greater health benefits, this problem is one of efficiency as 
well. 
3.6. Summary 
Welfare economics provides valuable insights into the optimal allocation of resources. 
It considers social welfare as having two dimensions, those of economic efficiency and 
distributional justice. These two criteria involve predicting or analysing how changes 
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in resource allocation brought about by government policy effects social welfare. It 
is these criteria that were adopted in this study to analyse the effect of the reforms 
(Table 3.1). Predominantly, the analysis is concerned with efficiency, both productive 
and allocative. Equity, in terms of equal access for equal need, is used to describe the 
distributional aspects of the reforms. However, in situations where equity is found to 
be a concern, the concern is also an efficiency one and involves no trade-offs between 
the two objectives. 
(1) Assessment Criteria 
• Productive efficiency: 
• Allocative efficiency: 
(2) Descriptive Criteria 
• Horizontal equity: 
Table 3.1 : THE CRITERIA 
Efficiency 
Coronary revascularisation services should be 
provided so as to achieve maximum output at least 
cost. 
Coronary revascularisation services should be 
expanded in all areas to the point where marginal 
benefits equal marginal costs. 
Equity 
Coronary revascularisation services should be 
provided so as to achieve equal access for equal 
need. 
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A perfectly competitive market would achieve an efficient allocation of resources 
under certain ideal conditions. However, as these conditions do not exist in health 
care markets, first-best allocations cannot be achieved. Sources of market failure 
include information asymmetry, natural monopoly, barriers to market entry, 
externalities and uncertainty. Government intervention is therefore required to correct 
for these market failures in order to achieve second-best allocations. Although there 
is an abundance of literature assessing the potential effect of the reforms on efficiency 
and equity there are few empirical studies. This thesis aims to start to fill this gap by 
applying these criteria to empirical evidence on one specific area of health care, 
coronary revascularisation services. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CORONARY REV ASCULARISATION 
PROCEDURES 
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4.1 Introduction 
Coronary artery bypass grafting (CAB G) and percutaneous transluminal coronary 
angioplasty (PTCA), known collectively as coronary revascularisation procedures, are 
the two invasive interventions for coronary heart disease (CHD). The objectives of 
this chapter are to: (1) outline briefly the epidemiology and cost of CHD; (2) describe 
the trends in the provision of CABG and PTCA and explore the reasons behind those 
trends; (3) assess the need for revascularisation services; (4) review the literature on 
the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of CABG and PTCA; and (5) discuss the 
recent developments in monitoring outcomes and improving the quality of patient care. 
4.2 Epidemiology and cost of CHD 
CHD is a major cause of mortality and morbidity in England. In 1991 it accounted 
for 149,498 deaths in England and Wales, being 27% of annual mortality from all 
causes. Although the death rate from CHD has been declining slowly since the early 
1970s, the greatest reductions being amongst men aged between 45 and 50 [60], it 
remains one of the highest in the world [61]. 
The Welsh Heart Survey and the British Regional Heart Study estimated that 25% of 
middle-aged men show some evidence of heart disease, amounting to 1.74 million 
cases under the age of 65 in England & Wales [62]. The prevalence of CHD in 
women is approximately the same as that found in men ten years their senior [63]. 
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For purchasers, CHD comes high on the public agenda as the burden of CHD spans 
both the primary care and hospital sectors. In a typical district, with a population of 
500,000, there will be at least 1,275 acute myocardial infarctions and 5700 patients 
presenting with angina per year, 8-13% of whom will be referred by their GP to a 
cardiologist. A total of 600-900 patients will be assessed by cardiologists as 
potentially suitable for coronary revascularisation and approximately 540 angiograms, 
75 PTCAs and 150 CABGs will be undertaken [64]. 
The cost of CHD is considerable. Service provision for CHD spans a broad range of 
areas including specialist cardiologist services, inpatient and outpatient hospital care, 
general and paramedical services, and continuing care facilities. It also impinges on 
primary care and community care services. In terms of direct health service 
expenditure 2.5% is spent on cardiovascular disease [65] with an estimated £500 
million (in 1987) attributable to the treatment of CHD per annum [66]. 
Treatments for CHD are costly. CABG and PTCA have been costed at £7685 and 
£6208 respectively over two years (1993/94 prices) [67]. Demand for these 
procedures is continuing to rise [68,69], despite the fall in the prevalence of CHD. 
If these trends continue, treatments for CHD will constitute an ever increasing 
proportion of purchasers' budgets. 
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4.3 Trends in provision 
CABG was introduced by Favaloro in 1967 and has been the main surgical treatment 
of CHD since the 1970s [70]. The aims of the intervention are to prolong life, prevent 
myocardial infarction, relieve angina and improve quality of life. The technique 
involves using part of a vein or artery from elsewhere in the patient's body to bypass 
an arterial constriction with the aim of complete revascularisation of the myocardium. 
Vein grafts are limited by the high rate of occlusion in the grafted vessels. Arterial 
grafts, which are associated with reduced rates of occlusion, are used more frequently 
now. 
PTCA is a relatively new intervention which is rapidly evolving and was developed 
by Andreas GrUntzig in 1977 as an alternative to bypass surgery in patients with less 
severe disease [71]. The procedure involves penetration of the skin (percutaneous), 
passing a catheter along arteries (transluminal), and moulding of the vessel constriction 
(angioplasty) for the purpose of improving the blood flow in those arteries thickened 
with atherosclerosis. It became accepted as part of routine clinical practice in the UK 
in the late 1980s and is increasingly favoured over CABG for treating some types of 
angina because its less traumatic, has a better recovery response, and a lower initial 
cost. PTCA should only be performed when and where surgery is immediately 
available. 
Utilisation rates for CABG and PTCA have increased dramatically since they were 
first introduced and wide international and national variations have been found. In the 
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USA the rate of CABG per million population increased from about 700 in 1981 to 
over 1,000 in 1990. In 1990, the Canadian rate was about half the US rate [72]. In 
the UK the rate is much lower having risen to only 278 per million by 1990 [73] from 
a rate of 107 per million population in 1982 [74]. These marked international 
differences also apply to PTCA. In 1985 the rate of PTCA in the US was 452 per 
million compared to only 29 per million in the UK [75]. The UK rate rose to 168 per 
million by 1991 [76] while the US rate increased to 1,317 per million [64]. Rates in 
other European countries lie between the US and UK rate. Wide variations have also 
been demonstrated between regions of the United Kingdom [74,75], and within North 
America [72,77,78]. It should be noted that many of these studies were inexact as 
they did not identify patient flows outside the defined area of study or did not take 
private and non-resident use into account, as the routine information systems did not 
include these data. 
4.3.1 Reasons for an increase in demand 
There are a number of possible explanations for the increase in demand for coronary 
revascularisations. First, with the diffusion of more advanced techniques and an 
increase in operator skill, which has resulted in lower operative mortality and 
morbidity, clinicians are now performing revascularisations on patients who would 
have previously not been considered suitable for surgery. More elderly and more 
female patients are being referred [79]. The interventions have also been extended to 
include patients with more severe disease [80,81]. 
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Second, there has been a trend towards a more rigorous approach to the investigation 
of patients with CHD using non-invasive techniques resulting in more referrals. The 
safety of coronary angiography has also been established, creating a greater willingness 
for physicians to refer patients [82]. Third, although PTCA was introduced as an 
alternative to CABG there has not been a transfer of patients between the procedures 
with a subsequent decline in the demand for CABG. There are a number of possible 
explanations for this. Clinicians are more likely to refer patients for intervention now 
a less invasive procedure is available than when surgery was the only option [82]. 
This has contributed to the increase in the rate of coronary angiograms which in turn 
has identified more patients who would benefit from CABG. PTCA may also have 
caused an increase in the number of repeat revascularisations because of the problem 
of rest enos is [83,84]. Finally, those patients undergoing PICA are thought to be those 
who would previously have been medically managed rather than those suitable for 
CABG. 
4.3.2 Factors causing geographical variations 
Reasons for intranational and international variations in utilisation rates include: 
statistical factors (data inaccuracy, random variation); supply factors (variations in the 
availability of health care facilities, differences in clinical judgement); and demand 
factors (differences in the sociodemographic composition of the patient populations, 
variation in the behaviour of patients). Observed variations suggest that differences 
in clinical judgement exist and that there only partial consensus regarding criteria for 
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use of coronary revascularisation procedures. Variations could therefore partly be 
caused by inappropriate intervention [85]. 
A method to assess whether inappropriate use of these procedures can explain 
variations in rates of use was developed by the RAND Corporation in the USA. The 
method involves applying criteria for the appropriate use of a procedure, that have 
previously been developed by a panel of physicians and surgeons, retrospectively to 
cases in specific hospitals or regions. CABG was one of the first procedures for 
which criteria were derived through this process [86]. 
Inappropriate use has been found both in areas of high utilisation (America) and low 
utilisation (Britain). There was, however, a striking difference in the views of doctors 
in the two countries. British clinicians considered 35% of CABGs done in America 
were inappropriate whereas US clinicians considered only 17% to be inappropriate 
[87]. Even in an area of the UK with low activity, inappropriate use was found by 
both UK and US clinicians (16% and 7%) though the level was much lower than in 
high rate areas [88,89]. It seems therefore that inappropriate use contributes to but 
does not account for all the international differences in utilisation rates. 
In contrast, studies comparing high and low rate areas within North America have 
found little difference in inappropriate rates. They concluded that little of the 
variation in rates could be explained by the level of inappropriate surgery [90-92]. 
Similar conclusions have been made for other medical and surgical procedures [93-95]. 
A model put forward by the RAND Corporation based on these results, proposed that 
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variation in rates could largely be explained by underuse of interventions in low use 
areas rather than differences in criteria for intervention and inappropriate procedures 
in high use areas. 
The techniques used in these studies have, however, increasingly been questioned 
[96,97]. There remain a number of unanswered questions as to why revascularisation 
rates vary, especially in the UK where few studies have been conducted. The use of 
these procedures is evidently a product of a complex process. Consideration is also 
needed of all the steps leading up to revascularisation, that is, from the illness 
behaviour of sufferers and the identification of the disease by general practitioners 
through angiography to the intervention itself. 
4.4 An assessment of need 
Several approaches used to determine the need for and hence the appropriate level of 
revascularisation services shall be discussed. They include angiographic surveys, 
waiting list censuses, use of appropriateness criteria, consensus conferences and 
international comparisons. 
Determining the need for coronary revascularisation services ideally involves an 
assessment of the extent of coronary artery disease in a population. However this 
would require angiographic surveys. Such surveys would be unethical as angiography 
is an invasive procedure with an associated risk of mortality. An alternative estimation 
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of need could be obtained from a survey based on non-invasive tests, for example 
exercise electrocardiograms [98]. This however has not been done in the UK. 
Given the difficulty and cost associated with assessing need based on non-invasive 
tests, a number of other approaches can be used. Studies in other conditions have 
used waiting lists to indicate the level of need [99]. Clinicians may, however, admit 
patients to the waiting list who do not need the intervention. This has been 
demonstrated by the studies done on appropriateness discussed earlier. When using 
waiting lists there is therefore a need to analyse waiting lists to ensure that only 
patients who can benefit from treatment are included. 
Another approach to determine the right rate of use that has been suggested was to 
find an area where utilisation was deemed to be appropriate as measured against a 
defined set of appropriateness criteria [100]. The rate found in this area could be 
adopted nationally. Surrey, an area of low incidence of CHD, matched these criteria 
and had a rate of CABG at 470 per million. It was suggested that this be the 
minimum rate set nationally [79]. The problem with this approach is that 
appropriateness criteria were not questioned and the definition of need for intervention 
is dependent of the level of supply of services. 
An estimation of need and appropriate level of use can be determined by a consensus 
conference. This method was used by a King's Fund consensus conference in 1984 
to determine a target level for CABG. The process was limited by the lack of data 
on the epidemiology of CHD. Revascularisation rates in other countries, especially 
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the US, were considered. A target of 300 CABGs per million was proposed [101] and 
achievement of this by 1990 was later adopted by the Government [102]. 
Further analysis of international trends have led to recommendations for the British 
government to update the current UK target for CABGs and to set a specific target for 
PTCA. The Third Joint Report from the Royal College of Physicians of London and 
the Royal College of Surgeons of England estimated an annual requirement of 400-500 
PTCAs and CABGs per million [103]. However it was suggested that this figure 
should apply to CABG, with a need for PTCA in addition [79]. The Fourth Joint 
Report from the Royal Colleges estimated that this additional requirement should be 
in the order of300 per million [104]. Targets set by the professionals do not represent 
endorsements as the methods by which they were derived can be considered arbitrary. 
They do however serve as a guide. 
4.5 Evaluation of coronary revascularisation procedures 
4.5.1 Effectiveness 
Three large randomised controlled trials (RCTs) showed CABG to be a highly 
effective treatment for the relief of chronic disabling angina and for improving long-
term survival in patients who had not responded to medical treatment in whom 
angiograms showed three-vessel disease or disease of the left-main artery. Quality of 
life was also improved but the risk of an acute myocardial infarction was not reduced 
[105-108]. A meta-analysis [109] of all appropriately randomised trials of stable 
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coronary heart disease [105,110-114] confirmed these results with respect to survival 
by demonstrating that the difference in survival, between those treated medically and 
those treated surgically, was greater in patients with more extensive coronary artery 
disease, defined by the severity of the coronary anatomy (left main stem, three-vessel 
and left anterior descending disease). Other risk factors, including poor left ventricular 
function, a history of myocardial infarction, a positive exercise test and age, were not 
found to affect survival separately but in combination they were found to have an 
effect. 
There has only been one major RCT comparmg medical therapy with surgical 
treatment for patients with unstable coronary heart disease [115-117]. It showed that 
CABO offered more effective relief of angina and improved survival in patients with 
poor left ventricular function, severe angina at rest and three-vessel disease. 
The results of these trials, however, must be treated with caution as they were 
performed in the 1970s and operative techniques have now changed [118]. The trials 
were also highly selective about the patients included. Generalising about the results 
into present day settings is not necessarily appropriate. 
Although observational studies are potentially hampered by selection bias they are 
useful for supplementing the results of RCTs because of their less restricted selection 
of patients and longer follow-up. One such study [119] reported similar findings to 
those of the meta-analysis of RCTs. Survival was significantly improved in patients 
with severe coronary disease (left main stem and three-vessel disease). They also 
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found that risk factors such as older age, severe or unstable angina, and poor left 
ventricular function did not individually affect survival but were important 
considerations when combined into an overall risk. The study also found that results 
of surgery improved progressively over time due to improved surgical techniques. 
The selection criteria and survival of patients receiving CABO compared to those 
receiving medical therapy in the RCTs and the observational study are summarised in 
Table 4.1. The general conclusions which can be drawn are that it is likely that 
surgery will improve survival in patients with left main stem and three-vessel disease. 
Other patients demonstrating improved survival were those with poor left ventricular 
function, unstable angina, old age, history of myocardial infarction and positive 
exercise test results. 
With respect to PTCA, one trial has demonstrated that PTCA offered better relief of 
angina for people with single-vessel disease than medical treatment but at a higher cost 
and with a greater chance of complications [120]. A second trial, RITA II, is also 
comparing PTCA with medical therapy, however no results have yet been published 
[121]. 
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Table 4.1: Patient characteristics. five-year mortality and subgroups showing the 
greatest survival gains from CABG included in randomised controlled 
trials (RCTs) and an observational study. 
RCTs for patients ReT for patients Observational study 
with stable angina: with unstable angina [119] 
meta-analysis [109] [l15-1 17] 
Patient characteristics 
I. Age < 65 < 70 All ages 
2. Sex 96.8% Male 100% Male 81% Male 
3. Angina 
No angina 11.2% -
Class I or II 53.8% - 16% 
Class III or IV 35.0% 100% 84% 
4. Ejection fraction 19.7% EF < 50% 28.0% EF < 50% NA 
5. Previous MI 59.6% 42.2% 56.3% 
6. Vessels involved 
Single 10.2% 18.7% 20.7% 
2-vessel 32.4% 34.9% 29.0% 
3-vessel 50.6% 46.4% 42.0% 
Left main stem 6.8% 
-
8.3% 
7. Smokers 83.5% 46.0% 72.5% 
Mortality (5 year) Medical 15.8% Medical 19.0% Medical 20.0% 
CABG 10.2% CABG 16.0% CABG 12.0% 
Subgroups showing (1) Left main stem (1) Severe rest (1) Left main stem 
greatest survival gains disease angina disease 
from CABG (2) Three-vessel (2) Three-vessel (2) Three-vessel 
disease disease disease 
(3) Left anterior (3) Poor left (3) High overall risk 
descending disease ventricular function (defined by old age, 
(4) High overall unstable angina, 
risk (defined by poor left ventricular 
poor left ventricular function) 
function, history of 
MI, positive 
exercise test, old 
age) 
NA, not available. MI, myocardial infarction. EF, ejection fraction 
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The final issue relates to the relative benefits of CABG and PTCA. Several RCTs and 
non-randomised studies have compared the two interventions [64]. A number of major 
trials are currently being conducted comparing the relative effectiveness of PTCA and 
CABG [122]. The protocols of each of these studies vary greatly reflecting 
differences in practice. Patients with one-vessel disease are excluded from all trials 
except the UK Randomised Intervention Treatment for Angina (RITA) trial [123], due 
to the widely held but unproven view that PTCA is the treatment choice for this set 
of patients. All trials exclude patients with left main stem disease. There is less 
agreement about the selection of patients with multi-vessel disease. 
Only two have published interim results. The RITA trial has reported that, after a two 
year follow-up of 1011 randomised patients, there were no differences in survival or 
in the rate of myocardial infarction between the two groups. Recovery after CABG 
took longer than after PTCA, though CABG led to less risk of angina and fewer 
additional diagnostic and therapeutic interventions. The follow-up will continue for 
at least five years [124]. The Argentinian randomised trial (ERACI) reported that 
after one year 84% of patients undergoing CABG were free of cardiac events 
compared to only 64% of PTCA patients. Furthermore 32% of PTCA patients 
required a repeat procedure compared to only 3% of CABG patients [125]. 
The as yet limited evidence available from the trials regarding the effectiveness of 
angioplasty can be supplemented by information obtained from several non-randomised 
studies [126,127]. There is a consensus that for patients with single vessel disease 
PTCA is preferable and for patients with left main stem disease CABG is preferable. 
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One review stated that the primary success rate and the rate of restenosis are the 
principal factors limiting PICA's effectiveness [126]. An estimated 20-30% of 
patients undergoing angioplasty develop restenosis [128], a problem that remains 
largely unsolved. 
Angioplasty is a relatively new intervention, therefore the problem of changing 
technology is greater than for CABO. As a result, evaluations of its effectiveness 
from experimental and observational data may be out of date by the time they are 
published and may not apply to newer PICA techniques such as the use of lasers and 
intra-coronary stents. 
4.5.2 Effects of waiting on effectiveness 
In the NHS, universal access to health care is free at the point of use. However since 
the demand for health care exceeds the available medical resources, a system of 
rationing becomes unavoidable. The explicit form of rationing in the UK has been 
queuing on waiting lists. Patients are not denied access to health care, but access is 
temporarily delayed. No research has demonstrated that delaying surgery adversely 
affects outcome. It is not known whether waiting is associated with increased 
preoperative or postoperative mortality or morbidity. 
For some groups of patients access to surgery is delayed indefinitely, by not allowing 
them to use the service at all. In the US, the poor [129], women [130], and ethnic 
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minorities [131], have less access to cardiac surgery than the rest of the population. 
Such inequities have also been found in the UK for women [132] and individuals 
living in areas of high deprivation [133] and explicit denial of patients who smoke has 
been suggested [134]. Reasons for inequitable use may relate to the attitudes and 
behaviour of clinicians, patients or both. Again it is not known if denying certain 
groups of patients access to care affects the overall benefits derived from treatment. 
Some studies have found that some patients die while waiting for surgery though the 
cause of these deaths does not necessarily relate to the delay itself. One study 
conducted in South West Thames (1979-88) found that 2.4% of patients referred to 
NHS hospitals died while waiting for surgery, while no deaths occurred among those 
referred to private hospitals [135]. A European study, conducted in The Netherlands, 
found a similar death rate (2.2%) in its study population [136]. In the Canadian 
province of Ontario only 1 % of patients died while waiting [137]. The relationship 
between waiting and morbidity is also poorly researched. Long waiting times have 
been found to be associated with an increase in the psychosocial burden of disease on 
patients [138,139], greater costs to patients [139] and a reduction in the ability to 
return to work [140,141]. It has been suggested that delaying surgery in some patients 
may lead to a destabilisation of symptoms and thereby increasing the risk of operative 
mortality [137]. 
The case-control study conducted in the Netherlands identified a set of risk factors 
which were associated with mortality while waiting [136]. Patients at high risk of 
short-term mortality were found to be those with evidence of cardiac enlargement on 
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chest X-ray, a positive exercise test, coumarin treatment, unstable angina, left main 
stem disease and three-vessel disease. Poor left-ventricular function was found to be 
associated with an increased risk of mortality but was not an independent variable. 
Another study, conducted in Ontario, found that patients with left main stem disease 
were three times more likely to die while waiting than other patients [137]. 
4.5.3 Costs and Cost-Effectiveness 
Economic studies comparing CABG and PTCA with medical therapy are very poor 
and most only relate to cost differences. Comparison of costs of CABG with medical 
therapy have shown that one year costs for medical therapy were only a third of 
CABG costs [142]. However, CABG patients had higher event-free survival and 
quality of life, suggesting less difference as regards cost-effectiveness [143]. 
Comparison of the costs of PTCA and medical therapy found that PTCA was three 
times more expensive than medical therapy initially, rising to five times more 
expensive after one year due to the high follow-up costs [144]. 
The comparative cost-effectiveness of PTCA and CABG is influenced by several 
factors: PTCA is initially cheaper to perform, has a shorter length of hospital stay and 
patients are able to return to work more quickly than CABG patients. PTCA, 
however, has higher reintervention rates. Analyses must therefore assess the frequency 
and the cost of the reintervention rate for those interventions that fail or where 
restenosis of the arteries occurs requiring a repeat procedure. One study which 
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assessed the comparative costs of PTCA and CABG found that PTCA was cheaper 
than CABG, but suffered from higher reintervention rates (29% compared to 2%) 
which reduced the apparent cost difference [144]. 
Few of the studies comparing costs of CABG and PTCA have been based on RCTs 
[144-152]. There are two exceptions. The Argentinian randomised trial found that 
the initial cost of PTCA was 33% that of CABG but increased to 54% at one year 
[125]. The RITA trial has recently reported the health service costs of the two 
procedures at two years. The initial cost of PTCA (£3467) was only 52% that of 
CABG (£6628) but after two years this increased to 80% (£6208 and £7685). The 
reduction in the cost difference was due to the higher rate of reintervention, diagnostic 
tests and drug use in PTCA patients [67]. A factor which will decrease the cost 
advantage of PTCA even further is that PTCA may precipitate infarction or other 
complications which then require immediate bypass surgery. Estimates of the 
proportion of patients undergoing PTCA who require emergency surgery vary from 
4% to 21 % [153]. 
There have been few attempts to compare the cost-effectiveness of coronary 
revascularisations with other treatments in terms of cost per life year gained or per 
quality adjusted life year gained (QAL Y). Assessing the relative cost-effectiveness of 
these procedures against other interventions is essential if purchasers are to allocate 
resources between competing needs in the most cost-effective way. Studies which 
have attempted to construct league tables using cost per QAL Y data have shown that 
for patients undergoing CABG, the cost-effectiveness varies with the severity of the 
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disease. In patients with severe angina and left main disease, CABG cost £2,090 per 
QAL Y gained in 1990, whereas for a patient with moderate angina and single vessel 
disease the cost per QAL Y gained was £18,830 (Table 4.2). It should be noted that 
the use of the QAL Y is open to substantial criticism because of the underlying 
assumptions. They are, however, a useful guide to the relative magnitudes involved 
when making decisions based on the cost-effectiveness of different interventions. 
Table 4.2: Cost/OAL Y of competing treatments 
Treatment CostlQALY 
(£ Aug 1990) 
Cholesterol testing and diet therapy only (all adults aged 40-69) 220 
Advise from GP to stop smoking 270 
Neurosurgical intervention for subarachnoid haemorrhage 490 
Anti-hypertensive treatment to prevent stroke (ages 45-64) 940 
Pacemaker implantation 1,100 
Hip replacement 1,180 
Valve replacement for aortic stenosis 1,190 
Cholesterol testing and treatment 1,480 
CABG (left main stem disease, severe angina) 2,090 
Kidney transplant 4,710 
Breast cancer screening 5,780 
Heart transplantation 7,840 
Cholesterol testing and treatment of all adults aged 25-39 14,150 
CABG (single vessel disease, moderate angina) 18,830 
Continuous ambulatory peritoneal dialysis 19,870 
Erthropoietin treatment for anaemia in dialysis patients 54,380 
Neurosurgical intervention for malignant intracranial tumours 107,780 
Source: Gunnell 1994 [64J 
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4.6 Recent developments in improving effectiveness 
The introduction to the NHS of contracting has emphasised the need for health care 
providers to demonstrate the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of their services. For 
purchasers evaluation of services is high on the agenda as demographic change, new 
costly medical technologies and growing public expectations place increasing pressure 
on their budgets. The need to ensure that a high quality, cost-effective package of 
care has been secured for their resident population has never before been so apparent. 
This has brought about an increase in the use of clinical audit and the subsequent 
development of clinical guidelines to ensure that care is both appropriate and effective. 
4.6.1 Clinical Audit 
The recent focus of coronary revascularisation services has been on monitoring 
outcomes. This involves the comparison of operative results, generally in terms of 
mortality, against accepted standards of care. Mortality has been the most commonly 
used measure of outcome because it is an important performance indicator in heart 
surgery. is easy to measure and is more often available than other measures of 
outcome. There is a consensus among health care professionals that if mortality is to 
be used both to assess the quality of patient care within hospitals and to make 
meaningful comparisons between hospitals, the measure must be accurately risk 
adjusted [154]. 
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Risk adjustment aims to account for the effect specific patient-related risk factors have 
on outcomes by stratifying patients into risk groups before comparisons of outcomes 
are made. Risk-adjusted actual (or observed) mortality can then be compared with 
predicted rates to identify poor or good quality care. The literature on risk-adjustment 
strategies has expanded dramatically over the last few years, especially in the field of 
acute hospital care [155]. 
Several risk-adjustment models have been developed for CABG. The models aim to 
predict mortality using data on the clinical experience of a defined group of patients. 
The predictive accuracy of these models and ease of use vary widely. Randomised 
controlled trials have formed the basis of some risk stratification methods [156], some 
using Baysian analysis to sort patients into risk categories [157]. However, these 
models are limited by patient selection criteria and the clinical variables collected 
during the trial. 
Other models have been of limited value because they were based on information from 
patients undergoing surgery at only one hospital. These include: the Montreal Heart 
Institute scoring system [158], which has been criticised for being based on only 500 
patients; the Parsonnet Risk Stratification System [159], which has been criticised both 
for its reliance on individual physician's opinions to assign weights to certain factors 
[160] and for its statistical foundations which have been considered to be inappropriate 
[161]; and the Higgins Clinical Severity Score, which also attempted to build 
morbidity into its model, but when tested failed to predict morbidity accurately in high 
risk patients [160]. 
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Comparisons of the Parsonnet model with the Baysian analysis suggest the latter may 
be a more accurate method of predicting operative mortality [157,162,163]. Baysian 
analysis has two main advantages over the Parsonnet model; first, it is able to account 
for a large number of risk factors and second, it is flexible enough to allow for 
modifications to take account of changes in the patient population and/or clinical 
practice which affect operative risk. 
Few risk-adjustment strategies have been developed for PTCA. Only one model has 
been developed to date. It was set up to predict long-term (5 year) morbidity and 
mortality [164]. However, the model was not based on the results of randomised 
controlled trials and the patient data used were collected at only one hospital. Its 
application is therefore limited. 
4.6.2 Clinical guidelines 
Guidelines have been defined as ' systematically developed statements to assist 
practitioners and patient decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical 
circumstances' [165]. Purchasers' interest in the development of clinical guidelines 
stems from the belief that they will ensure that limited resources are used in the most 
efficient and appropriate manner thereby maximising the potential benefits derived 
from health care services [166]. It has been argued, however, that guidelines would 
only be effective if appropriately developed, disseminated and implemented [167]. 
Guides for purchasers to ensure guidelines are scientifically valid and implemented 
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successfully have been produced [168,169]. 
In the field of coronary revascularisation services a number of guidelines have been 
developed with the aim of ensuring that treatment is given on the basis of ability to 
benefit (appropriate utilisation) and that the timing of surgery is based on urgency of 
need (appropriate prioritisation). Various guidelines on the appropriate use of CABG 
and PTCA have been produced by the British Cardiac Society and by the American 
College of Cardiology and the American Heart Association [170-172]. There are 
however, few published audits of performance measured against these guidelines. 
Waiting lists for in-patient surgical procedures have always been a feature of the NHS. 
As previously stated, the number of deaths which occur on the waiting list is low and 
the number of patients whose symptoms deteriorate is unknown. However, if it is 
assumed that the delay itself causes the death of patients on the waiting list and that 
those patients whose symptoms deteriorate while waiting are at increased risk of 
operative and postoperative death, then there is a case for developing guidelines to 
ensure that the number of such deaths are minimised. Guidelines for assessing 
urgency have been developed in Canada, using a consensus panel [173], and used to 
audit the appropriateness of prioritisation of CABO and PTCA in both Canada 
[137,174] and New Zealand [175]. Similar guidelines are being developed in New 
Zealand [176]. In the UK the British Cardiac Society is developing guidelines for the 
identification of patients who should bypass the waiting list and be referred for 
treatment as an urgent case [177]. However, guidelines to assess the urgency of 
patients waiting for surgery in the UK have not yet been developed. 
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4.7 Summary 
CHD is a major cause of mortality and morbidity in the UK. Treatments for the 
disease are costly and demand is continuing to rise despite the fall in the death rate 
from CHD. 
Utilisation rates for CABO and PTCA have increased dramatically since they were 
first introduced and wide international and national variations have been found. A 
number of factors have contributed to the increase in demand which include the 
increased use of new technology, both investigation techniques and PTCA. Reasons 
for the wide variations in the use of coronary revascularisation procedures include 
statistical, supply and demand factors. No rigorous studies have been conducted in the 
UK on why district and regional rates of CABO and PTCA vary. 
There is a lack of data on the need for revascularisation which makes it difficult to 
estimate the right rate of use. The national target set in 1984 was based on the level 
of use in other counties and is therefore only a crude estimate of relative need. 
Randomised controlled trials have shown that CABO is effective in increasing survival 
and the relief of angina in patients who have not responded to medical therapy and 
whose angiograms show multi-vessel disease or disease of the left main artery. PTCA 
is cheaper and less invasive but with higher reintervention rates which reduce the 
apparent cost difference. PTCA produces optimal results when confined to individuals 
who have not responded to medical management and whose angiograms show single-
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vessel disease. As techniques and patient characteristics change, caution must be taken 
in general ising these results to the present day. The effect waiting has on the overall 
effectiveness of CABO and PTCA is unknown. 
Revascularisation should be restricted to those patients most likely to benefit. The 
development of clinical guidelines and the increased use of clinical audit are two 
initiatives which may help to ensure that those patients who can benefit the most from 
revascularisation services are given priority and that treatment is received within an 
appropriate time period. Purchasers, when determining where resources should be 
spent, must assess the relative benefits of revascularisation services compared to other 
health services in order to maximise the health benefits from the resources available. 
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PART II 
94 
CHAPTER 5 
TRENDS IN THE AVAILABILITY AND USE OF 
CORONARY REVASCULARISATION SERVICES 
95 
5.1 Introduction 
Market forces were introduced into the NHS four years ago. Measuring the impact 
of the reforms on social welfare is complicated by the effects of other concurrent 
policy changes including: the Governments' White Paper 'The Health of the 
Nation' [11]; the incorporation of a maximum in-patient waiting time of twelve months 
for CABG in the Patient's Charter [14]; the introduction of a new weighted capitation 
formula for distributing funds to health regions [1,178]; and the Tomlinson inquiry and 
similar undertakings in other major cities set up to recommend major changes in the 
configurations of health services [12]. 
Despite the methodological difficulties associated with measuring the impact of the 
reforms it is important that attempts to understand what impact the 1991 reforms have 
had and are having on specialist services are undertaken. The selected criteria against 
which the reforms are to be judged are those of productive and allocative efficiency. 
Equity will be used to describe the distributional aspects of the reforms. Quantitative 
and qualitative methods were used to assess whether the change in resource allocations 
brought about by the reforms have been instrumental in improving efficiency. The 
quantitative analysis is presented in this chapter and the qualitative analysis in Chapter 
6. This chapter reviews and discusses the patterns and trends in resource availability, 
resource use and cost of coronary revascularisation services. Chapter 6 assesses how 
the contracting process has influenced any of the observed changes in the service. 
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5.2 Methods 
The study (quantitative and qualitative) was carried out in three English Regions 
(South East Thames, East Anglian, North Western) and three Scottish Health Boards 
(Greater Glasgow, Lanarkshire, Ayr/Arran). For the purposes of this study, the area 
covered by the three Scottish Health Boards will be referred to as a Region. This 
provided a sample of 42 English Health Districts and three Scottish Health Boards and 
covered a total popUlation in 1991 of 11.6 million (20% of the UK population). They 
were selected to provide a representative sample with reference to historical levels of 
provision, population density, geographical location and initial approaches to 
purchasing. 
Data for five financial years were collected, two of which were periods before the 
1991 NHS reforms were implemented (1987/88, 1989/90, 1991192, 1992/93, 1993/94). 
All patients who underwent either CABG (OPCS codes K40-K46) or PTCA (OPCS 
codes K49-KSO) without any other procedure were included in the study. 
All NHS and private hospitals providing revascularisation services for the residents of 
the four Regions were identified (Table 5.1). The location of these providers in each 
Region are shown in Appendix I. 
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Table 5.1: NHS and private providers included in the study in South East Thames, East Anglian, North Western and Greater Glasgow. 
I 
I 
\0 
00 
South East Thames 
East Anglian 
North Western 
Greater Glasgow 
-- ---- - -----
Intraregional NHS providers 
Guy's Hospital 
Brook Hospital 
St Thomas' Hospital 
King's College Hospital 
Papworth Hospital 
Wythenshawe Hospital 
Manchester Royal Infirmary 
Blackpool Victoria Hospital 
Glasgow Western Infirmary 
Glasgow Royal Infirmary 
---~---.-.-~ ---_ .. -
Extraregional NHS providers Private providers 
Royal Brompton Hospital Data not supplied by several 
St Mary's Hospital providers 
St Bartholomew's Hospital 
St George's Hospital 
Royal Brompton Hospital Cambridge Lea Hospital 
Liverpool Cardiothoracic Centre Alexandra Hospital 
Leeds General Infirmary 
None Ross Hall Hospital 
Intraregional providers were identified by contacting the relevant RHAs. Patient flows 
out of the Regions, to so-called extraregional providers, were identified by obtaining 
aggregated data from all providers who might have treated patients from the study 
Regions in 1991192. Data on individual patients were then collected from all the 
major providers such that at least 97% of all procedures carried out on the study 
population were included. This meant data were collected from 10 intraregional NHS 
providers, 6 extraregional NHS providers and 3 intraregional private providers. 
Private hospitals outside the study Regions made little contribution in East Anglian, 
North Western and Greater Glasgow. In South East Thames, four private providers 
refused or were unable to supply data, therefore analyses for that Region had to be 
restricted to NHS patients. 
5.2.1 Data relating to the availability of revascularisation resources 
The following data were collected from each of the intraregional NHS providers for 
the first four periods of the study (1987/88 - 1992/93): number of whole-time-
equivalent (WTE) consultant and non-consultant' staff by grade in cardiac surgery and 
cardiology; and the number of available beds in cardiac surgery and cardiology. Staff 
and beds devoted to thoracic surgery were excluded. Cardiologists were only included 
if their main base was at the provider unit carrying out CABG or PTCA. This will 
underestimate the number of cardiologists in those areas where cardiologists and 
general physicians with a special interest in cardiology are based outside the Regional 
7 Non-consultant staff included senior registrar, associate specialist, registrar, 
senior house officer and lecturer. 
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provider unit. 
Availability of revascularisation resources within each Region was determined by 
relating intraregional staffing and bed levels to the resident population. This definition 
of availability was based on the assumption that it is NHS policy to achieve a 
regionally equitable distribution of resources. The resident population used was men 
and women aged over 24 years as few people below this age are treated at adult 
centres. For Greater Glasgow Region, it was assumed that the NHS providers in 
Glasgow served an area which covered 4 health boards8 in addition to the three health 
boards included in this study. 
5.2.2 Data relating to utilisation of revascularisation services 
The following data on all patients treated by each of the 19 providers were collected 
for all five time periods of the study: age, sex, procedure, provider unit, and 
District/Board of residence. Data were collected from a variety of sources including 
clinical computer systems, manual registers, card indexes, clinician's summary charts, 
theatre registers and case notes. For the first three time periods data on DistrictIBoard 
of residence was often not available. For these patients a postcode had to be obtained 
from the hospital's computer system. The District was then identified using a 
commercial software package. Data were entered into a dBase file, analysed using 
EPI-INFO and then transferred into a Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet. Patients whose age 
8 These areas comprised the Western Isles, Argyll/Clyde, Dumfires/Galloway, 
and half of Forth Valley Health Board. 
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was unknown (about 2%) were distributed across the age range according to the age 
distribution of the majority of patients whose ages were known. District utilisation 
rates, directly standardised9 for sex and age (25-44,45-54,55-64,65-74,75 years or 
older) and Regional rates (per million aged over 24 years and per million total 
population) were calculated for each procedure for each year of the study for NHS 
provision and private provision separately. 
Comparison of the extent of inter-district variation within each Region were made 
using the systematic component of variation (SCV) [179]. This takes into account 
differences in the mean Regional rate and differences in the sizes of the District 
populations, both of which will influence the amount of random variation. This 
provides a measure of the extent of variation which can be used to compare Regions 
or different years. Values below about 4 indicate low variation, 5-10 moderate 
variation and above 10, high variation. Trends in the use of services were considered 
in three categories: treated as NHS patients within or outside their Region (total NHS 
provision); treated as NHS patients outside their Region (NHS-extraregional 
provision); treated privately either inside or outside their Region (Private provision). 
Trends in the sociodemographic characteristics of patients was assessed and reasons 
for the variations in rates were sought for the latest study period (1993/94)10. 
9 Rates were directly standardised using the total population of the four regions 
derived from the 1991 decennial census. 
10 Except for the geographical mapping of Districts' rates which was done for the 
preceding year (1992/93). 
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5.2.3 Data relating to the costs of services 
Data relating to the cost of CABG and PTCA were obtained from interviews with 
intraregional providers and purchasers carried out in July and August 1994. The 
interview structure will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Each provider was 
asked what their Extra-contractual referral (ECR) price was for each of the procedures 
and was asked to give an assessment of how it had changed over time. A list of ECR 
prices was also requested from purchasers. 
5.3 Results : availability of services 
5.3.1 Cardiac surgical services 
The availability of consultant staff changed very little between 1987/88 and 1992/93 
(Table 5.2). In most Regions it showed only a slight rise (East Anglian, South East 
Thames, Greater Glasgow) and remained the same in one (North Western). There was 
however a notable increase in the availability of non-consultant staff. In Greater 
Glasgow, for example, the number per million population increased from 5.68 in 1987 
to 10.00 in 1993, representing an increase of 76%. The availability of cardiac surgical 
beds fell in South East Thames by 13%, but more dramatically in North Western 
Region by 31 %. In the other two Regions there was an increase (East Anglian 26%, 
Greater Glasgow 12%). 
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Table 5.2: Medical staff and beds per million population for cardiac surgery and cardiology in the four study Regions (1987-1993). 
I 
-- ------- -
-11-
-
------- ---
I I Regions Cardiac Surgery Cardiology 
Consultants Non-consultants Beds Consultants Non-consultants Beds 
South East Thames 
1987/88 2.94 7.52 32.20 3.81 8.35 33.80 
1989/90 3.01 7.40 30.80 3.77 8.22 29.60 
1991192 3.14 8.89 28.30 4.06 8.69 30.30 
1992/93 3.89 9.30 27.90 4.70 8.29 34.00 
East Anglian 
1987/88 1.75 4.57 23.60 2.20 3.81 22.80 
1989/90 2.26 4.38 24.10 2.99 3.65 21.90 
1991192 2.16 5.03 27.30 2.73 4.31 21.60 
1992/93 2.12 5.67 29.70 2.83 4.25 21.20 
North Western 
1987/88 4.61 7.36 56.50 3.48 5.03 32.10 
1989/90 4.54 7.63 55.10 3.44 5.34 31.70 
1991192 4.86 7.90 54.60 3.38 5.65 28.20 
1992/93 4.48 8.28 39.10 3.76 6.02 28.20 
I 
Greater Glasgow I 
1987/88 2.78 5.68 26.00 4.56 7.69 22.50 
1989/90 2.75 6.22 25.80 4.46 7.63 22.30 
1991192 3.09 7.81 25.70 4.43 8.16 21.00 
1992/93 3.66 10.00 29.10 4.30 8.14 20.90 
- ---
-o 
\.oJ 
Wide inter-regional differences in surgical staffing levels were found. In 1987/88 
there was a 2.6 fold difference in the level of consultants between East Anglian and 
North Western, which had reduced to a 2.1 fold difference by 1992/93. East Anglian 
also had the lowest provision of non-consultant surgical staff. Bed provision was 
fairly similar for three Regions (South East Thames, East Anglian, Greater Glasgow). 
In 1987/88 bed provision per million population ranged from 24 to 32 and from 28 
to 29 in 1992/93. The exception was North Western, which traditionally had twice 
the number, but this fell in 1992/93 to 39 per million. 
5.3.2 Cardiology services 
There was also very little change in the provision of cardiology staff and beds between 
1987/88 and 1992/93 (Table 5.2). The availability of consultant cardiologists 
increased only slightly in three Regions and fell in one (Greater Glasgow). The 
number of non-consultant staff per million population increased by 6-20% in all 
Regions except South East Thames. Bed provision hardly changed at all. 
Inter-regional differences, however, were as pronounced as for cardiac surgical 
provision. Greater Glasgow and South East Thames had about 60% more consultants 
and twice as many non-consultants per million population than East Anglian. Bed 
provision in South East Thames and North Western was about 50% higher than in the 
other two Regions. 
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5.4 Results: utilisation 
5.4.1 Trends in utilisation 
The overall NHS rates (per million total population) for both procedures increased 
every year in all Regions between 1987/88 and 1993/94 except in Greater Glasgow, 
where the rate started to decrease in 1993/94 (Figures 5.1 and 5.2). The rates for 
intraregional NHS provision are shown in Appendix II, for intra plus extraregional 
NHS provision in Appendix III, for private provision in Appendix IV and for NHS 
and private provision combined in Appendix V. The annual growth in the Regional 
rate for CABG was maintained over the six years in E Anglian (Table 5.3). In N 
Western and SE Thames the rate of increase in the Regional rate increased in 1993/94 
after having slowed down between 1987/88 and 1992/93. No trend was apparent in 
G Glasgow where the annual rates of increase fluctuated. 
Table 5.3: Annual changes (%) in NHS rates (per million total population) of 
CABG in the four study Regions 0987/88 to 1993/94) 
REGION 
E Anglian N Western SE Thames G Glasgow 
87/88 - 89/90 12.3 14.5 14.8 2.3 
89/90 - 91192 14.6 8.5 7.3 23.3 
91/92 - 92/93 16.7 1.0 7.4 6.8 
92/93 - 93/94 18.9 5.7 16.9 -4.0 
105 
..... 
o 
0'\ 
Figure 5.1: Age-sex standardised rates (per million total population) of CABG in the four study 
regions (1987/88 - 1993/94). (* Private provision for SE Thames not included) 
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Figure 5.2: Age-sex standardised rates (per million total population) of PTCA in the four study 
regions (1987/68 - 1993/94). [* Private provision for SE Thames not included] 
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All four Regions achieved the nationally agreed target for the NHS of 300 CABGs per 
million total population. Greater Glasgow had achieved the target by 1989/90, SE 
Thames by 1990/91, North Western by 1991192 and East Anglian by 1993/94. In the 
last year of the study, two of the Regions had NHS rates well above the target set (G 
Glasgow 465 per million and SET 423 per million) while two had rates lying just 
above it (E Anglian 308 per million and N Western 333 per million). 
Most NHS cases were treated within a resident's local Region. The extent of 
extraregional NHS provision varied. In the final year of the study (1993/94), the 
proportion of CABG cases provided outside the local Region varied from none in 
Greater Glasgow to 7% in South East Thames and for PTCA from none in Greater 
Glasgow to 4% in South East Thames. No trend in the proportion of cases treated 
outside a Region was found over time. 
The contribution of the private sector also varied between Regions. In 1993/94 private 
financing increased the rate of CABG by 10% in Greater Glasgow, 14% in East 
Anglian and 17% in North Western. The equivalent proportions for PTCA were 1 %, 
21 % and 15%. The proportions for South East Thames are not known but it is likely 
that they would be higherll. The proportion of cases that were private increased 
from 1987/88 when the proportions were 2% (Greater Glasgow), 8% (East Anglian) 
and 14% (North Western) for CABG. The equivalent proportions for PTCA were 0%, 
II Data were collected from all but four potential private providers in South East 
Thames at the beginning of the study for 1991/92 and the proportion of 
CABGs paid for privately was 17%. The actual proportion is likely to have 
been considerably higher. 
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10%,11%. 
Concurrent with the continued increase in revascularisation rates was an increase in 
the mean age of patients and an increase in the number of females relative to the 
number of males. The mean age of patients increased over the seven year period by 
3.5 years from 56.3 to 59.8 (Table 5.4). The mean age of women was about three 
years older than of men (1993/94; 62.2 v 59.1) and the mean age for bypass grafting 
was about two years older than for angioplasty (1993/94; 60.4 v 58.5). These 
differences were fairly constant over the seven years studied. Revascularisation rates 
in men were about three and a halftimes higher than in women in 1993/94 (3.46:1), 
however, this was significantly less than in 1987/88 (4.20:1). The higher male 
utilisation rates can be partly explained by their disproportionate use of the private 
sector. Although the mean age of NHS and private patients was similar, a high 
proportion of private patients were men (Table 5.5). 
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Table 5.4: Mean (standard deviation) age (years) of patients undergoing 
revascularisation in the four study Regions (private patients in South 
East Thames excluded). 
Men Women Overall 
CABG 
1987/88 56.1 (8.6) 59.3 (8.7) 56.7 (8.8) 
1989/90 57.2 (8.9) 60.1 (9.4) 57.8 (9.1) 
1991192 58.3 (9.1) 61.7 (8.8) 58.9 (9.1) 
1992/93 58.8 (9.3) 62.1 (8.7) 59.5 (9.3) 
1993/94 59.7 (9.0) 62.9 (8.4) 60.4 (9.0) 
PTCA 
1987/88 54.4 (9.0) 57.3 (9.8) 55.2 (9.2) 
1989/90 55.2 (9.2) 57.5 (10.1) 57.7 (9.5) 
1991192 56.5 (10.0) 59.6 (9.8) 57.3 (10.1) 
1992/93 57.2 (9.7) 59.7 (10.2) 57.9 (9.9) 
1993/94 57.6 (9.7) 61.0 (9.8) 58.5 (9.9) 
Overall 
1987/88 55.8 (8.7) 58.7 (9.1) 56.3 (8.9) 
1989/90 56.7 (9.1) 59.2 (9.7) 57.2 (9.2) 
1991192 57.7 (9.4) 60.9 (9.3) 58.4 (9.5) 
1992/93 58.3 (9.5) 61.2 (9.4) 58.9 (9.5) 
1993/94 59.1 (9.3) 62.2 (9.0) 59.8 (9.3) 
Table 5.5: Comparison of mean age and sex ratio (male to female) of NHS and 
private patients (East Anglian. North Western and Greater Glasgow 
Regions) 
Mean age (years) Sex Ratio 
NHS Private NHS Private 
1987/88 56.3 55.2 3.8 7.7 
1989/90 56.9 56.9 4.2 6.2 
1991192 57.8 57.7 3.9 7.2 
1992/93 58.6 57.9 3.6 5.5 
1993/94 59.5 59.0 3.4 5.0 
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Comparison of the utilisation rates for each year revealed significant inter-regional 
differences in NHS rates (per million aged over 24 years) for the two procedures 
which were persistent (Table 5.6). For CABG, in 1993/94, the rates varied 1.5 fold 
from 459 per million (East Anglian) to 704 per million (Greater Glasgow) and for 
PTCA, 3.4 fold, from 146 per million (North Western) to 499 per million (South East 
Thames). The variation in utilisation rates between Districts within each Region was, 
not surprisingly, even greater than the extent of inter-regional variation (Table 5.6). 
In 1993/94 the District rate of CABG varied 4-fold from 257 to 1029 per million 
population aged over 24 years and the rate ofPTCA varied 34-fold from 43-1475 per 
million. The amount of variation fluctuated over the six years studied. It reached its 
highest level for CABG in 1991/92 (9-fold) and in 1992/93 for PTCA (120-fold). 
Some of these differences between Districts arose from random variation. To take 
account of differences in the mean Regional rates and differences in the sizes of 
District populations, both of which will influence the amount of random variation, the 
SCV was calculated (Table 5.7). 
Table 5.7: 
E Anglian 
N Western 
SE Thames 
G Glasgow 
Systematic component of variation (SCV) between District rates CNHS 
crude rates) ofCABG and PTCA in the four study Regions (1987/88-
1993/94) 
CABG PTCA 
87/ 89/ 91/ 92/ 93/ 87/ 89/ 91/ 92/ 93/ 
88 90 92 93 94 88 90 92 93 94 
3.8 4.7 5.5 4.6 3.0 + 55.0 14.3 14.8 23.6 
27.3 18.8 13.1 12.1 8.6 39.8 56.8 24.5 60.0 10.4 
15.7 Il.l 9.6 5.7 6.7 50.1 47.6 36.9 50.4 44.1 
1.7 1.8 5.5 6.6 1.9 19.9 11.1 4.3 2.9 0.7 
+ insufficient number of observations to give a reliable statistic 
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Table 5.6: Differences in Regional and District NHS rates (per million population aged> 24 years) for CABG and PTCA (1987/88-1993/94). 
-- --- --- -
Year I 
Range 
1987/88 213-461 
1989/90 261-475 
1991192 332-687 
1992/93 387-734 
1993/94 459-704 
• Ratio of highest to lowest rate . 
..-
..-
IV 
CABG 
Region District 
(Ratio") Range 
(2.2) 124-951 
(l.8) 159-1091 
(2.1) 105-949 
(l.9) 212-1077 
(l.5) 257-1029 
-~~ 
--- -- -------
--
I PTCA 
Region District 
(Ratio*) Range (Ratio*) Range (Ratio·) 
(7.7) 13-130 (10.0) 8-346 (43.3) 
(6.9) 76-248 (3.3) 22-694 (31.5) 
(9.0) 92-401 (4.4) 18-1117 (62.1) 
(5.1) 119-490 (4.1) 12-1450 (120.1) 
(4.0) 146-499 (3.4) 43-1475 (34.3) 
Between 1987/88 and 1993/94 the extent of inter-district variation in CABG rates was 
low or moderate but fluctuating in East Anglian and Greater Glasgow and high but 
decreasing in North Western and South East Thames. For PTCA the amount of 
variation was much higher. In East Anglian and South East Thames the extent of 
inter-district variation remained very high. In North Western the variation was high 
but decreased over time and in Greater Glasgow variation decreased to a very low 
level. 
5.4.2 Reasons for variations in use 
There are three types of factors which may explain why rates of use of a procedure 
vary: statistical factors; demand factors; and supply factors. 
(a) Statistical factors 
Statistical factors were not found to be the cause of variations in utilisation. Observed 
variation could have been caused by incomplete data collection or the amount of 
random variation. Incomplete data collection was not a factor which could be put 
forward to explain the variation as data were collected directly from clinical 
departments rather than depending on suspect hospital information systems. Also, 
cross-boundary flows were identified and included in the study so that information was 
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collected on at least 97% of patients resident in the study Districts. High levels of 
variation persisted even after random variation had been taken into account (Table 
5.7). 
(b) Demand factors 
Demand factors also did not account for much of the observed variations. The factors 
which influence the demand for a procedure are: the normative need for treatment, 
people's expectations and the use of alternative interventions. The normative need is 
determined partly by the age-sex structure of the population and the prevalence of 
coronary heart disease. The demographic structure of the population was accounted 
for by standardising the rates for age and sex and found to have no impact on the 
degree of variation. For both CABG (Figure 5.3) and PTCA (not shown) the crude 
rates and age-sex standardised rates were closely correlated. 
No accurate data existed on the prevalence of coronary heart disease by health 
districtlboard, therefore two proxy measures were used: the standardised mortality ratio 
(SMR) for coronary heart disease (ICD9 410-414; 1990/91) and both the Jarman [180] 
underprivileged area score and Department of Environment [181] social deprivation 
index for 1990/91. The amount of association between these proxy measures of need 
and utilisation rates was assessed using Pearson correlation coefficients. Age-sex 
standardised utilisation rates were inversely correlated with SMRs but positively 
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Figure 5.3: Scatter plot of age-sex standardised District rates 
with crude rates for CABG (1993/94) 
Age-sex standardised rate per million aged > 24 years 
1,~Ori--------------------------------------------------~ 
a 1,000' ...... - - - - - - - .. - - . - - . - - - - .. - - - .. - - - - - .. - . - .. - - - - - . - . - - - - . - - . - - - . - - . 
800 
600 
400 
200 
OLI ______________________________________________________________________________ ~ 
~ 190 ~ 3~ 4~ 590 6~ 7~ 890 
Crude rate per million aged > 24 years 
correlated with social deprivation (Table 5.8). The correlation coefficients between 
revascularisation rates and SMRs were significant at the 5% level, but this was not 
true for the correlations with social deprivation scores. Thus districts with higher 
intervention rates were associated with lower SMRs and, non-significantly, a higher 
degree of deprivation. These findings appear to conflict with each other. One 
explanation is that the association made with the measure of social deprivation may 
have been confounded by distance from the specialist centre. The more deprived 
Districts tend to be in inner city areas where many of the specialist centres are located 
[133]. 
Table 5.8: Relationship between District NHS revascularisation rates (1993/94) 
and proxy measures of morbidity (1990/91) (correlation coefficients 
plus 95% confidence intervals) 
CABG PTCA BOTH 
Standardised -0.33 (-0.58 to -0.03) -0.48 (-0.69 to -0.20) -0.45 (-0.66 to -0.17) 
mortality ratio 
Jarman 0.18 (-0.13 to 0.46) 0.05 (-0.26 to 0.35) 0.11 (-0.20 to 0.40) 
underprivi.leged 
area score 
Department of 0.21 (-0.10 to 0.48) 0.08 (-0.23 to 0.37) 0.14 (-0.18 to 0.42) 
Environment social 
deprivation index . 
• higher index scores represent greater deprivation 
Variation in utilisation rates could be a product of the demand for other procedures. 
For example, the rate of use of CABG could be affected by the rate of use of PTCA. 
The District NHS rates for CABG (1993/94) were however highly correlated with 
those for PTCA (Pearson correlation coefficient r=0.76, 95% confidence limits 0.60 
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to 0.86). In other words, districts with a low CABG rate were not compensated for 
by a high PTCA rate. 
(c) Supply factors 
The availability of a service was found to be a factor affecting the rate of use and 
therefore could be used as an explanation for the variations observed. Association 
between the availability of NHS facilities in a Region and the Regional rate was 
assessed by means of a scatterplot. Regional rates for CABG and PTCA correlated 
with consultant and non-consultant staffing levels (one example shown in Figure 5.4) 
but not with bed numbers. Generally, the higher the staffing levels, the higher the 
Regional rate of intervention. 
Two supply factors at a District level were also analysed. First, the influence of the 
distance of the District from the main specialist centre was investigated by mapping. 
Generally, the closer people live to a provider unit, the higher their rate of use of the 
service (two examples are shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6). 
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Figure 5.4 Age-sex standardised rate CNHS and private cases per million 
population aged 25 years or more) for CABG for three study regions 
(EA. NW. GG) for years 1987/88(1), 1989/90(2), 1991192(3), 
1992/93(4) by consultant staffing levels in regional centres. 
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Figure 5.5: Age-sex standardised rates (per million aged over 24 years) 
of CABG in East Anglian region: NHS and Private cases (1992/93) 
o NHS hospitals 
o Private hospitals 
o Brompton 
II = 700 or more 
L..-_--li = less than 300 
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Figure 5.6: Age-sex standardised rates (per million aged over 24 years) 
of PICA in South East Thames region: NHS cases (1992/93) 
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Second, the influence of there being a local cardiologistl2 on the District rate was 
assessed. Of the seven Districts which did not have a cardiologist, the mean rate for 
CABG in 1993/94 was 358 per million compared with 589 per million for the other 
38 Districts (F statistic=10.4; p=0.003). The corresponding rates for PTCA were 117 
and 323 per million (Kruskal-Wallis statistic=8.12; p=0.004). 
5.5 Results: cost of services 
Table 5.9 presents the ECR prices obtained from purchasers and providers during 
semi-structured interviews. ECR prices were also obtained from South East Thames 
purchasers for London providers outside the Region. The price of CABG and PTCA 
changed very little between 1992/93 and 1994/95 (Table 5.9). The small annual 
differences in prices are likely to have been caused by the changes in costing methods 
which developed since 1991. It is unlikely that these prices represented true costs and 
thus efficiency, despite government regulations that prices should equate with average 
cost, because the sophistication of costing methods across providers was not the same. 
12 Defined as at least six sessions from a physician with specialist training in 
cardiology and who spends at least 40% of his or her time practising 
cardiology. 
121 
Table 5.9: Trends in the price of CABG and PTCA from 1992/93 to 1994/95 
Region and CABG (£) I PTCA (£) I provider" 
1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 
East Anglian 6,062 6,291 5,997 3,255 2,680 2,454 
North Western 
Provider 1 7,169 6,592 6,922 N/A N/A 2,500 
North Western 
Provider 2 8,519 7,711 8,362 2,563 2,717 2,568 
Greater Glasgow N/A 5,788 5,714 N/A N/A 1,728 
South East Thames N/A N/A 4,397 N/A N/A 2,527 
Outer London 1,900* 1,984# 2,600* 
Provider 1 6,066 6,334 6,500 2,400- 2,506- 4,000-
Inner London 
Provider 2 N/A N/A 4,299 N/A N/A 2,138 
Inner London 
Provider 3 N/A N/A 4,631 N/A N/A 2,500 
" ECR prices are not presented for all providers in the study due to unavailability of data. 
NI A=not available, # Simple, - Complex 
All CABG pnces observed in 1993/94 were within 15% of the RITA estimate 
(Sculpher 1994), with only one provider in North Western exceeding this cost. All 
PTCA prices, however, were over 20% lower than the estimated RITA price. This 
may indicate that costing methods for PTCA at this time were not as advanced as 
those for CABG. CABG prices for inner London for 1994/95 were substantially lower 
than those for providers in outer London or those in other Regions. This may indicate 
that providers in inner London were faced with greater competition which had driven 
down the costs of the service. 
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5.6 Summary 
There were no significant changes in the availability of revascularisation services 
between 1991 and 1994 in terms of consultant staff. In contrast, the number of non-
consultant cardiac s1;lfgical staff increased. This may have been the result of a policy 
aimed at reducing non-consultant's hours. The number of cardiac surgical beds fell 
in two regions and increased in two. Wide inter-regional differences were found 
which either decreased or stayed the same over time. 
The NHS utilisation rate for CABG and PTCA increased between 1987 and 1994 but 
at a decreasing rate. There was also an increase in private provision, an increase in 
the age of patients and a decrease in the ratio of males to females undergoing the 
operation. Wide inter-regional and inter-district variation were found but decreased 
over time. 
If it is assumed that the need for coronary revascularisation services is similar in each 
area wide variations in the availability and utilisation of this specialist service between 
regions and districts suggest that the marginal benefit and marginal costs have not been 
equalised indicating allocative inefficiency. But, as there are no routine data available 
on the need for the service the validity of this assumption cannot be adequately tested. 
Furthermore, no account has been taken of the variations in the cost or quality of the 
service provided, therefore it is difficult to state that such variations signify 
inefficiency. However, given that the spacial distribution of coronary revascularisation 
services were found to be highly unequal, especially for PTCA, it is probable that a 
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more equal distribution of resources would lead to improvements in efficiency. 
Variations in the availability and use of these services have decreased over time 
suggesting improvements in both efficiency and equality of access. 
There was little change in the price of these procedures over time which may imply 
no change in productive efficiency, an improvement in real terms or an improvement 
in the costing methods. Prices were found to vary between providers, probably due to 
differences in costing methods rather than differences in efficiency. 
The variation observed in the utilisation rate between Regions and Districts was mainly 
due to differences in supply, both availability of services and differences in clinical 
judgement. Large variations in the use of PTCA was expected as it was a relatively 
new technology and the provision of CABO was still expanding. A further reduction 
in variation may be expected over the coming years as the availability of 
revascularisation services increase. However, the contracting process may work 
against this as responsibility for purchasing these services is devolved from Regions 
to smaller purchasing units in the form of DHAs and OPFHs. The nature of the 
contracting process and its effect on these services will now be discussed. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRACTING: 
A LONGITUDINAL ENQUIRY 
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6.1 Introduction 
This part of the thesis describes the views of purchasers and providers of the two 
specialist services (CABG and PTCA) over the first three years of the reforms in the 
study regions defined in Chapter 5. First the evolution of contracting is described. 
Second, the nature of the market is assessed, and finally the problems faced in the first 
year are compared with experiences in the third year. 
6.2 Methods 
A series of semi-structured interviews were carried out during July and August 1992, 
1993 and 1994 with a sample of purchasing agencies and providers of CABG and 
PTCA in four Regions of the UK. These were South East Thames Region, North 
Western Region, East Anglian Region and Greater Glasgow, including Lanarkshire and 
Arran! Ayrshire. 
The business managers responsible for cardiology and cardiothoracic contracts in all 
ten NHS providers in the four Regions were interviewed in each of the three years. 
Thirteen purchasers were selected with the advice of local NHS staff as being 
particularly interested and active in contracting for these services. They included 
regional and district health authority staff and, in 1994, GPFHs. The interviews were 
concerned with the respondents' experiences of commissioning these two specialist 
services. The interviews lasted approximately one hour and information was recorded 
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by either making notes during and after the interviews or by audio-taping. The data 
obtained were categorised according to the five principle issues which emerged. For 
purchasers the categories were: responsibility for purchasing; types of contracts used; 
methods used to agree, place and monitor contracts; type of relationship with the main 
provider; and problems that had occurred. For providers the categories were: types 
of contracts used; methods used to price procedures; relationship with the main 
purchaser; issues regarding the type of competition; and problems that had occurred. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Evolution of contracting 
When the reforms were introduced in 1991 three Regions (including one in which 
commissioning did not start until April 1992) maintained the status quo as regards 
responsibility for purchasing the services (Table 6.1). Contracts were paid for 
centrally (by the Regional Health Authorities in the three English regions studied) by 
either top-slicing funds from district allocations or charging the district according to 
their level of use. The fourth Region devolved the responsibility of purchasing to 
district purchasing consortia from the outset. After the initial maintenance of a steady 
state, the other Regions also began to relinquish their control over the market and 
devolve the responsibility of contracting to either district purchasing consortia or 
individual districts. At the same time, the proportion of the population served by 
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Table 6.1: Key features of commissioning in the four study Regions from 1991/92 to 1994/95 
1991192 1992193 
Responsibility for purchasing 
SE Thames BOTH Type I Type 3 
N Western BOTH Type 2 Type 2 
E Anglian BOTH Type 4 Type 4 
G Glasgow CABG N/A Type I 
PTCA N/A Type 4 
Resource allocation 
SE Thames BOTH Steady state Weighted capitation 
N Western BOTH Steady state Steady state 
E Anglian BOTH Steady state Weighted capitation 
G Glasgow BOTH Steady state Steady state 
Type of principal contract 
SE Thames BOTH Block Block 
N Western BOTH Block Block 
E Anglian BOTH Cost and Volume Cost and Volume 
G Glasgow CABG N/A Cost and Volume 
PTCA N/A Block 
Length of contract 
SE Thames BOTH 12 months 12 months 
N Western BOTH 3 year 
E Anglian BOTH 12 months 12 months 
G Glasgow CABG N/A 12 months 
PTCA N/A 12 months 
Notes: 
Type I: Regional purchasing in which Region established contracts with local providers and top-sliced funds for these services 
Type 2: Regional purchasing in which Region contracted with providers and charged districts according to their level of use. 
1993194 
Type 3 
Type 2 
Type 4 
Type I 
Type 4 
Weighted capitation 
Steady state 
Weighted capitation 
Steady state 
Sophisticated block 
Block 
Cost and Volume 
Cost and Volume 
Cost and Volume 
12 months 
12 months 
6 months 
12 months 
Type 3: District purchasing consortia in which the responsibility for purchasing these services has been devolved to districts who have formed purchasing consortia 
Type 4: District purchasing in which the responsibility for purchasing was taken on by individual districts. 
BOTIl:CABG and PTCA. N/A: Not applicable 
(" An agreement was sought from all main purchasers for a seven year commihnent although contracts would still be issued on a one year basis) 
..... 
IV 
00 
1994195 
Type 3 
Type 4 
Type 4 
Type I 
Type 4 
Weighted capitation 
Weighted capitation 
Weighted capitation 
Steady state 
Sophisticated block 
Sophisticated block 
Cost and Volume 
Cost and Volume 
Cost and Volume 
12 months 
12 months 
12 months· 
12 months 
12 months 
fund-holding general practices increased with the effect that the responsibility for 
purchasing CABGs and PTCAs increasingly shifted from purchasing authorities to the 
patient's own GP. 
Meanwhile, the Department of Health introduced a new weighted capitation formula 
in 1991 to fund regions and it was recommended that they in turn should use it to 
allocate resources to district purchasing authorities. Each region slowly phased in the 
use of this formula to fund districts so that its use had become established in all 
Regions except Greater Glasgow by 1994/95. The new formula, based on capitation 
adjusted for age and a measure of need, caused a redistribution of resources creating 
per-capita losing and per-capita gaining districts. 
As the purchasing function developed with the advent of better information on unit 
prices and activity, districts and district consortia moved away from block contracts. 
Block contracts, where the purchaser pays the provider a fixed sum for access to a 
defined range of services to meet the demand from the purchaser's resident population, 
do not allow purchasers to increase the efficiency of resource use and place providers 
in a situation of uncertainty regarding their workload. Purchasers moved either to 
more sophisticated block contracts, where they set a target for the level of activity to 
be carried out based on projections of activity and unit costs, or to cost and volume 
contracts which are more precise as a fixed price is set for a specified target volume 
of treatment. 
The length of contracts also changed. Initially, most contracts were for one year at 
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the end of which the need for the service was reviewed and the contract changed if 
required. One Region, however, chose to purchase services on a three year rolling 
contract so as to protect the service in the initial stages of the reforms. By 1994, 
hospitals were considering longer-term contracts to enable them to carry out service 
developments. A seven year commitment from purchasers had been negotiated in one 
Region but was unlikely to be translated into a seven year contract due to a reluctance 
by purchasers to commit themselves to anyone provider for so long. So despite 
intentions, contracts in all four Regions in 1994/95 were still only for 12 months. 
6.3.2 Nature of the market 
When contracting was devolved to districts and district consortia from regions, 
providers were placed in the position of having to compete for contracts. Purchasers, 
both district health authorities and fundholding GPs, started to question the 
configuration of services and the traditional choice of providers. 
Purchasers initially contracted at historical levels of activity with providers with whom 
they already had established links. As contracting developed, however, a spectrum of 
approaches to purchasing emerged. As regards volume, some purchasers said that they 
recognised cardiac surgery as a priority and sought to increase the level of activity so 
as to meet 'The Health of the Nation' targets [11]. In contrast, others continued to 
base contracts on historical trends in utilisation. As regards patient flows, the majority 
of purchasers did not change their referral patterns radically. Those that did were 
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influenced by price rather than claims of improved quality. Some purchasers reduced 
the number of providers with whom they contracted, though this was mainly the result 
of central planning initiatives such as the Tomlinson Inquiry in London [12], rather 
than market forces. 
In general the contractual relationships between, on the one hand, purchasers and their 
main providers and, on the other hand, between providers and their main purchasers 
were stable (Table 6.2). In SE Thames Region the providers felt that the relationship 
was open because information about activity, costs and quality was shared freely with 
purchasers. This view of stability and openness was not held however by their 
purchasers who were actually in the process of altering their referral patterns and 
switching contracts. In contrast, the views of purchasers and providers appeared to be 
concordant in the other three Regions, in part because of the lack of alternative local 
providers. 
Despite the contractual relationship between purchasers and providers being 
predominantly stable, all providers felt that they had to compete for contracts (Table 
6.2). This competitive environment arose as a result of providers having to maintain 
their contracts with their main purchasers, compete for contracts from more distant 
districts, and compete for patients from fundholding GPs who were controlling an ever 
increasing proportion of the market. 
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Table 6.2: 
SE Thames 
N Western 
E Anglian 
G Glasgow 
-W 
I-.l 
Key features of the relationship between purchasers and providers and providers responses to questions regarding the competitive 
environment in 1993/94. 
------
- - -- - -
Providers: Purchasers: Providers: Providers: 
'What is your relationship with 'What is your relationship 'Do you compete for 'Is the basis of competition 
your main purchasers? ' with your main providers?' contracts? ' fair?' 
Stable open contractual Short-term buying and selling Yes No, tendering process is 
relationship arrangements unfair and Special Health 
Authorities have an unfair 
advantage 
Stable contractual relationship Stable contractual Yes No, tendering process and 
relationship regulation by Region is I 
unfair 
I 
Stable long-term contractual Stable long-term contractual Yes Yes 
! 
relationship relationship 
I 
Stable contractual relationship Stable contractual Yes Yes 
I 
relationship 
Providers were divided in their views as to the fairness of competition. In SE Thames 
and N Western Regions they felt that competition through competitive tendering was 
unfair. They argued that purchasers assessed tenders with regard to the price but not 
the quality of the service provided. This concern was compounded by the feeling that 
prices were not considered representative of a provider's efficiency because of the 
different methods used to determine costs. Furthermore, it was felt that tenders were 
more likely to be offered to inefficient providers who, charging their main local 
purchasers full cost and retaining excess capacity could then charge other more distant 
purchasers at marginal cost to attract additional tenders. Providers also felt that, in the 
early years, London's Special Health Authorities had had an unfair advantage since 
they had been allowed to charge lower prices due to subsidies received for research 
and teaching. 
6.4 Commissioning problems 
6.4.1 Obstacles during the first year (1991192) 
In the first year of the reforms, when most Regions retained control over purchasing 
for these services and before the traditional means of allocating resources to districts 
gave way to weighted capitation, purchasers and providers struggled to deal with the 
problems the new contracting system imposed (Table 6.3). They faced five new 
challenges. 
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Table 6.3: Problems experienced by purchasers and providers in 1991/92 and 1993/94 
Problems experienced in 1991/92 Problems experienced in 1993/94 
Providers (l) Type of contract (1) Uncertainty about demand 
(2) Lack of routine information (2) Lack of fair competition 
(3) Appropriate organisational level for (3) Inability to carry out service deVelopments , 
purchasing (4) Problems related to fundholding GPs I 
(4) Uncertainty about demand (5) Problems related to target waiting times 
(5) Achieving equality between purchasers 
(6) Lack of fair competition 
Purchasers (1) Type of contract (1) Managing demand 
(2) Lack of routine information (2) Conflict with 'The Health of the Nation' 
(3) Appropriate organisational level for (3) Difficulties with price comparability 
purchasing (4) Lack of information on patient outcomes 
(4) Weighted capitation (5) Loss of resources under weighted capitation 
(5) Setting specialties against each other 
(6) Conflict with 'The Health of the Nation' 
-w 
~ 
(a) Handling logistics 
The overriding problem faced by both purchasers and providers was handling the 
complexities of the new system including the type of contract used, the lack of routine 
information on which to base contracts and the appropriate organisational level for 
purchasing cardiac services. Block contracts were high risk for providers and many 
found that their actual level of activity exceeded the anticipated level leading to a 
financial loss. In contrast, cost and volume contracts caused waiting lists to grow 
because as the number of emergencies rose elective cases were usurped. Meanwhile, 
block contracts gave no guarantee to purchasers as to the volume and type of work 
that would be carried out and cost and volume contracts were difficult to define due 
to the inability of providers to price their services according to case-mix. Lack of 
information on which to base contracts was a limiting factor for both parties. 
Providers were concerned about the expense they faced in collecting data on the cost, 
activity and quality of services. Purchasers, unable to make comparisons between 
providers on the basis of quality due to a lack of uniform indicators, were having to 
base their choice on price alone. Even when a purchaser had placed a contract, 
monitoring the service was again hampered by lack of data. 
The appropriate organisational level for purchasing was a concern both for providers 
and purchasers. Providers found it easier to negotiate contracts which covered more 
than one district as this avoided the time and expense of negotiating lots of small 
volume contracts with their inevitable risks. On the purchasing side there was a 
conflict between Regions and Districts about who should be responsible for 
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purchasing. The former argued that Districts did not have the necessary skills and that 
if these services were purchased on a regional basis equality of access could be 
ensured. However the Districts argued that they were in a better position both to 
assess the needs of their resident population and to choose between competing 
demands. 
(b) Managing demand 
Providers faced difficulties in managing demand for their services as they were 
uncertain about the actual number of patients that would be referred to them. This in 
turn both reflected the difficulties purchasers faced in coming to terms with their new 
function, which sometimes led to contracts being agreed after the financial year had 
begun, and the impact of the introduction of weighted capitation. The new funding 
formula meant that some provider units situated in per-capita losing districts suffered 
a reduction in income which in turn caused problems for their purchasers who, as a 
consequence, had to cover a higher proportion of the provider's fixed costs. 
(c) Achieving equality of access 
Providers became aware of their inability to provide a fair and equitable service to 
their various purchasers. They found the clinical priority of patients was being 
distorted by the amount of resources purchasers were allocating for these services. 
Quite often providers completed a contract for a purchaser who still had urgent 
patients waiting to be treated. Meanwhile contracts with other purchasers were 
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continuing in which patients in less need of urgent attention were being treated. 
Providers were frustrated with their powerlessness for treating patients according to 
clinical need. 
(d) Unfair competition 
Some providers considered the basis of competition unfair. Well-established providers 
were thought to be able to compete more effectively than those who were trying to 
develop their service. Also some providers felt there was too much central control 
over the market which tended to favour certain providers over others. 
(e) Facing conflicts 
Purchasers found they were coming up against several conflicts. First, in setting 
priorities for health care, they felt that involving clinicians from the provider units in 
discussions about how to choose between competing needs for health care would result 
in setting specialities against each other. Second, purchasers found that contracting 
could be in direct conflict with 'The Health of the Nation' policies as contracting 
rewarded purchasers who achieve maximum efficiency gains as measured by the 
Efficiency Index [182,183]. As the definition of efficiency was based on maximising 
patient activity from the resources available it followed that purchasers achieved higher 
efficiency gains by increasing hospital activity rather than by moving resources from 
treatment to prevention, a strategy that was believed to be more likely to meet the 
goals set in 'The Health of the Nation'. 
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6.4.2 Obstacles during the third year (1993/94) 
Two years later, when contracting had become better established, some of the early 
problems had resolved, some remained and some new ones had emerged (Table 6.3). 
(a) Problems solved 
Handling the logistics of contracting was no longer seen to be as serious a problem 
for purchasers and providers due to the skills that had been developed over the 
preceding three years. Routine data on costs and activities of cardiac services were 
being collected so that more sophisticated contracts could be used. This, to a large 
extent, had taken much of the uncertainty out of contracting. 
(b) Problems remaining 
Providers were still concerned about how to manage demand for cardiac services. 
They were experiencing problems with contractual volumes being exceeded because 
of an increase in the number of emergencies and an overall increase in referrals. They 
were also still concerned about their inability to treat patients solely according to 
clinical need. 
Purchasers had also become increasingly concerned about the dramatic increase in 
demand for CABG and PTCA by their resident population over the previous few 
years. Reasons for the increase were firstly that cardiologists from specialist centres 
138 
had set up more clinics in district general hospitals, particularly in districts with 
traditionally low referral rates, secondly they were conducting out-patient sessions in 
fundholding general practices, and thirdly diagnostic facilities, including angiography, 
had been developed in some district general hospitals. The resulting increase in 
demand from traditionally low referring districts had not been offset by a decrease in 
districts with historically high referral rates. Purchasers who were losing resources 
under weighted capitation were finding it difficult to reduce their commitment to these 
services in view of increasing demand. As a result, greater pressure was put on 
reducing expenditure on other services. 
Lack of fair competition was still causing a problem for providers though the nature 
of their concern had changed to that of pricing. Many felt that they were put at a 
competitive disadvantage as a result of being efficient and pricing their services at true 
average cost. Other providers with much lower prices were felt to be distorting the 
market in a variety of ways including using cardiac services as a 'loss leader' to attract 
business for other services, subsidising the service through monies received for 
research functions, cross-subsidising between services (which had been banned by the 
NHS Management Executive), or charging local purchasers the full cost while 
allowing other purchasers to use their services at marginal cost. 
Lack of data on the quality of the service remained a problem for purchasers who 
were continuing to select providers on the basis of price. However, they found it was 
almost impossible to make meaningful comparisons of prices because providers did 
not all use the same cost accounting systems, apportionment rules and methods of 
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product specification. They felt that price alone could not be used as an indication of 
efficiency unless all providers used the same method of pricing and achieved the same 
outcome. 
Purchasers were also still finding that contracting sometimes conflicted with the 
objectives of 'The Health of the Nation'. Purchasers argued that the more of their 
patients that were treated, the more credibility they received because treating patients 
was easily quantifiable while promoting health was not. 
(c) New problems 
Several new problems had emerged for providers. First, providers became 
increasingly concerned about the future development of their services. Demand for 
the service had risen with no increase in the amount of resources available. Providers 
therefore found that their ability to carry out service developments was limited. 
Second, growth in the number of fundholding GPs added to the existing equity 
problems. Although providers generally did not have an explicit policy of giving the 
patients of fundholding GPs a better service, several found that as a result of market 
pressures and the need to maintain their share of the ever increasing market controlled 
by fundholding GPs, they had to provide a quicker, cheaper and sometimes better 
quality service than that provided for district purchasers. Third, although target 
waiting times were welcomed by providers, many found that they were either having 
to distort clinical priorities in order to achieve them or refer non-urgent cases back to 
their GPs rather than put them on a waiting list. This problem had arisen because 
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many purchasers were still buying services on a historical basis and were not basing 
their decisions on the need to achieve the 12 month inpatient waiting time target. 
6.S Summary 
There was a complex web of inter-connected problems which, in general, caused more 
problems for purchasers than providers initially but which appeared to be of increasing 
concern to providers. Clearly, the purchasing function developed considerably over 
the last four years and the contracting process became more sophisticated. The 
majority of Regions relinquished their control over the market for specialist services 
and devolved the responsibility to districts, district consortia and GPFHs whose 
purchasing skills developed. There remained a lack of appropriate data on activity and 
costs on which to base contracts, however purchasers dealt with this problem by 
creating sophisticated block contracts, where an agreement was set between the two 
parties on a target level of activity to be carried out for a fixed sum which did not 
require perfect information. 
Despite the development of contracting, purchasers and providers continued to express 
misgivings about the way specialist services were commissioned. Purchasers found 
that the increase in demand for CABG and PTCA, in part brought about by initiatives 
set up by providers, put an ever increasing burden on their limited budget and more 
efficient use of resources was made difficult by their inability to make meaningful 
comparisons between the quality and cost of providers' services due to the paucity of 
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accurate and comparable information. 
Providers' concerns seem to become more acute since the introduction of market 
mechanisms. In the first year of the reforms their main concern was how to deal with 
the contracting process. By the third year providers were more concerned about the 
future. Some providers experienced an increase in demand for their services with no 
concurrent increase in the resources available. This problem was exacerbated in some 
districts by the effects of the new resource allocation formula. Although some 
providers attempted to secure longer term contracts to create greater stability and thus 
enable service developments to be carried out, purchasers were reluctant to commit 
themselves for longer than 12 months. Providers felt they were also subject to unfair 
competition in the market place and an inability to maintain clinical need as the basis 
of selecting patients. 
In summary, the contracting process developed considerably since its introduction in 
1991 and purchasing skills became more sophisticated. However, given the number 
of problems faced by both purchasers and providers it is not certain whether the 
impact the contracting process had on social welfare was positive or negative. One 
of the main obstacles which seemed to prevent greater efficiency from being achieved 
was the inability of purchasers to make cost and quality comparisons between 
providers. Purchasers were therefore unable to choose the most efficient provider and 
providers were faced with unfair competition. This, coupled with the considerable 
administrative costs associated with contracting, would suggest that the impact of the 
reforms on social welfare had been, if anything, negative. 
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PART III 
143 
CHAPTER 7 
MANAGING DEMAND: 
A CASE-STUDY 
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7.1 Introduction 
The quantitative and qualitative analyses have demonstrated the changes which have 
occurred since 1991. Although it was not possible to attribute confidently these trends 
solely to the effects of the NHS reforms because of other policy changes occurring at 
the same time, it was possible to highlight areas where greater efficiency and equity 
were achieved and areas where more could still be achieved. To explore this further, 
it is necessary to consider these findings in the light of the economic principles 
outlined in Chapter 3. 
This chapter will: (1) discuss the evidence from the quantitative and qualitative 
analyses; (2) consider a strategy for improving efficiency through the contracting 
process, which involves the more effective management of demand; and (3) assess the 
scope for achieving greater efficiency through an audit of the current management of 
three hospital's waiting lists. 
7.2 Discussion of the evidence 
The quantitative analysis demonstrated the trends which occurred during the period 
from 1987 to 1994 with respect to the availability, use, and cost of coronary 
revascularisation services. There was little consistent change in the availability of 
resources over time, except for the increase in non-consultant cardiac surgical staff. 
The wide inter-regional variations in staffing and beds either decreased or stayed the 
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same. In contrast, the utilisation rates increased steadily over the same time period, 
though the rate of increase varied between places. More significant were the 
geographical variations found between regions and districts. For CABO the amount 
of variation decreased over time, especially in those Regions where the initial variation 
had been high. For PTCA the amount of variation between Regions and Districts 
remained high. Finally, the price of both procedures, especially PTCA, varied 
significantly between hospitals. 
The decrease of variations in resource availability and resource use suggest a move 
towards greater efficiency and equality of access. However, the large remaining 
variations in the availability, use and cost of services, especially for PTCA, indicated 
that greater efficiency gains were still possible. 
The qualitative analysis described the evolution of the contracting process and the 
problems experienced by purchasers and providers between 1991 and 1994. The 
responsibility for purchasing these services was devolved to districts and OPFHs 
whose purchasing skills had become more sophisticated with time. However, the 
ability of the contracting process to secure greater efficiency gains and equality of 
access was prevented by a series of obstacles, mainly caused by the effects of market 
failure. Purchasers, faced with an ever increasing demand for these services, were 
unable to choose the most efficient provider because of their inability to make 
meaningful comparisons between providers with respect to the cost and quality of care 
due to the paucity of accurate and comparable information. Providers, faced with 
imperfect competition and an inability to plan for the future development of their 
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services, may have developed opportunistic or monopolistic tendencies which, if not 
adequately controlled by the government or purchasers, would lead to inefficiency. 
The increase in GPFHs and the introduction of waiting time targets were clearly 
causing a number of equity problems preventing greater equality of access being 
achieved. 
In short, the decrease in variations in the availability and use of coronary 
revascularisation services and the increase in the sophistication of contracting suggest 
the reforms may have been instrumental in increasing efficiency and equity. However, 
the large variations which persist and the contracting problems which remain suggest 
that the introduction of market mechanisms into the NHS is still a long way off 
achieving an efficient allocation of resources. 
7.3 A strategy for improving efficiency 
There are a number of reasons why market mechanisms have failed to achieve an 
efficient allocation of resources in the NHS. These reasons, outlined in Chapter 3, 
relate to market failure and inappropriate regulation. One of the major obstacles 
seems to be imperfect information on the need for the service, the appropriate level 
of use, the price and the quality of care. If greater efficiency is to be achieved 
purchasers need to be able to make comparisons between providers with respect to the 
price and quality of care and to ensure that those patients who need revascularisation 
services gain access (appropriate utilisation) and that patients receive surgery in an 
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appropriate time period (appropriate prioritisation). A strategy for improving 
efficiency therefore needs to encompass an improvement in the information available 
to both purchasers and providers through clinical audit and guideline development, 
thus allowing purchasers to manage the market for revascularisation services more 
effectively. 
As most revascularisations are performed as elective rather than emergency procedures, 
the management of demand for coronary revascularisation procedures takes place 
predominantly on waiting lists. Hence, more effective management of waiting lists 
could potentially lead to improved efficiency by ensuring that the right patients got 
treated at the right time. At present the majority of providers manage waiting lists 
using informal criteria and decisions about who should be treated when are made on 
an ad hoc basis by the clinicians involved. The appropriateness of this method of 
managing waiting lists first needs to be audited so as to assess the scope for improving 
efficiency and the potential for developing guidelines to manage coronary 
revascularisation waiting lists more effectively. 
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7.4 Current waiting list management 
The audit of current waiting list management was confined to CABO. Cardiac waiting 
lists are generally longer than those for PTCA and have received more attention from 
the government and the public. The objectives of this study were: (1) to describe how 
providers currently manage their patients on cardiac surgical waiting lists; (2) to assess 
the extent to which such management is appropriate; (3) to identify the factors that 
influence the speed of treatment; and (4) to evaluate the effect the reforms and other 
factors have had on these processes. 
7.4.1 Methods 
Data on 1594 patients who had undergone CABO in 1992 and 1993 in three London 
providers were collected retrospectively from the providers' cardiac surgical database. 
Only patients who underwent CABO without any other procedure were included. 
Information was collected on each patient's waiting time, age, sex, hospital waiting 
list priority category, angiographic findings, angina status and left ventricular function. 
The actual waiting time was measured in days from the date of placement on the 
waiting list to the date of surgery. Where available, data were also collected on 
coronary heart disease risk factors which included a history of smoking, diabetes, 
hypertension and obesity. 
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The appropriateness of the informal methods used by the three hospitals were assessed 
against a set of criteria developed by a Canadian consensus study [173,184,185]. The 
criteria, known as the Urgency Rating Score, were developed by a panel of 
cardiologists and cardiac surgeons. The panel agreed on the clinical factors affecting 
risk of delay, which were then combined into 438 hypothetical cases. Each panellist 
rated each case on a scale made up of seven time-frames (from immediate 
revascularisation to 6 months) which represented the maximum acceptable delay in 
Canada before revascularisation. 
The score was developed on the assumption that patients with a higher risk of 
ischaemia-related adverse events should get priority. Risk was determined by a 
patient's coronary anatomy and angina status (based on the Canadian Cardiovascular 
Society's classification system). The Canadian study produced a table of average 
urgency scores for patients on this basis, adjusted for poor left ventricular function or 
high ischaemic risk. The resulting score indicated, in a Canadian context, the 
maximum acceptable waiting time, deemed to be 6 months. 
The Canadian scoring system was adjusted for this study to take into account both the 
longer waiting times for CABG in the UK and the data available on the providers' 
databases. First, the New York Heart Association (NYHA) classification of angina 
was used instead of the Canadian Cardiovascular Society classification because that 
is the system UK clinicians use. They are however, similar [186]. Second, patients' 
scores were not adjusted for high ischaemic risk (judged by exercise test results) as 
this information had not been included in the databases. Third, the maximum 
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acceptable waiting time was extended from 6 to 12 months to reflect the reality of 
longer waits in the UK. Table 7.1 shows the adapted average urgency scores used in 
this study and Table 7.2 shows the maximum acceptable waiting times for each of 
those scores. Each patient was assigned an urgency score using these criteria. 
The actual waiting time each patient experienced was compared with the appropriate 
waiting time, determined by the adapted Canadian Urgency Rating Score. Other 
variables were also analysed to assess whether factors other than angina status and 
angiographic findings determined priority on the waiting list. The degree of 
association between the actual waiting time and the two continuous variables (patient's 
appropriate waiting time and age) were assessed using Pearson correlation coefficients. 
The statistical significance of any association between actual waiting time and the 
categorical variables (sex, smoking, diabetes, hypertension and body mass index 
(8MI» were assessed using a Chi-squared test. For the purposes of this analysis 
waiting times were categorised into three groups: less than one month, one to six 
months, and greater than six months. This corrected for the non-normal (positively 
skewed) distribution of the waiting time data. 
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Table 7.1: Urgency Scoring System (Adapted from the Canadian Consensus Study 
Scoring System £173] 
Clinical NYHA NYHA NYHA NYHA 
Severity IIII HI ill IV 
Stable Stable Unstable Stable 
angina angina angina angina 
Left main stem 5.4 4.85 4.75 3.4 
3 VD and LAD 6.15 6.0 5.5 3.9 
3 VD and no 6.45 6.35 5.8 3.9 
LAD 
1-2 VD and 6.8 6.55 5.8 4.05 
LAD 
1-2 VD and no 6.95 6.65 6.15 4.15 
LAD 
Adjustment of score: (subtract number below from urgency score) 
Poor LV 
function (EF 
<30) 
0.2 0.2 0.2 
NYHA=New York Heart Association, a classification of effort angina 
VD=vessel disease 
LAD=left anterior descending (proximal stenosis) 
L V=left ventricular 
EF=ejection fraction 
NYHA 
IV 
Unstable 
angina 
2.15 
2.55 
2.65 
2.90 
3.05 
0.2 
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Table 7.2: Urgency/appropriateness rating scale (adapted from the Canadian 
Consensus Study urgency rating scale [173]). 
Urgency Score Minimum and maximum acceptable 
waiting times * 
1-1.9 Emergency Immediate 
2-2.9 Extremely Urgent Within 24 hours 
3-3.9 Urgent 24 to 72 hours 
4-4.9 Semi-urgent 73 hours to 14 days 
5-5.9 Short-list 15 days to 3 months 
6-6.5 Delayed 4 to 12 months 
>6.51 Marked delay Over 12 monthsll 
* Appropriate waiting times reflect those employed by the Society of Cardiothoracic 
Surgeons pilot national database study. 
II This category no longer exists since the Department of Health announced a standard 
of a maximum waiting time of twelve months for CABG. 
The representativeness of waiting list management in the three hospitals audited was 
assessed by analysing the extent to which patients were waiting longer periods for 
CABG than their surgeons had planned in the three London providers compared to a 
sample of other hospitals. The sample of hospitals (10) selected were those from the 
four study Regions (South East Thames, East Anglian, North Western and Greater 
Glasgow) outlined in Chapter 5. The ten hospitals provided information on the 
priority category to which patients had been assigned to when put on the waiting list 
for surgery. These data were extracted from the case-notes of 50 consecutive patients 
in each hospital treated from April 1 1992. 
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Explanations for the results were sought from purchasers and providers. During the 
interviews outlined in Chapter 6 they were asked the following two questions: 'how 
are patients prioritised for cardiac surgery' and 'do you consider the process to be 
efficient and fair?'. These data were supplemented with published information. 
7.4.2 Results 
(a) Data completeness 
Seventy-five patients (5%) were excluded from the study because the date of 
placement on the waiting list was not available (Table 7.3). The data required to 
assign an urgency score to each patient was 100% complete for three variables 
(severity of angina, angiographic findings, angina status) and 83% complete for one 
(left ventricular function). Data completeness on other coronary heart disease risk 
factors (age, sex, smoking history, diabetes, hypertension and obesity) ranged from 
69% to 100% with age being the only variable available from all three providers. 
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Table 7.3: Details of patients referred for CABG 
Patient Characteristics Hospital I Hospital 2 Hospital 3 Total Data completeness 
Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) (%) 
Total number of patients 816 420 358 1594 
Total number of patients excluded' 0 0 75 75 95 
Severity of Angina tOO 
NYHA 1111 419 (51) 58 (14) 172 (61 ) 649 (43) 
NYHAIII 255 (31 ) 237 (56) 68 (24) 560 (37) 
NYHAIV 142 (IS) 125 (30) 43 (15) 3tO (20) 
Angiographic findings tOO 
1·2 vessel disease 212 (26) SO (19) 78 (27) 370 (24) 
3 or more vessel disease 512 (63) 268 (64) 200 (71) 9SO (65) 
Left Main Stem >50% 92 (11) 72 (17) 5 (2) 169 (II) 
Angina Status tOO 
Stable 571 (70) 295 (70) 238 (84) 1104 (73) 
Unstable 245 (30) 125 (30) 45 (16) 415 (27) 
Left ventricular function 83 
EF > 50 (Good) 258 (40) 262 (72) 133 (54) 653 (52) 
EF 30·49 (Fair) 311 (4S) 79 (22) 83 (34) 472 (37) 
EF < 30 (Poor) 84 (12) 21 (6) 29 (12) 134 (11) 
, These patients were excluded from the analysis as the date when they were put onto the waiting list had not been entered onto the provider's cardiac surgical database. 
NYHA=New York Heart Association classification of angina, EF=ejection fraction. BP, blood pressure 
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Table 7.3 (conn Details of patients referred for CABG 
Patient Characteristics 
Age (Mean, years) 
Sex 
Female 
Male 
Smoking History 
Non-smoker 
Ex-smoker 
Smoker 
Diabetes 
Non diabetic 
Diet/oral controlled 
Insulin dependent 
I Hypertension 
I Non hypertensive 
Hypertensive (BP > 140/90) 
Obesity 
Body Mass Index < 30 
Body Mass Index 31-35 
Body Mass Index> 35 
Priority Category 
Urgent (0-60 days) 
Soon (61-240 days) 
Routine (> 241 days) 
lP=blood pressure,NA=not available 
.-
V\ 
0\ 
Hospital I 
Number (%) 
60 
167 (20) 
649 (80) 
328 (40) 
379 (46) 
109 (14) 
719 (88) 
80 (10) 
17 (2) 
476 (58) 
340 (42) 
671 (86) 
93 (12) 
14 (2) 
357 (45) 
178 (22) 
268 (33) 
Hospital 2 
Number 
60 
63 
357 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
227 
95 
88 
Hospital 3 Total Data completeness 
(%) Number (%) Number (%) (%) 
60 60 100 
81 
(15) NA 230 (19) 
(85) NA 1006 (81) 
72 
87 (31) 415 (38) 
182 (64) 561 (51) 
14 (5) 123 (11) 
72 
224 (79) 943 (86) 
49 (17) 129 (12) 
10 (4) 27 (2) 
72 
158 (56) 634 (58) 
125 (44) 465 (42) 
69 
245 (90) 916 (87) 
18 (7) 111 (11) 
9 (3) 23 (2) 
98 
(55) 17 (6) 601 (40) 
(23) 47 (17) 320 (22) 
(22) 216 (77) 572 (38) 
(b) Patient characteristics 
Over half the patients (57%) had a NYHA angina grade above II and 27% had 
unstable angina. The majority of patients (76%) had coronary artery disease of more 
than two vessels. Left main stem disease was present in 11 % of the patients and poor 
left ventricular function in 11 %. The mean age of the patients was 60 years (range 
30-83) with a female to male ratio of 1 :4.4 (Table 7.3). Hypertension was present in 
42% of the group, 11% were current smokers, 14% had diabetes and 13% had a body 
mass index of over 30. The method of prioritisation used by the hospital to rank 
patients according to their clinical urgency was a system of three categories; urgent 
(0-60 days), soon (61-240 days) and routine (> 240 days). The highest proportion of 
patients fell into the urgent category (40%), followed by the routine category (38%) 
and the soon category (22%). 
The mean time patients actually waited was 129 days with a range from 0 to 757. 
The actual time patients waited showed a skewed distribution with most patients 
waiting less than 6 months (67%) and only 10% waiting longer than 12 months 
(Figure 7.1). The median time spent waiting was 64 days and the mean urgency score 
was 5.42 (a higher score indicates lower severity). The range of urgency score 
categories showed a skewed distribution with most patients having an urgency score 
greater than 6 (62%) (Figure 7.2). 
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Figure 7.1: Actual waiting time for patients referred for CABG 
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Figure 7.2: Distribution of Urgency Scores for patients referred for CABG 
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(c) Comparison of appropriate waiting time with actual waiting time 
Patients with three-vessel disease and left anterior descending disease with stable 
angina (NYHA I1II) were the largest group (26%) within the urgency score categories 
(Table 7.4). 
The actual waiting time was compared with the appropriate waiting time, defined by 
the urgency score. The strength of the association was only modest (Pearson's 
correlation coefficient=0.33, confidence intervals 0.29-0.38). Few patients were 
treated within the time considered appropriate for their risk of ischaemia-related 
adverse events. Figure 7.3 shows the proportions of patients who were treated on 
time, early or late by urgency category (data for Figure 7.3 are shown in Appendix 
VI). Cases were designated' concordant' when their actual waiting time matched their 
appropriate waiting time defined by the urgency score. If they waiting longer they 
were designated as 'delayed' and if they were treated sooner they were designated as 
'accelerated'. Only 38% of patients were treated within their designated period. 
However, 34% of patients had surgery earlier than their score indicated, and only 28% 
were delayed. Not surprisingly, delay was more likely for patients in the high (1-2.9) 
and medium (3.0-4.9) urgency categories than in the low categories and likewise, 
accelerated cases were more likely to he among the least urgent patients. 
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Figure 7.3: Concordance of patient's actual waiting time with the appropriate 
waiting time, as defined by the Urgency Score. 
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Table 7.4: Number (percentages) of patients in each urgency score category 
Clinical NYHA NYHA NYHA 
Severity IIII III III 
Stable Stable Unstable 
angina angina angina 
Left main 43 (3) 59 (4) 12 (1) 
stem 
3 VD and 398 (26) 289 (19) 71 (5) 
LAD 
3 VD and no 12 (1) 13 (1) 6 (0.4) 
LAD 
1-2 VD and 180 (12) 82 (5) 23 (2) 
LAD 
1-2 VD and 16 (1) 3 (0.2) 2 (0.1) 
no LAD 
• Percentages do not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
NYHA=New York Heart Association 
VD=vessel disease 
LAD=left anterior descending (proximal stenosis) 
NYHA 
IV 
Stable 
angina 
9 (1) 
45 (3) 
4 (0.3) 
6 (0.4) 
1 (0.1) 
(d) Comparisons of actual waiting time with other factors 
NYHA 
IV 
Unstable 
angina 
46 (3) 
140 (9) 
2 (0.1) 
53 (3) 
4 (0.3) 
The actual waiting time was compared with other factors to see whether criteria other 
than those included in the urgency score had been used systematically by clinicians to 
influence priority. Such factors might explain some of the observed variation between 
the appropriate and the actual waiting time. On univariate analysis, two factors were 
found to be significantly associated with actual waiting time. Women had shorter 
waits than men (99 v 132 days; x,2=15.56, p < 0.001) and ex-smokers and lifetime 
non-smokers waited less time than smokers (127 v 135 days; x,2=6.89, p=0.03). The 
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difference between waiting times for smokers and non-smokers is small (8 days) and 
therefore does not warrant further investigation. The difference between men and 
women can be explained by severity of disease as women were significantly more 
likely than men to have unstable angina (Odds ratio 2.00, confidence interval 1.47-
2.73, p < 0.001), a variable which is included in the Canadian Urgency Rating Score. 
Once unstable angina was taken into account sex was not a significant predictor of 
waiting times (X2=0.99, p=O.61). Patient's age (Pearson correlation coefficient=O.OS, 
confidence interval -0.02,0.08), diabetes (X2=0.55, p=0.76), hypertension (X2 
O.80,p=0.67), BMI (X2=3.28, p=0.19 for a BMI of over 30, X2=3.21, p=0.20 for a BMI 
of over 35) were not significantly associated with waiting time. 
(e) Inter-hospital comparison 
Concordance of actual waiting times with approptiate waiting times ranged from 41 % 
in hospital 1, through 40% in hospital 3, to 32% in hospital 2 (Table 7.5). The Figures 
for each hospital are shown in Appendix VII. Delay was more likely for patients in 
hospital 2 (36%). However, hospital 2 had more patients with NYHA angina grade 
III or IV and left main stem disease than the other two hospitals (Table 7.3). 
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Table 7.5: Concordance of patient's actual waiting time with the appropriate 
waiting time, as defined by the Urgency Score, for each Hospital. 
Urgency Score Concordant (%) Delayed (%) Accelerated (%) 
Hospital 1 41.2 25.8 33.0 
Hospital 2 31.7 36.4 31.9 
Hospital 3 39.6 21.2 39.2 
Total 38.2 28.0 33.8 
(I) Representativeness 
The actual waiting time was compared with the priority category the clinicians had 
allocated to each patient for each of the three London Hospitals and a larger sample 
of Hospitals covering a wider geographical area (Table 7.6). Cases were designated 
'concordant' when their actual waiting time was the same as their priority category. 
If they had to wait longer they were designated 'delayed'; and if they were treated 
sooner they were designated 'accelerated'. Overall a similar proportion of patients 
were delayed in the three London Hospitals (11 %) as were delayed in the larger 
sample of NHS hospitals (9%), although the range between hospitals was wide (0-
32%). This suggests that all hospitals found managing waiting lists for CABG 
difficult and that the three hospitals chosen for this study were not significantly 
different from other cardiac centres. 
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Table 7.6 Concordance between priority rating and waiting time for CABO. 
Hospital Concordant (%) Delayed (%) Accelerated (%) 
Study Regions 
1 62 32 6 
2 82 0 18 
3 28 6 66 
4 68 2 30 
5 40 0 60 
6 9 2 89 
7 59 22 19 
8 67 4 29 
9 80 10 10 
10 77 3 20 
Total Study Regions 60 8 32 
London Hospitals 
1 68 11 21 
2 65 18 17 
3 35 1 64 
Total London Hospitals 61 11 28 
7.5 Discussion 
The study revealed that most patients' waiting times were not concordant with a 
measure of appropriate waiting time, suggesting that patients were not prioritised 
accurately according to their clinical need. A large number were treated earlier than 
their ischaemic risk would indicate was necessary and this may have contributed to 
other patients with higher ischaemic risk experiencing delay. 
The variations found between the measure of appropriate waiting time and actual 
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waiting times could be explained by three alternative hypothesis. First, the variations 
are a result of inappropriate informal prioritisation systems. Second, the variations are 
a result of the Canadian criteria (used as a 'gold standard' in this study) being 
unsuitable for use in a UK context. Third, the variations are a result of internal or 
external organisational factors creating difficulties in the implementation of any 
prioritisation systems, regardless of how simple or sophisticated. Each will be 
considered in turn. 
7.5.1 Appropriateness of informal prioritisation systems. 
The system of prioritisation used in each of the three London providers was based on 
the allocation of patients into one of three categories. Allocations were made by each 
individual clinician on an ad hoc basis often without the use of written criteria. As 
a result, some patients may have been classified differently by other clinicians. In 
addition, although clinicians in the same hospital may use similar criteria, clinicians 
at other hospitals may follow different indications. There seems to be ample scope 
for improving on these informal methods. 
7.5.2 The suitability of the Canadian criteria 
In order to evaluate whether the Canadian criteria are suitable for use in the NHS three 
issues need to be assessed: the appropriateness of the waiting time frames; the 
appropriateness of the clinical factors included; and the differences in patients and/or 
the disease between Canada and the UK. 
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The Canadian definition of appropriate waiting times for each urgency score was 
considered unsuitable for use in the NHS because waiting times have always been 
much longer in the UK. This was dealt with by replacing the Canadian waiting time 
categories with those used by the British Society of Cardiothoracic Surgeons (Table 
7.2). 
The clinical factors included in the Canadian Urgency Rating Score were considered 
suitable. The factors included were consistent with those factors, identified in Chapter 
4, which have been shown to be associated with the greatest gains in health following 
revascularisation and with increased risk of short-term mortality while waiting. 
Despite agreement with the suitability of the criteria, it is possible that cardiac 
surgeons in the UK may weight some of the factors in the Urgency Scoring System 
differently or use other factors not incorporated into the scoring system. Howev.er, 
none of the factors studied were found to influence the speed of treatment once 
unstable angina had been taken into account. Factors not studied that may have 
influenced the waiting time for treatment included other clinical variables, such as 
cardiac enlargement, positive exercise test and coumarin treatment [136] and other 
socio-economic variables, for example, work status [187]; 
The differences in patients and/or disease is unlikely to affect the suitability of the 
Canadian Urgency Scoring System. Although the Canadian intervention rate has 
remained about twice that of the UK, this difference has been found to relate more to 
the finance and structure of the health services rather than to differences in levels of 
morbidity. No relationship has been found between international CABO rates and 
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death rates from CHD, national income, number of cardiologists or spending on health 
care [76]. 
7.5.3 The influence of internal and external organisational factors on any 
prioritisation system 
(a) The contracting process 
The contracting process has the potential for causing waiting lists to be managed 
inappropriately. This was the reason most often cited by providers. Waiting times 
may be determined by the agency responsible for paying for the patient's treatment. 
For publicly funded care, priority is determined by the resources the district health 
authority or general practitioner fundholder allocates to cardiac surgery. Furthermore, 
providers who are keen to maintain their share of general practitioner fundholder's 
resources may give fundholder's patients a quicker service, regardless of relative 
clinical need. 
Further problems have occurred as a result of providers being unable to manage their 
contracted workload evenly over the financial year. If a provider completes a contract 
before the end of the financial year, untreated patients may have to wait until the 
beginning of the new financial year regardless of need, while patients with a lower 
priority referred by other purchasers are treated. The contracting process has also 
created the need for providers to retain a specific amount of excess capacity to treat 
unanticipated urgent referrals. If no such referrals occur the excess capacity is filled 
with patients who are contactable at short notice rather than those most in need [188]. 
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(b) Waiting time policies 
When the number of patients on the waiting list exceed available surgical resources, 
achieving the Patients' Charter waiting time target can result in the admission of 
patients whose waiting time is approaching the imposed limit at the expense of patients 
in more urgent clinical need but who have waited a shorter time. Waiting list 
initiative monies cause a similar problem. This initiative was introduced in 1987 with 
the aim of eliminating the longest waiting lists. However, the monies are often for 
specific patients designated by the length of waiting time rather than clinical need, 
again distorting clinical priority. 
(c) Patient pressures and waiting list administration 
There may be considerable and highly variable pressure from the patients themselves 
or from their families and general practitioners to admit them for surgery earlier than 
others with similar symptoms, making it difficult for the provider to select patients 
solely according to clinical need. Patients also distort the waiting list in other ways, 
for example, by delaying surgery due to work or leisure commitments. 
The organisation of waiting lists makes it more difficult to select patients on the basis 
of clinical need [189]. The order of admission is dependent on how information about 
patients is stored and whether patients are easily contactable [188]. Patients 
contactable by phone and patients not working are more likely to be admitted. 
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7.6 Summary 
The decrease in variations in the availability and use of coronary revascularisation 
services and the increase in the sophistication of contracting suggest the reforms may 
have increased efficiency, both productive and allocative, and equity within the NHS. 
However, the large variations that remain and the contracting problems which prevail 
suggest the introduction of market mechanisms into the NHS is still a long way off 
achieving an efficient allocation of resources. 
The demand for coronary revascularisations procedures is predominantly managed by 
means of waiting lists. More effective management of waiting lists could potentially 
lead to improved efficiency by ensuring that the right patients got treated at the right 
time. An audit of waiting list management demonstrated that patients were often not 
treated within the appropriate time, as defined by a Canadian Urgency Score, 
indicating that they were not prioritised accurately according to their clinical need. 
Three hypotheses were put forward to explain the variations found between the 
appropriate and the actual waiting time. First, the variations were a result of 
inappropriate informal prioritisation systems. Second, the variations were a result of 
the Canadian criteria being unsuitable for use in a UK context. Third, the variations 
were a result of internal or external organisational factors creating difficulties in the 
implementation of any prioritisation systems. All three contribute potentially to the 
mismatch between actual and appropriate waiting times. 
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The development of guidelines to prioritise patients awaiting CABG might improve 
efficiency and benefit patients, providers and purchasers of health care services. By 
ensuring a more appropriate ranking of priority for treatment morbidity and mortality 
associated with waiting might be minimised, though such benefits would need to be 
demonstrated. Such guidelines could be incorporated into the contracting process to 
ensure patients are managed more efficiently and equitably, allowing standards to be 
met without having to distort clinical priority and thus maximising the potential gains 
in health from this speCialist service. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES: 
THE URGENCY SCORING SYSTEM 
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8.1 Introduction 
Patients were currently not always being managed in a way that maximises the 
potential benefits derived from coronary revascularisation services within the resources 
available. Long waiting times have always been a feature of the NHS. In Chapter 4 
it was stated that the number of deaths which occur while waiting for CABG is low 
and that the number of patients whose symptoms deteriorate is unknown. However 
if it is assumed that the delay itself causes the death of patients on the waiting list and 
that those patients whose symptoms deteriorate while waiting are at increased risk of 
operative and postoperative death, then there is a case for developing guidelines to 
ensure that the number of deaths are minimised and that the waiting lists are managed 
efficiently and fairly. 
Although such guidelines have been developed in other countries [173,176], none have 
yet been developed in the UK. The system of prioritisation used by clinicians in the 
UK was an informal one where allocations for surgery were made on an ad hoc basis 
by each individual clinician, often without the use of written criteria. As the previous 
Chapter demonstrated there seemed to be ample scope for improvement on these 
informal methods. The development of guidelines for prioritising patients awaiting 
coronary revascularisation was therefore recommended. 
Three assumptions had to be made in the development of such guidelines. First, that 
their use, by ensuring that those patients at risk of adverse cardiac events are given 
precedence over those who can more safely wait, will reduce the number of 
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unnecessary deaths. Second, that those patients defined by the guidelines as being at 
high risk of preoperative mortality and morbidity while waiting were those for whom 
the potential gains in health from surgery were the highest. Third, that referral to the 
waiting list was appropriate, that is only those patients with an ability to benefit from 
the intervention gained access. 
The aim of this part of the thesis was to develop guidelines that had the ability to 
prioritise patients according to their urgency of need. Having done that it would be 
possible to set a future research agenda for testing the three assumptions outlined 
above. 
8.2 Developing a scoring system 
The development of a scoring system involved the collaboration of three types of 
organisation: two health agencies in North Thames (Ealing, Hammersmith and 
Hounslow Health Agency and Brent and Harrow Health Agency), four provider units 
in North Thames Region (Hammersmith Hospital, Royal Brompton National Heart and 
Lung Hospital, St Mary's Hospital and Harefield Hospital), and an academic 
institution, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. 
Preliminary discussions regarding the nature of scoring systems took place between 
the health agencies and one selected provider, the Hammersmith Hospital, which was 
selected because of its links with the newly developing UK National Cardiac Register. 
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It was decided that the scoring system should be multifactorial and had to be 
acceptable to all participating providers. In the development of any guidelines, 
purchasers can either collaborate with providers in developing locally-agreed 
guidelines or adapt published guidelines for local use. The second option was chosen, 
predominantly because the development of scientifically valid guidelines is extremely 
resource expensive. As the Canadian guidelines had been developed by a consensus 
panel of selected cardiologists and cardiac surgeons and had been used in clinical 
practice, it was thought appropriate that the North Thames system should incorporate 
a similar set of variables [173]. 
The first stage of development involved cardiologists and cardiac surgeons from the 
Hammersmith Hospital identifying the variables that needed to be included. The 
variables were the same as those used in the Canadian study (symptom status, coronary 
anatomy, ischaemia, and left ventricular function), though the subcategories for each 
variable and the weights assigned to each subcategory were different. 
Symptom status was graded according to the Canadian Cardiovascular Society 
classification system [186] with an extra subcategory was added to reflect symptom 
stability (stable, recent deterioration, nocturnal angina). Coronary anatomy was 
divided into eight categories: left main stem stenosis with luminal occlusion of at 
least 50% and left dominant or occluded right coronary artery; left main stem stenosis 
with luminal occlusion of at least 50%; three-vessel disease with proximal left anterior 
descending (LAD) arterial involvement; three-vessel disease without proximal LAD 
arterial involvement; double-vessel disease with proximal LAD arterial involvement; 
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single-vessel disease with proximal LAD arterial involvement; double or single-vessel 
disease without proximal LAD arterial involvement; and normal. Ischaemia was 
defined on the basis of non-invasive tests, using heart rate at onset of myocardial 
ischaemia on treadmill testing to define the subcategories: greater than 130, 100 to 
130; and less than 100. Left ventricular function was divided into three categories: 
poor (ejection fraction (EF) ofless than 30); fair (EF of between 30 and 49); and good 
(EF of greater than 49). 
The weights assigned to each factor were chosen by the group of Hammersmith 
clinicians based on their clinical experience of how predictive each risk factor was of 
preoperative mortality or morbidity. It was an additive scoring system where the 
resulting score fell into one of five categories: less than 10 points should be treated 
within 12 months; between 11 and 20 points, treated within 6 months; between 21 and 
30 points, treated within 3 months; greater than 30 points, treated within 1 month; and 
emergency cases, which were not placed on a waiting list. 
The second step was to obtain a wider consensus. Selected cardiologists and cardiac 
surgeons from the four London providers were invited to attend a consultation 
semmar. A number of representatives were present from each provider with the 
exception of St Mary's. The scoring system that resulted from the consultation 
seminar was sent to the cardiologists and cardiac surgeons at St Mary's to obtain their 
views. They considered no changes were necessary and accepted the system. 
At the consultation seminar, views on the Hammersmith Hospital scoring system were 
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sought. The objective of the seminar was to reach a consensus on four issues: the 
appropriateness of the four clinical variables included; the appropriateness of the 
subcategories within each cl.inical variable; the weight which was assigned to each 
subcategory; and the suitability of the waiting time categories. A consensus was 
reached regarding the changes required for all four issues under discussion. 
The resulting scoring system is shown in Figure 8.1. It was agreed that the scoring 
system could only be applied to patients on a surgical waiting list and therefore 
excluded emergency referrals. The four variables used in the Canadian system and the 
time frames suggested by the Hammersmith team were not disputed. The changes 
proposed at the seminar related to the subcategories of each variable and the weight 
given to each subcategory. In terms of the subcategories, the clinicians felt that 'rest 
pain in hospital', which was not included in the draft system, was a particularly bad 
prognostic symptom and therefore a good predictor of preoperative mortality. A 
separate category in the 'symptom status' section was added therefore to include this 
risk factor. With respect to ischaemia it was agreed that referring clinicians would 
decide whether the patient's exercise test was normal, equivocal, positive or strongly 
positive, rather than use the heart rate at onset of myocardial ischaemia. Given that 
some patients are unable to undertake exercise tests due to comorbidity, the referring 
clinicians would be required to allocate the patient to the most suitable category based 
on other clinical factors. 
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Figure 8.1: Urgency Scoring System 
CLINICAL FACTOR 
I. SYMPTOM STATUS 
Angina Status 
O[ ] = Asymptomatic 
I [ ] = No limitation of ordinary physical activity 
2( ] = Ordinary physical activity causes discomfort 
3[ ] = Moderate/great limitation of ordinary physical activity 
4[ ] = Unable to perform physical activity without discomfort 
Symptom Stability 
O[ ] = Stable 
I [ ] = Recent deterioration 
2[ ] = Nocturnal angina 
Rest pain in hospital, on maximum medical therapy 
2 CORONARY ANA TOMY 
O[ ] = Normal 
I [ ] = Single/Double vessel without LAD stenosis 
2[ ] = Single vessel + proximal LAD stenosis 
3[ ] = Double vessel + proximal LAD stenosis 
4[ ] = Three vessel + no proximal LAD stenosis 
5[ ] = Three vessel + proximal LAD stenosis 
6[ ] = LMS > 50% 
7[ ] = LMS > 50%, left dominant or occluded RCA 
3. ISCHAEMIA 
Results of Exercise Test 
SCORE 
0 
2 
4 
6 
10 
0 
5 
10 
Yes [ 
No [ 
0 
I 
4 
6 
6 
10 
15 
20 
(if a patient has not had an exercise test the procedure to follow is; a patient with acute 
coronary syndrome should be allocated to box 3, other patients should be allocated to a box 
at the cardiologists discretion) 
4. 
O[ ] = Normal 
I [ ] = Equivocal 
2[ ] = Positive 
3[ ] = Strongly positive 
LEFT VENTRICULAR FUNCTION 
I [ ] = Good (ejection fraction >50) 
2( ] = Fair (ejection fraction 30-49) 
3[ ] = Poor (ejection fraction <30) 
WAITING LIST PRIORITY SCORE 
PRIORITY SCORE TIMING 
1 [ ] = < II 1 year 
2[ ] = 11-20 points: < 6 months 
3[ ] = 21-30 points: < 3 months 
4[ ] = > 30 points: < I month 
5[ ] = Emergency case, not referred onto the waiting list 
LAD=left anterior descending. LMS=left main stem, RCA=right coronary artery. 
o 
2 
5 
10 
o 
4 
6 
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The weights were determined in two ways, by consideration of those used in the 
Canadian Urgency Scoring System (which had been generated by means of a 
regression based model) and by each individual clinician's experience of the impact 
of each clinical factor. The resulting weight defined the variable's ability in 
influencing the level of urgency for treatment. The only change thought necessary to 
the weights assigned by the Hammersmith team were those relating to the coronary 
anatomy. It was considered necessary to give more weight to patients with three-
vessel disease and left main stem disease. The inflation factor thought necessary was 
agreed. The agreed Urgency Scoring System had a minimum score of 0 and a 
maximum score of 56. 
8.3 Future research and audit agenda 
The first assumption that underpins the scoring system is that it will improve 
efficiency as cases at high risk of sudden death, and cases likely to show improvement 
in the short-term, are given priority over those who can more safely wait thereby 
reducing the number of unnecessary deaths. In order to test this hypothesis the 
proposed scoring system will be validated prospectively in the four Hospitals. This 
will highlight for which group of patients delay is likely to cause either mortality or 
morbidity. The scoring system, as it stands at present, is based on a consensus of 
local clinicians and is therefore open to varying opinions. The prospective analysis 
will allow it to be validated and adapted to locally-agreed and accepted criteria. It is 
envisaged that this process of validation will be ongoing in order to modify the 
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Urgency Scoring System 10 the light of changing technology and the patient 
population. 
The proposed study design for the prospective analysis is a before and after study. 
Baseline data will be collected prospectively for a period defined by the study size 
required to show a significant change after which the urgency score will be put into 
routine use and evaluated prospectively for a time period matching the recruitment 
period. The study will aim to analyse the natural history of the disease while waiting. 
A comparison will be made between appropriate and actual waiting times and between 
outcomes (mortality and morbidity) before and after implementation. The actual 
process of implementation will also be evaluated including the constraints experienced. 
The reasons why patients deviate from appropriate waiting times will be explored. 
To evaluate the effect of the Urgency Scoring System over the long-term, it is 
proposed that a cohort of patients recruited in the prospective study be followed-up 
for five years to assess its effects on long-term mortality and morbidity. The system 
will be reviewed annually and modified as necessary. 
The second assumption was that patients at high risk of adverse consequences of 
waiting for coronary revascularisation, as defined by the score, were also those with 
the potential to benefit significantly from the intervention. In this context benefit is 
defined in terms of improvement in life expectancy and relief of symptoms. 
Conceptually this is simple - priority should go to those likely to show the greatest 
increase in life years, the greatest reduction in symptoms or a combination of the two. 
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As was seen in Chapter 4 RCTs have shown that CABG offers greater benefits than 
medical therapy to patients with three-vessel disease and left main stem disease. Poor 
left ventricular function and a positive exercise test also affect survival after surgery 
when combined with other risk factors. All four of these variables were included in 
the Urgency Scoring System. Given that there have been significant improvements 
in techniques since the RCTs were conducted, continued assessment of this association 
is required. 
This could be achieved by following up those patients in the prospective study to see 
if those patients who were urgent cases as defined by the urgency score were also 
those with the potential to benefit significantly from surgery. Follow-up to 5 years 
assessing long-term outcomes. 
The third assumption underpinning the guidelines was that selection of cases to join 
cardiac waiting lists was appropriate. Studies reviewed in Chapter 4 have 
demonstrated that this is not always the case. Despite the methods used in those 
studies being open to criticism, the significant variations in utilisation rates that exist 
in the UK (Chapter 5) suggest that access is not as appropriate as it could be. Access 
to cardiac surgery waiting lists should therefore be audited using guidelines developed 
by the British Cardiac Society and the American College of Cardiology and American 
Heart Association on the appropriate use of coronary revascularisation procedures, or 
by using the 'appropriateness criteria' developed by RAND for auditing the use of 
CABG in the UK [88]. 
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8.4 Discussion 
Guidelines for assessing urgency were developed by a group of UK clinicians based 
on a scoring system developed in Canada with the aim of maximising the benefits 
derived from surgery, thereby increasing efficiency. The ability of the scoring system 
to improve efficiency will depend on the validity of the assumptions upon which it is 
based. 
The development of these guidelines should be considered as the first step to 
improving efficiency. Although the guidelines were based on others developed and 
validated elsewhere, they were modified by UK clinicians and their validity is 
therefore uncertain. Testing the guidelines prospectively in a number of providers is 
therefore needed. Furthermore, the economic consequences of introducing such 
guidelines should be evaluated. Guideline development, implementation and 
dissemination has associated costs and should only be implemented if the benefits of 
improved efficiency outweigh these costs. 
There are, however, good arguments for purchasers and providers to adopt guidelines 
which aim to allocate surgery on the basis of urgency of need. Delaying surgery may 
cause patients to destabilise on the waiting list causing them to be admitted as an 
emergency hospital admission. This could displace other patients on the waiting list, 
increasing operative risk and thereby reducing the capacity to benefit. Of course 
mortality is not the primary reason for prioritising patients as deaths on waiting lists 
are rare. The main reason is to increase patients' quality of life (shortening patients' 
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duration of symptoms) and to reduce the economlC and psychosocial burdens 
associated with waiting. For many patients and for society, long waits are not an ideal 
rationing mechanism because the total benefits gained from the intervention are less 
when long waits are involved. Since revascularisation procedures are typically done 
on relatively old people, the number of years over which benefits can be enjoyed is 
reduced by waiting for treatment. 
Pressure is on both purchasers and providers to manage demand for coronary 
revascularisation services more efficiency and fairly, especially as ever shorter waiting 
time targets are included in the Patient's Charter. Purchasers could require, through 
contracts, that providers treat patients in accordance with a particular waiting time 
based on their urgency score. This would assure providers that purchasers are 
committed to buying an appropriate waiting time for all their patients rather than 
supply a specified block of procedures. It would also put providers in a better position 
to meet the targets set out in the Patient's Charter. Furthermore, if scores were 
monitored consistently in all hospitals, purchasers could identify areas of inequality 
of access which could then be addressed by a redistribution of resources or a 
reallocation of patients to other providers. 
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8.S Summary 
One strategy for improving efficiency through the contracting process is through the 
better management of patients on coronary revascularisation waiting lists. This 
Chapter has outlined the development of a set of urgency guidelines which aims to 
prioritise patients according to their urgency of need. The crucial assumption that 
underpins the development of the scoring system is that their use will reduce 
preoperative and postoperative mortality and morbidity, thereby improving efficiency 
in the use of coronary revascularisation services. The future research agenda required 
to test this assumption has been outlined. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
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9.1 Introduction 
This Chapter will (1) review the objectives of this thesis, summarise the findings and 
discuss any methodological limitations, (2) outline the implications of these findings 
for health care policy and (3) suggest an agenda for future research. 
9.2 Review of main findings 
The aim of the thesis was to assess the impact of the 1991 health care reforms on the 
British National Health Service with respect to one specialist service, coronary 
revascularisation, using an economic framework and to examine ways in which greater 
improvements in social welfare could be achieved. 
The first objective was to describe the 1991 reforms of the NHS. The main concept 
behind the reforms was the creation of a competitive market within the framework of 
public provision and finance brought about by the separation of responsibility for 
funding and providing health services. The idea was that a competitive market would 
be created on the supply side and that competition would take place between existing 
hospitals (providers of health care) for contracts offered by DHAs and GPFHs 
(purchasers of health care). The introduction of market mechanisms occurred in stages 
alongside other policy changes which aimed to shift some resources to primary care 
services and to give patients more rights regarding the quality of the health care they 
received. 
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The second ohjective was to select relevant economic criteria for assessing the impact 
of the reforms on social welfare. The assessment criteria used in this thesis were 
taken from the branch of economics known as welfare economics which considers 
social welfare as having two dimensions, those of economic efficiency and 
distributional justice (equity). These two criteria involve predicting or analysing how 
changes in resource allocation brought about by government policy affects social 
welfare. Predominantly, the thesis was concerned with efficiency, both productive and 
allocative. Equity, in terms of equal access for equal need, was used to describe the 
distributional aspects of the reforms. 
Tile third ohjective was to apply these criteria to coronary revascularisation services 
in a large representative sample of the UK. In order to assess whether the change in 
resource allocations brought about by the introduction of market mechanisms had been 
instrumental in improving efficiency the patterns and trends in the availability, 
utilisation and cost of coronary revascularisation services were reviewed. In summary, 
there were no significant changes in the availability of revascularisation services 
between 1991 and 1994 in terms of consultant cardiac surgical and cardiology staff. 
In contrast, the number of non-consultant cardiac surgical staff increased while the 
number of cardiac surgical beds fell in two Regions and increased in two. Wide inter-
regional differences were found which either decreased or stayed the same over time 
indicating some improvement in allocative efficiency. 
The NHS utilisation rate for CABO and PTCA increased between 1987 and 1994 but 
at a decreasing rate. There was also an increase in private provision, an increase in 
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the age of patients and a decrease in the ratio of males to females undergoing the 
operation. Wide inter-regional and inter-district variations were found which were 
mainly due to differences in supply. These variations decreased over time indicating 
a move towards greater allocative efficiency and equality of access. There was little 
change in the price of these procedures over time. Prices were unlikely to represent 
true costs and thus efficiency, despite government regulations that prices should equate 
with average cost, because the costing methods differed across providers. These 
trends, therefore, may imply no change in productive efficiency, an improvement in 
real terms or an improvement in the costing methods. Prices were found to vary 
between providers, probably due to differences in costing methods rather than 
differences in productive efficiency. 
A number of methodological limitations should be noted. First, detecting any 
measurable impact of the reforms was limited by the short period of time over which 
the trends in availability and utilisation of coronary revascularisation procedures could 
be assessed. Second, attributing the trends found to the reforms is complicated by the 
effects of concurrent policy changes and the diffusion process of new technologies. 
Other policy changes, which may have made some contribution to the trends found, 
included 'The Health of the Nation' [11], the Tomlinson Report [12] and the Patient's 
Charter [13]. Also, as PTCA was a relatively new technology and the provision of 
CABG was still expanding, large variations in the rate of use of these procedures were 
expected. A further reduction in variation may be expected over the coming years 
simply as a consequence of increasing the availability of revascularisation services. 
Third, as no account had been taken of the variations in the need for coronary 
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revascularisation services, the severity of cases, the quality of service, or costs, it was 
difficult to attribute the decrease in variations in availability and use of coronary 
revascularisation services to improvements in allocative efficiency. Fourth, the use of 
total bed numbers and WTE staffing levels as indicators of resource availability may 
have led to misleading results for a number of reasons: Coronary revascularisation 
beds were difficult to separate out from the bed allocations of other specialties; 
cardiologists were only included if their main base was at the specialist centre which 
may have led to an underestimation of the number of cardiologists; and defining the 
number of staff by the use of WTEs made it difficult to distinguish an actual rise in 
resource availability from a reduction in the number of working hours. 
The fourth objective was to assess how the contracting process had influenced these 
observed changes. The contracting process developed over the first four years and 
purchasing skills became more sophisticated. However, given the considerable 
problems faced by both purchasers and providers and the administrative costs 
associated with purchasing it is likely that, if anything, the contracting process has had 
a negative impact on social welfare. 
Purchasers were concerned about the increase in demand for CABG and PTCA, in part 
brought about by initiatives set up by providers, which put an ever increasing burden 
on their limited budget. More efficient use of resources was made difficult by 
purchasers' inability to make meaningful comparisons between the quality and cost of 
providers' services due to the paucity of accurate and comparable information. 
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Providers' concerns seem to have become more acute since the introduction of market 
mechanisms. In the first year of the reforms their main concern was how to deal with 
the contracting process. By the third year, providers were more concerned about the 
future. Some providers experienced an increase in demand for their services with no 
associated increase in the resources available. This problem was exacerbated in some 
districts by the effects of the new resource allocation formula. Although some 
providers attempted to secure longer term contracts to create greater stability and thus 
enable service developments to be carried out, purchasers were reluctant to commit 
themselves for longer than 12 months. Providers felt they were also subject to unfair 
competition in the market place and an inability to maintain clinical need as the basis 
of selecting patients. 
It is possible that these views of the reforms were not representative and that the 
problems which have occurred as a result of the introduction of the contracting system 
have either been overstated or understated. However, a representative from each of 
the ten NHS providers in the four regions studied were interviewed in each of the 
three years (1992-1994). Purchasers in each region were also interviewed on a sample 
basis in each of the three years. They were selected with the advice of local NHS 
staff as being particularly interested and active in contracting for these services. As 
the four regions studied were selected to ensure representation of different historical 
levels of provision, population density, geographical location and initial approaches to 
purchasing, it is probable that the views obtained were representative. The analysis 
was qualitative in that the aim was to determine the views that existed not to count 
their frequency. 
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The fifth objective was to determine whether and how the management of demand for 
coronary revascularisation services could be improved. The quantitative and 
qualitative analyses had demonstrated the changes which had occurred since the 
introduction of market mechanisms into the NHS in 1991. The decrease in variations 
in the availability and use of coronary revascularisation services and the increase in 
the sophistication of contracting suggest the reforms have increased efficiency, both 
productive and allocative, and equity within the NHS. However, the large variations 
that remain and the contracting problems which prevail signify that the introduction 
of market mechanisms into the NHS is a long way off achieving an efficient allocation 
of resources. 
There are a number of reasons why market mechanisms failed in the first three years 
to reallocate health care resources in a way that significantly improved social welfare. 
The major obstacles seemed to be market failure and inappropriate regulation. A 
strategy for improving social welfare would involve managing the market for coronary 
revascularisations more effectively to overcome these market failures. 
Most revascularisations are performed as elective rather than emergency procedures, 
therefore the management of demand for coronary revascularisation services takes 
place predominantly on waiting lists. More effective management of waiting lists 
could potentially lead to improved efficiency by ensuring the right patients were 
getting treated at the right time. An audit of waiting list management in three 
hospitals demonstrated that patients were often not treated within the appropriate time, 
as defined by a Canadian Urgency Score, indicating that they were not prioritised 
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accurately according to their clinical need. The potential to improve efficiency by 
more effective management of coronary revascularisation waiting lists therefore 
existed. 
It could be argued that the management of waiting lists in each of the three hospitals 
studied was not representative of all cardiac centres in the UK. However, most 
cardiac centres have there own informal guidelines, which generally consist of three 
categories (urgent, soon, routine). A similar proportion of patients were delayed 
(treated later than their surgeons had planned) in the three hospitals (11%) as were 
delayed in a larger sample of ten NHS hospitals studied in 1992/93 (8%). This 
suggests that all hospitals find managing demand for coronary revascularisation 
services equally difficult and that the three hospitals chosen for this study were not 
atypical. 
9.3 Implications for Health Care Policy 
TIle sixth objective was to make recommendations to improve social welfare. Market 
failure and inappropriate regulation have prevented market mechanisms from achieving 
an efficient allocation of resources. Greater social welfare could potentially be 
achieved by more effective management of the market and more appropriate regulation 
by the government. General recommendations for managing health care markets more 
effectively and for improving the appropriateness of government regulation have been 
outlined elsewhere [40,43]. 
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In relation to coronary revascularisation services a number of suggestions and 
recommendations can be made with the aim of improving social welfare: 
9.3.1 Improving social welfare 
Health care markets will improve efficiency if a number of conditions exist. First, 
purchasers must be able to make cost and quality comparisons between providers to 
ensure that they are operating efficiently. The theory is that those who are operating 
inefficiently will be forced out of the market. However, this thesis has shown that 
purchasers were unable to choose the most efficient provider because of their inability 
to make meaningful comparisons between providers due to the paucity of accurate and 
comparable information. There are a number of ways to improve information on cost. 
The development of a system for coding and pricing groups of treatments (Healthcare 
Resource Groups) will allow more accurate understanding of providers' costs, 
furthermore if purchasers request providers to supply information on pricing strategies 
it will become more apparent if prices differ between providers because of differences 
in efficiency. 
In addition to improving knowledge on the comparative costs of coronary 
revascularisation services purchasers should assess the quality of care and request 
providers to supply information on certain accepted measures, for example, risk-
adjusted mortality. Most providers have started to collect data on the outcomes of 
care. The British Society of Cardiothoracic Surgeons has recommended the use of a 
clinical database (Patient Analysis and Tracking System) which has the capacity of 
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generating risk-adjusted outcomes and a national database is currently being piloted 
for both CABO and PTCA. Purchasers should ensure that their main providers are 
using a similar approach to measuring outcomes so that they can be compared between 
providers and that newly acquired clinical databases are compatible with those 
recommended by the Society. 
Second, by separating purchasing from provision and by allowing OPs to hold budgets, 
the reforms created a purchasing function that encouraged concentration on the health 
needs of the population. Efficiency would be improved if purchasers were successful 
in avoiding health care which is inappropriate rather than avoiding health care which 
is expensive. Few purchasers were able to assess the level of need in the population 
or the appropriateness of referrals for these procedures due to lack of information. 
Purchasers should start to move away from purchasing these services on the basis of 
historical levels of activity and use proxy measures of need (for example, standardised 
mortality ratios) to determine how many procedures to purchase. It is recommended 
that purchasers monitor the appropriateness of referrals and encourage their main 
providers to achieve a professional consensus on referral guidelines. 
Revascularisation should be restricted to those patients most likely to benefit. The 
development of clinical guidelines, which are informed by the results of RCTs, may 
help to ensure that those patients who can benefit most from revascularisation services 
are given priority and that treatment is received within an appropriate time period. 
However, given that the purchasers' budgets are limited, they should assess the relative 
benefits of revascularisation services compared to other health services in order to 
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maximise the health benefits from the resources available. 
9.3.2 Prioritisation of waiting list patients 
This thesis focused on one method of improving social welfare. It was demonstrated 
that the right patients were not always being treated at the right time. This may have 
been the result of a number of factors including inappropriate informal prioritisation 
systems or the adverse effects of the contracting process. It was recommended that 
the management of demand be improved by the development of guidelines aimed at 
prioritising patients awaiting coronary revascularisation services. The guidelines 
developed for the purposes of this study were based on the Canadian guidelines and 
adapted by local clinicians, they were therefore open to varying opinions and required 
validation. However, it is recommended that rather than wait until the guidelines have 
been validated. they should be implemented and their effect on short-term mortality 
and morbidity reviewed. Data on each patient allocated surgery on the basis of the 
guidelines should be collected and the progress of the guidelines monitored. One 
hospital has already taken up the use of these guidelines for managing coronary 
revascularisation patients. 
9.4 Future research agenda 
TI.e final objective was to suggest a future research agenda consequent on the results 
of this thesis. A number of suggestions, relating to the development of urgency 
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guidelines, have already been discussed in Chapter 8 and will not be repeated here. 
This thesis has made recommendations for managmg the market for coronary 
revascularisation services more efficiently. It addressed, in detail, one area where 
efficiency could be improved. There are a number of other strategies for improving 
efficiency not addressed in this thesis. For example, an audit of the production 
processes and costs of coronary revascularisation services may reveal areas where 
productive efficiency could be improved. This thesis also did not address issues 
regarding the humanity of care. The urgency guidelines studied included only clinical 
factors and no social factors such as the influence of work status. It is therefore 
recommended that a prospective study considers the influence social factors should 
have on how long patients wait for treatment. 
This study has outlined the difficulties of analysing the effects of the reforms on social 
welfare in the short-term. It is recommended that the monitoring of these trends is 
continued over the long-term. It is unclear over what time period the reforms should 
be monitored given that the nature of the market is continually evolving. However, 
given that most of the structural developments of the health care market have already 
taken place and that the resource allocation formula has been introduced into all 
Regions, monitoring these trends for another three to four years should be sufficient. 
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APPENDIX II 
AGE-SEX STANDARDISED RATES: INTRAREGIONAL NHS CASES 
Table IIa: AKe-sex standardised rates (per million aKed >24 years) of CABG 
and PTCA in districts of E. AnKlian redon: intrargional NHS 
~ 
District CABG PTCA 
87/ 89/ 911 92/ 93/ 87/ 89/ 911 92/ 93/ 
88 90 92 93 94 88 90 92 93 94 
Cambridge 239 349 377 507 628 12 101 158 205 285 
Peterbro' 244 196 332 407 477 22 66 51 96 98 
W. Suffolk 240 352 488 491 554 7 83 123 148 252 
E. Suffolk 124 155 281 371 458 11 97 87 143 251 
Norwich 273 299 315 347 450 12 37 66 78 130 
Yannouth 130 182 192 212 282 8 56 40 64 104 
W. Norfolk 146 226 239 207 274 14 22 78 36 63 
Huntington 298 382 568 641 548 17 26 195 223 291 
Region II 213 261 330 377 456 II 12 76 92 116 178 
No. per 138 172 221 253 306 8 50 62 78 119 
million 
total pop" 
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Table lib: Ale-sex standardised rates (per million aled >24 years) of CABG 
and PTCA in districts of N. Western region: intraregional NBS 
cases 
District CABG PTCA 
87/ 89/ 91/ 92/ 93/ 87/ 89/ 91/ 92/ 93/ 
88 90 92 93 94 88 90 92 93 94 
Lancaster 188 299 105 287 309 26 103 100 100 128 
Blackpool 460 444 510 588 669 55 61 66 30 217 
Preston 276 286 385 457 257 88 85 112 12 72 
Blackburn 164 205 310 324 421 40 80 74 74 133 
Burnley 220 314 381 425 411 20 59 58 38 58 
West 143 261 419 418 204 28 85 102 76 64 
Lancashire 
Chorley 201 330 243 256 261 16 53 66 66 43 
Bolton 261 314 336 409 506 25 77 18 81 75 
Bury 402 454 390 374 539 114 44 68 141 142 
North 350 575 433 545 570 97 187 134 149 156 
Manchester 
Central 951 1091 949 1077 931 225 482 280 469 184 
Manchester 
South 445 584 772 537 718 91 157 130 130 299 
Manchester 
Oldham 256 267 298 260 271 49 64 22 64 82 
Rochdale 349 458 559 722 618 23 97 67 252 171 
Salford 153 313 424 342 375 150 168 130 195 187 
Stockport 409 482 575 433 455 118 66 125 134 148 
Tameside 286 564 530 485 487 114 141 156 104 101 
Trafford 306 288 542 440 448 116 117 181 142 165 
Wigan 253 312 428 476 508 83 III 112 95 177 
Region 315 402 461 471 493 76 106 99 115 144 
No. per 205 261 304 311 325 49 69 65 76 95 
million total 
popn 
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Table lie: 
District 
Brighton 
Eastboume 
Hastings 
S.E. Kent 
Canterburyl 
Thanet 
Dartfordl 
Gravesham 
Maidstone 
Medway 
Tunbridge 
Wells 
Bexley 
Greenwich 
Bromley 
W. Lambeth 
Camberwell 
Lewisham 
NS 
I Region I 
No. per 
million total 
pop· 
Age-sex standardised rates (per million aged >24 years) of CABG 
and PTCA in districts of S.E. Thames region: intraregional NBS 
cases 
CABG PTCA 
871 891 911 92/ 93/ 87/ 89/ 91/ 921 93/ 
88 90 92 93 94 88 90 92 93 94 
332 340 434 508 628 74 156 220 307 296 
149 218 249 345 465 37 95 263 303 297 
393 507 485 475 599 64 213 239 270 463 
276 330 357 383 478 151 136 173 238 356 
175 281 285 401 407 22 149 163 284 261 
479 447 512 510 677 41 151 482 513 462 
280 313 558 542 826 168 334 516 575 650 
355 342 336 443 447 20 151 259 182 237 
498 409 344 354 459 90 95 268 243 288 
542 668 775 674 881 62 687 854 1195 956 
610 756 786 760 964 141 660 1109 1443 1467 
173 191 312 388 528 81 239 265 383 383 
119 374 344 335 435 107 101 267 252 254 
442 556 727 791 951 329 274 673 1096 1185 
415 539 615 579 547 227 277 396 490 337 
339 392 448 475 589 102 235 377 476 477 
224 263 300 318 395 67 157 253 319 320 
226 
Table lId: Aee-sex standardised rates (per million aeed >24 years) of CABG 
and PTCA in districts of G. Glaseow re&ion: intrare&ional NHS 
cases 
District I CABG II PTCA I 
871 891 911 921 931 871 891 911 921 931 
88 90 92 93 94 88 90 92 93 94 
Greater 526 541 855 879 799 188 226 316 301 240 
Glasgow 
Lanarkshire 377 360 475 513 650 75 162 186 203 222 
Ayr/Arran 411 467 578 672 550 61 79 195 220 197 
Region 461 475 687 730 704 130 177 252 256 225 
No. per million 295 309 453 482 465 83 115 166 169 149 
total pop" 
227 
APPENDIX III 
AGE-SEX STANDARDISED RATES: 
INTRA AND EXTRAREGIONAL NHS CASES 
Table IlIa: Age-sex standardised rates (per million aged >24 years) of CABG 
and PTCA in districts of E. Anglian region: intra and extra regional 
NHS cases. 
District CABG PTCA 
87/ 89/ 91/ 92/ 93/ 87/ 89/ 91/ 92/ 93/ 
88 90 92 93 94 88 90 92 93 94 
Cambridge 239 349 382 515 633 12 101 158 205 285 
Peterbro' 244 196 346 407 477 22 66 51 96 98 
W. Suffolk 240 352 495 505 561 14 83 123 155 259 
E. Suffolk 124 159 294 394 462 11 97 87 152 260 
Norwich 273 304 321 355 450 12 37 66 81 139 
Yannouth 130 182 192 212 294 8 56 40 70 104 
W. Norfolk 146 226 239 221 274 14 22 78 36 63 
Huntington 298 382 568 641 548 17 261 195 223 294 
Region 213 261 332 387 459 13 76 92 120 183 
No. per 138 172 222 259 308 
I 
8 
I 
50 
I 
62 
I 
80 
I 
123 
I 
million total 
pop' 
228 
Table IIIb: Ale-sex standardised rates (per million aled >24 years) of CABG 
and PTCA in districts of N. Western reeion: intra and 
extrargional NHS cases 
District CABG PTCA 
871 891 91/ 921 931 871 891 91/ 921 931 
88 90 92 93 94 88 90 92 93 94 
Lancaster 188 310 105 287 309 26 103 100 100 128 
Blackpool 460 444 513 592 669 55 61 71 30 217 
Preston 278 286 397 457 257 88 85 Il2 12 72 
Blackburn 164 205 316 324 421 40 80 74 85 133 
Burnley 220 399 446 458 450 26 59 78 38 58 
West 257 318 535 504 424 71 155 141 142 131 
Lancashire 
Chorley 201 339 251 256 261 16 53 66 73 43 
Bolton 261 314 336 409 512 25 77 18 68 76 
Bury 402 463 390 382 539 128 44 78 141 142 
North 350 575 433 557 570 97 187 134 160 144 
Manchester 
Central 951 1091 949 1077 931 239 482 296 469 184 
Manchester 
South 445 584 782 537 727 91 138 130 130 299 
Manchester 
Oldham 256 267 305 260 279 49 64 22 64 82 
Rochdale 364 480 567 722 618 23 97 67 252 171 
Salford 153 313 437 342 375 150 168 130 195 187 
Stockport 409 476 575 427 455 118 66 125 134 148 
Tameside 286 564 530 485 487 114 141 156 110 101 
Trafford 313 288 542 440 448 116 117 181 142 172 
Wigan 259 312 450 493 521 83 III 117 102 183 
Region 319 411 483 478 504 78 107 102 119 146 
No. per million 207 267 312 315 333 51 70 67 79 96 
total pop. 
229 
Table IIIc: Age-sex standardised rates (per million aged >24 years) of CABG 
and PTCA in districts of S.E. Thames region: intra and 
extra regional NHS cases 
District CABG PTCA 
871 891 911 921 931 871 891 911 921 931 
88 90 92 93 94 88 90 92 93 94 
Brighton 332 349 459 518 628 74 161 234 307 301 
Eastboume 149 237 271 428 475 33 101 283 323 320 
Hastings 393 540 503 495 608 81 249 248 270 463 
S.E. Kent 281 341 373 404 494 151 136 173 238 361 
Canterburyl 175 292 299 362 411 26 154 173 299 261 
Thanet 
Dartfordl 485 509 527 531 683 41 152 489 513 475 
Gravesham 
Maidstone 287 328 595 556 849 183 350 540 617 657 
Medway 360 346 347 476 456 20 151 263 195 251 
Tunbridge 498 431 366 376 481 97 95 275 257 325 
Wells 
Bexley 555 727 825 709 888 62 694 862 1195 998 
Greenwich 610 763 802 760 1012 141 668 1117 1450 1475 
Bromley 187 339 495 537 801 96 263 303 412 456 
W. Lambeth 137 731 830 996 544 119 222 543 378 351 
Camberwell 450 604 779 867 1029 346 292 698 1I11 1226 
Lewisham 425 573 641 635 557 227 281 423 496 342 
NS 
Region 1344 1 439 1 503 1540 1 631 11107 1248 1 401 I 490 1 499 1 
No. per 227 294 337 362 423 I 
71 
1
166
1 
269 
I 
328 
I 
334 
I million total pop" 
230 
Table IUd: Ale-sex standardised rates (per million aled >24 yean) of CABG 
and PTCA in districts of G. GlasloW reeion: intra and 
extrarelional NHS cases 
District CABG PTCA 
871 89/ 91/ 92/ 93/ 87/ 89/ 91/ 921 93/ 
88 90 92 93 94 88 90 92 93 94 
Greater 526 541 857 882 799 188 226 316 306 240 
Glasgow 
Lanarkshire 377 360 475 513 650 75 162 186 203 222 
Ayr/Arran 411 467 578 672 550 61 79 195 220 197 
Region 461 475 687 734 704 130 177 253 258 225 
No. per 295 309 453 484 465 83 115 167 170 149 
m ill ion total 
popn 
231 
APPENDIX IV 
AGE-SEX STANDARDISED RATES: PRIVATE CASES 
Table IVa: Ale-sex standardised rates (per million aled >24 years) of CABG 
and PTCA in districts of E. Anglian region: private cases 
District CABO PTCA 
87/ 89/ 911 92/ 931 87/ 89/ 911 92/ 93/ 
88 90 92 93 94 88 90 92 93 94 
Cambridge 24 65 97 120 62 12 33 51 78 125 
Peterbro' 7 58 89 102 75 0 0 0 50 22 
w. Suffolk 42 82 101 50 101 0 0 13 41 52 
E. Suffolk 14 60 71 140 101 0 10 14 56 63 
Norwich 26 38 66 74 75 0 9 14 8 31 
Yannouth 14 21 55 20 38 0 21 0 0 7 
W. Norfolk 7 33 36 49 28 0 0 0 0 29 
Huntington 0 92 118 69 142 0 13 75 0 77 
Region 19 52 75 81 75 I 2 11 18 30 49 
No. per 12 34 50 54 50 1 7 12 20 33 
mi1lion total 
pop" 
232 
Table IVb: Ale-sex standardised rates (per million aled >24 yean) of CABG 
and PTCA in districts of N. Western reeion: private cases 
District CABG PTCA 
87/ 89/ 91/ 92/ 93/ 87/ 89/ 91/ 92/ 93/ 
88 90 92 93 94 88 90 92 93 94 
Lancaster 11 21 22 53 80 0 23 11 0 34 
Blackpool 13 17 86 55 47 0 0 0 16 22 
Preston 24 24 24 24 84 25 12 0 0 0 
Blackburn 40 17 74 23 70 17 40 29 23 17 
Burnley 27 33 84 46 62 0 0 0 12 19 
West 28 41 40 68 203 0 13 0 37 40 
Lancashire 
Chorley 16 52 98 28 67 15 8 7 16 15 
Bolton 36 47 64 92 53 19 6 30 48 16 
Bury 132 103 126 192 163 0 18 42 68 87 
North 55 11 35 84 46 0 11 0 0 0 
Manchester 
Central 0 14 31 57 30 0 0 14 14 16 
Manchester 
South 123 118 63 55 129 9 18 0 46 9 
Manchester 
Oldham 48 22 64 58 128 0 14 21 0 22 
Rochdale 74 51 84 109 III 0 7 0 59 37 
Salford 31 39 90 71 65 0 13 20 20 6 
Stockport 138 131 119 137 217 10 35 48 75 65 
Tameside 25 41 90 91 80 12 0 5 17 34 
Trafford 103 90 128 134 168 42 48 67 82 20 
Wigan 31 34 61 85 90 10 20 10 30 5 
Region I 52 I 50 I 81 I 83 I 102 II 9 I 16 I 19 I 33 I 26 
No. per million 34 33 53 55 67 I 6 I 10 I 13 I 22 I 17 total pop. 
I 
I 
233 
Table IVe: AKe-sex standardised rates (per million aKed >24 years) of CABG 
and PTCA in districts of G. GlasKow relrion: private cases 
District CABG I PTCA I 
87/ 89/ 91/ 92/ 93/ 87/ 89/ 91/ 92/ 93/ 
88 90 92 93 94 88 90 92 93 94 
Greater 19 65 55 183 117 0 8 45 25 2 
Glasgow 
Lanarkshire 0 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 0 0 
Ayr/Arran 0 20 0 0 45 0 0 0 0 0 
Region 10 37 27 90 81 0 3 22 12 1 
No. per million 6 24 18 59 53 0 2 15 8 1 
total pop· 
234 
APPENDIX V 
AGE-SEX STANDARDISED RATES: 
NHS AND PRIVATE CASES 
Table Va: Ace-sex standardised rates (per million aced >24 years) of CABG 
and PTCA in districts of E. Anclian ree;ion: NHS and private cases 
District CABO PTCA 
871 89/ 911 92/ 93/ 87/ 89/ 911 92/ 93/ 
88 90 92 93 94 88 90 92 93 94 
Cambridge 263 415 479 632 695 23 135 209 283 410 
Peterbro' 251 261 436 509 552 22 66 51 146 120 
W. Suffolk 283 435 595 554 662 14 83 135 197 310 
E. Suffolk 138 219 365 533 564 11 107 101 208 323 
Norwich 300 343 387 430 525 12 46 80 89 170 
Yarmouth 144 203 247 232 333 8 77 40 70 III 
W. Norfolk 154 259 275 271 302 14 22 78 36 92 
Huntington 298 489 686 710 689 17 27 270 223 371 
Region 232 313 407 468 534 15 87 110 150 232 
No. per million 150 207 273 314 358 10 57 74 101 155 
total pop. 
235 
Table Vb: Age-sex standardised rates (per million aged >24 years) of CABG 
and PTCA in districts ofNe Western reeion: NUS and private cases 
District CABG PTCA 
87/ 89/ 911 92/ 93/ 87/ 89/ 91/ 921 93/ 
88 90 92 93 94 88 90 92 93 94 
Lancaster 198 331 128 340 389 26 125 III 100 161 
Blackpool 472 461 600 647 715 55 61 71 46 239 
Preston 299 322 421 481 340 113 96 112 12 72 
Blackburn 204 222 391 348 491 58 119 103 108 150 
Burnley 247 432 530 504 512 26 60 78 50 77 
West 302 359 575 572 628 71 168 141 204 171 
Lancashire 
Chorley 216 391 350 284 327 30 61 72 90 58 
Bolton 297 362 400 502 565 43 83 47 126 92 
Bury 534 566 516 574 702 128 62 120 203 229 
North 406 585 469 641 616 97 198 134 161 156 
Manchester 
Central 951 ll05 980 1134 962 239 482 310 445 200 
Manchester 
South 568 702 845 593 856 100 156 130 153 307 
Manchester 
Oldham 304 289 368 317 407 49 79 43 62 103 
Rochdale 438 531 651 831 730 23 104 67 302 208 
Salford 184 352 528 413 440 150 180 150 214 193 
Stockport 547 608 694 570 671 128 101 173 208 213 
Tameside 3ll 604 619 576 567 126 141 161 127 135 
Trafford 416 378 670 574 616 158 165 247 222 192 
Wigan 284 346 511 578 6ll 93 131 126 133 188 
Region 371 461 554 561 606 87 123 121 152 172 
No. per million 1241 I 300 I 366 I 370 1400 I 57 I 80 I 80 1100 I 1141 total pop' 
236 
Table Vc: 
District 
Greater 
Glasgow 
Lanarkshire 
Ayr/Arran 
Region 
Aee-sex standardised rates (per million aeed >24 years) of CABG 
and PTCA in districts of G. Glasgow region: NBS and private 
gm 
CABG PTCA 
87/ 89/ 911 92/ 93/ 87/ 89/ 911 92/ 93/ 
88 90 92 93 94 88 90 92 93 94 
546 606 912 1065 918 188 235 361 331 242 
377 360 475 513 697 75 162 186 203 222 
411 467 578 672 595 61 79 195 220 197 
1471 1 507 1 713 1 822 1 785 II 130 I 181 1275 1271 1 226 I 
No. per million 301 330 471 543 518 I 83 I 118 I 182 11791149 1 total pop. 
237 
APPENDIX VI 
DATA FOR FIGURE 7.3 
Urgency Concordant Delayed Accelerated Total 
Score No. 0/0 No. 0/0 No. % 
1-1.9 4 44.4 5 55.6 NA NA 9 
2-2.9 50 21.6 182 78.4 NA NA 232 
3-3.9 3 4.8 46 74.2 13 21.0 62 
4-4.9 21 26.9 44 56.4 13 16.7 78 
5-5.9 56 28.3 66 33.3 76 38.4 198 
6-6.5 289 43.6 81 12.2 293 44.2 663 
> 6.51 158 57.0 NA NA 119 43.0 277 
Total 581 38.2 424 28.0 514 33.8 1519 
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Figure Vila: Concordance of patient's actual waiting time with the appropriate 
waiting time, as defined by the Urgency Score. 
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Table VIla: Data for Figure Vila 
Urgency Concordant Delayed Accelerated Total 
Score No. % No. % No. % 
1-1.9 3 50.0 3 50.0 NA NA 6 
2-2.9 23 23.2 76 76.8 NA NA 99 
3-3.9 1 2.9 31 88.6 3 8.5 35 
4-4.9 14 42.4 12 36.4 7 21.2 33 
5-5.9 35 24.3 44 30.6 65 45.1 144 
6-6.5 166 48.1 45 13.0 134 38.9 345 
> 6.51 94 61.0 NA NA 60 39.0 154 
Total 336 41.2 211 25.8 514 33.0 816 
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Figure Vllb: Concordance of patients actual waiting time with the appropriate 
waiting time, as defined by the Urgency Score. 
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Table VIIb: Data for Figure VIIb 
Urgency Concordant Delayed Accelerated Total 
Score No. % No. 0/0 No. 0/0 
1-1.9 1 33.3 2 66.7 NA NA 3 
2-2.9 25 20.5 97 79.5 NA NA 122 
3-3.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
4-4.9 9 15.4 31 79.5 2 5.1 39 
5-5.9 6 40.0 3 20.0 6 40.0 15 
6-6.5 71 38.6 20 10.9 93 50.5 184 
> 6.51 24 42.1 NA NA 33 57.9 57 
Total 133 31.7 153 36.4 134 31.9 I 420 I 
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Figure Vile: Concordance of patient's actual waiting time with the appropriate 
waiting time, as defined by the Urgency Score. 
100 
~ 
o 80· ····· · ··· 
Ol 
Q) 
iii () 
-5 60· · · ······ 
III 
Q) 
C 
~ 40· ······ ·· · 
III 
-C Q) 
() 
Q; 20· ········· 
a. 
Hospital 3 
o " 
1-1 .9 2-2.9 3-3.9 4-4.9 5-5.9 6-6.5 
Urgency Score 
Categories 
DConcordant • Delayed DAccelerated 
> 6.51 TOTAL 
!II 
_1~,-. ----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Evolution of a Public Sector 
Market for Cardiac Services in the 
UK: 1991-1994 
Sue Langham and Nick Black 
The introduction of a market economy into the National Health Service caused 
concern about the future of specialist services. This article describes the impact of 
the reforms over time on two specialist services, focusing on the evolution of the 
contracting system, the nature of the market and the problems experienced by 
purchasers and providers. The article concludes that providers' concerns about 
the future of their specialist services have become more acute since the 
introduction of the market economy. Control over their future lies in the hands of 
purchasers and the Government. 
Refonn of the British National Health Service 
(NHS) in 1991 introduced competitive markets 
into the health care system. This sparked ofT fears 
among some health care professionals about the 
ability of market forces to preserve and develop 
highly specialized services. They feared that the 
future of these high-cost services. which were 
provided in only a sman number of pospitals, 
would be put in jeopardy. It was argued that the 
success of the reforms and the survival of specialist 
health care ser\'ices depended on striking the 
right balance between regulating the market and 
fostering competition (Donaldson. 1992). Health 
care professionals believed that specialist services 
would require careful regulation if equality of 
availability and access were to be achieved and 
that the service. if left to market forces. would 
·become fragmCJ1led and ineffective (House of 
Commons. 1992). 
Predictions as to the effects of introducing 
markets into specialist health care have varied 
widely . Some observers were cautiously optimistic 
that certain asperuofthe reforms would enhance 
efficiency and equity given the right balance 
between competition and regulation (King's Fund 
Institute. 1 989;Culyer. 1990. 1991; Roberts. 1993; 
Best tt aI .• 1994; Ham and Maynard. 1994 ;). 
Others have contradicted this view. stressing that 
a health service which combined characteristics of 
a market with those of central regulation risked 
getting the WOTSt of both worlds (Hughes and 
Dingwall. 1991; Boyle and Darkins. 1994). Yet 
others have highlighted the fact that the 
characteristics required for a competitive market 
were not likely to found in health care. and that 
therefore the benefits of increased efficiency 
brought about by a market-based system would 
not accrue (Donaldson and Mooney. 1993; Brazier 
and Normand. 1991 ; Propper. 1992; Roberts. 
1993). 
The reason for such diverse opinions has 
partly been a lack of empirical evidence. Results 
of studies evaluating the refonns started to emerge 
only two years after the inception of the changes 
and. inevitably. many reported littleactuaJ change 
(Robinson and Le Grand. 1993). Other studies 
reviewed the changes taking place within the 
NHS as a result of the new contracting system 
(NHSME. 1994). One such study was that 
undertaken by the Clinical Standards Advisory 
Group (CSAG). a body set up by the Government 
in 1991 to act as an independentsource of expert 
advice to UK health ministers. Oneoftht: CSAG's 
responsibilities was to monitor access to and the 
availability of selected specialist services and 
describe theeffeets the NHS reforms were having. 
Their first set of reports were published in 1993 
(CSAG. 1993 a-c). The Government's response 
to these reports was that there was no evidence 
that services had sutTered following the changes 
(DoH. 1993). As the reports on I)' covered the first 
12to 18 months of the new funding arrangements. 
it could be argued that it was too soon for the 
reforms to have had any detectable impact. 
Studying the etTect of the reforms has been 
complicated b)' several concurrent policy changes. 
including: 
oThe Government's White Paper The HtalJh of the 
Nation. which set specific targets for the 
reduction of coronary heart disease mortality. 
(Secretary of State. 1992). 
°The incorporation of a maximum in-patient 
waiting time of 12 months for coronary artery 
b)'pass grafting (CABG) in the PaJ.iml·s Gharin' 
(Department of Health. 1994). 
oThe introduction ofa new weighted capitation 
formula for distributing funds to health regions 
(Secretaries of State. 1989a and b). 
• The Tomlinson inquiry and similar undertakings 
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in other major cities set up to recommend 
major changes in the configurations of health 
services (Tomlinson Inquiry. 1992). 
Recent managerial and organizational 
changes. which may have some influence on the 
management and functioning of specialist services. 
include merging of family health service 
authorities (FHSAs) and district health authorities 
(DHAs). major changes to regional health 
authorities (RHAs) and changes to the funding 
and nature of general practitioner (GP) 
fundholding. 
Despite the methodological difficulties such 
concurrent interventions present. it is important 
the impact of the 1991 reforms is understood. 
This article describes the views of purchasers and 
providers of two specialist services-CABG and 
percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty 
(PTCA}-over the first three years of the reforms. 
First the evolution of contracting is described; 
second, the nature of the market is assessed. and. 
finally. the problems faced in the first year are 
compared with experiences in the third year. 
Methods 
Aseries of semi-structured interviews were carried 
out duringJuly and August 1992. 1993 and 1994 
with a sample of purchasing agencies and 
providers ofCABG and PTCA in four areas of the 
t;K. These were South East Thames Region. 
North Western Region. East Anglian Region and 
Greater Glasgow. including Lanarkshire and 
Arran/Ayrshire. The areas were selected to provide 
a representative sample with reference 10 historical 
levels of provision, population density . 
geographical location and initial approaches to 
purchasing. 
The business managers responsible for 
cardiology and cardiothoracic contracts in all ten 
N HS providers in the four areas were interviewed 
in each of the three years. Thirteen purchasers 
were selected. after advice from local NHS staff. 
as being particularly interested and active in 
contracting for these services. They included RHA 
and DHAstaffand, in 1994. GPfundholders. The 
interviews were concerned with the resp0l)dents' 
experiences of commissioning these two specialist 
services. The interviews lasted approximately one 
hour and information was recorded by either 
making notes during and after the interviews or 
by ·audio-taping. The data obtained were 
categorized according to the five principal issues 
which emerged. For purchasers the categories 
were: responsibility for purchasing; types of 
contracts used; methods used to agree. place and 
monitor contracts; type of relationship with the 
main provider; and problems that had occurred. 
For providers the categories were : types of 
contracts used; methods used to price procedures; 
relationship with the main purchaser; issues 
regarding the t)'pe of competition; and problems 
that had occurred. 
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Results 
Evolution of Contracting 
When the reforms were introduced in 1991. 
three areas (indudingone in which commissioning 
did not start until April 1992) maintained the 
stalus quo as regards responsibility for purchasing 
the services (see table I). Contracts were paid for 
centrally (by the RHAs in the three English regions 
studied) by either top-slicing funds from district 
allocations or charging the district according to 
their level of use. The fourth area devolved the 
responsibility of purchasing to district purchasing 
consortia from the outset. After the initial 
maintenance of a steady state •. the other regions 
also began to relinquish their control over the 
market and devolve the responsibility of 
contracting to either district purchasing consortia 
or individual districts. At the same time. the 
proportion of the population served by fund-
holding general practices increased with the effect 
that the responsibility for purchasing CABGs and 
PTCAs increasingly shifted from purchasing 
authorities to patients' CPs. 
Meanwhile. the Department of Health 
introduced a new weighted capitation formula in 
1991 to fund regions. and it was recommended 
that it should be used to allocate resources to 
district purchasing authorities. Each region slowly 
phased in the use of this formula to fund districts 
and it was established in all areas except Greater 
Glasgow by 1994/95 . The new formula . based on 
capitation adjusted for age and a measure of 
need. caused a redistribution of resources creating 
peT capita losing and peT capita gaining districts. 
As the purchasing function developed. with 
the advent of better information on unit prices 
and activity. districts and district consortia moved 
away from block contracts. Blockcontracts. where 
the purchaser pays the provider a fixed sum for 
access to a defined range of services to meet the 
demand from the purchaser'sresidem population. 
do not allow purchasers to increase the efficiency 
of resource use and place providers in a situation 
of uncertainty regarding their workload . 
Purchasers moved either to more sophisticated 
block contracts. where they set a target for the 
level of activity to be carrieo out based on 
projections of activity and unit costs. or 10 cost 
and volume contracts which are more precise as 
a fixed price is set for a specified target volume of 
treatment. 
The length of contracts also changed. Initially, 
most contracts were for one year at the end of 
which the need for the service was reviewed and 
the contract changed if required. One region. 
however. chose to purchase services on a three-
year rolling contract in order to protect the service 
in the initial stages of the reforms. By 1994. 
hospitals were considering longer-term contracts 
toenable them to carry out service developments. 
A seven-year commitment from purchasers had 
been negotiated in one area but is unl ikely to be 
translated into a seven-year comract due to a 
reluctance by purchasers to commit themselves to 
CClprA leH 
Table 1 .. Key features of commissioning in the four study areas from 1991/92 to 1994195. 
1991/92 199219) 199)194 199419' 
/UsptmsibJity for frurcMsing 
SEThames CABG Type I Type~ Type! Type! 
N Western CABG Type 2 Type 2 Type 2 Type. 
EAnglian CABG Type. Type. Type. Type. 
GGwgow CABG N/A Type I Type I Type I 
PTCA N/A Type. Type. Type 4 
IUSlNrua/J«4Jitm 
SEThames CABG Sludy stale Weighted capitation Weighted capitation Wrighted capitation 
N Western CABG Steady Slate Steady state Steady state Weighled capitation 
EAnglian CABG Steady SUIte Weighted capitation Weighted capitation Weighted capitation 
GGlasgow CABG Sleady state Steady state Steady state Steady state 
T1f>t of prindpoI cDnlrlll1 
SEThames CABG Block Block Sophisticated block Sophisticated block 
II; Western CABG Block Block Block Sophisticated block 
EAnglian CABG Cost and volume Cost and volume Cosl and volume Cost and volume 
GGwgow CABG N/A Cost and volume Cost and volume Cost and volume 
PTCA N/A Block Cost and Volume Cost and volume 
Ltnrth of contract 
SE Thames CABG 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 
N Western CABG ! years 12 months 
[Anglian CABG 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months· 
G Glasgow CABG N/A 12 months 6 months 12 months 
PTCA N/A 12 months 12 months 12 months 
Nolts: 
Type I : Regional purchasing in which region established contracts with local providers and top-sliced funds for these ~ces. 
Type 2: Regional purchasing in .. ·hich region contracted with providers and charged dutricts according to their level of use. 
Type g: OmriCl purchasing consortia in ,,·hich the responsibility for purchasing these sen;c" has been devolved to districts who have formed 
purchasing consortia . 
Type 4: District purchasing in which the responsibility for purchasing was taken on by individual districts. 
"f'/A : "f'OI applicable. 
(' An agreement .. ·as soughl from all main purchasers for a st'·en year commitment. although contracts would still be usued on a one rur basis.) 
anyone provider for so long. So despite intentions. 
contracts in all four areas in 1994/95 were still 
only for 12 months. 
Nalurt of 1M MarUI 
When contracting was devolved to districts and 
district consortia from regions. providers were 
placed in the position of having to compete for 
contracts. Purchasers. both district health 
authorities and fundholding GPs. started to 
question the configuration of services and the 
traditional choice of providers. 
Purchasers initially contracted at historical 
levels of activity with providers with whom they 
already had established links. As contracting 
developed. however. a spectrum of approaches to 
purchasing emerged. As regards volume. some 
purchasers said that they recognized cardiac 
surgery as a priority and sought to increase the 
level of activity so as to meet The Htalih of the 
Nation targets (DoH, 1993). In contrast, others 
continued to base contracts on historical trends in 
utilization. As regards patient flows, the majority 
of purchasers did not change their referral 
patterns radically. Those that did were influenced 
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by price rather than claims of improved quality. 
Some purchasers reduced the number of 
providers with whom they contracted, though 
this was mainl)' the result of central planning 
initiatives such as the Tomlinson Inquiry, rather 
than market forces. 
In general, the contractual relationships 
between purchasers and their main providers 
and between providers and their main purchasers 
were stable (see table 2). In South East Thames 
Region. the providers felt that the relationship 
was open because information about activity, costs 
and quality was shared fredy with purchasers. 
This view of stability and openness was not held 
by their purchasers who were actually in the 
process of altering their referral patterns and 
switching contracLS. In contrast, the views of 
purchasers and providers appeared to be 
concordant in the other three areas, in part because 
of the lack of alternative local providers. 
Despite the contractual relationship between 
purchasers and providers being predominantly 
stable. all providers felt that they had to compete 
for con tram (see table 2). This competitive 
environment arose as a result of providers having 
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Table 2. Key features of the relationship between purchasers and providers and providers' responses 
to questions regarding the competitive environment in 1993/94. 
PrtnJibn: I'InrJ.o.u.rs: Providnl: PTINidLrs: 
'What is your rtl4limuhip 'What is your rtlo&mship 'Do :PI' Ctmlptu 'Is IN Iwis of 
willi "",r IMi" fJUrcMsns" willi "",r u" prlNidLrs" for ,tmlrae/.!" , ... ,..tilitm fair" 
SE l1tames Stable open contractual Shon-term buying and \:,es No, tendering process is unfair 
relationship selling arnngements and Special Health Authorities 
have an unfair advantage 
N Western Stable contractual Stable contractual Yes No, tendering process and 
relationship relationship regulation by Region is unfair 
EAnglian Stable long-term Stable long-terin Yes Yes 
contractual relationship contractual relationship 
G Glasgow Stable contractual Stable contractual Yes Yes 
relationship relationship 
Table 3. Problems experienced by purchasers and providers in 1991/92 and 1993/94. 
PrlNidLrs 
Purchasm 
PToblnu~tdin 1991192 
(I) Type of contract 
(2) uck of routine information 
(g) Appropriate organiGtionailevel for purchasing 
(4) Uncenainty about demand 
(5) Achieving equality betw""n purchasers 
(6) uck offair competition 
(I) Type of contract 
(2) lAck of routine information 
(3) Appropriate organiGtionallevel for purchasing 
(4) Weighted capitation 
(5) Setting specialties against each other 
(6) Conflict with Tht Htabh of IN NaJitm 
to- maintain their contracts with their main 
purchasers. compete for contracts from more 
distant districts. and compete for patients from 
fundholding CPs who were controlling an ever 
increasing proportion of the market. ' 
Providers were divided in their views as to the 
fairness of competition. In the South East Thames 
and the North Western Regions competition 
through competitive tendering was thought to be 
unfair, It was argued that purchasers assessed 
tenders with regard to the price. but not the 
quality of the service provided, This concern was 
compounded by the feeling that prices were not 
considered representative of a provider's efficiency 
because of the different methods used to 
determine costs. Furthermore. it was felt that 
tenders were more likely to be offered to inefficient 
providers who. charging their main local 
purchasers full cost and retaining excess capacity. 
could then charge other more distant purchasers 
at marginal cost to attract additional tenders. 
ProbltmS ~td in 1993194 
(I) Uncenainty about demand 
(2) uck of fair competition 
(g) Inability to carry out service developments 
(4) Problems related to fundholding CPs 
(5) Problem. related to larget waiting times 
(I) Managing demand 
(2) Connict with Tht HtiJltA of 1M NatWrt 
(3) Difficulties with price comparability 
(4) uck of information on patient outcomes 
(5) Loss of resources under weighted capitation 
Providers also felt that. in lheearlyyears. London's 
Special Health Authorities had had an unfair 
advantage since they had been allowed to charge 
lower prices due to subsidies received for research 
and teaching, 
Obstacles During till First Ytar (1991/92) 
In the first year of the reforms. when most regions 
retained control over purchasing for these services 
and before the traditional means of allocating 
resources to districts gave way Lo weighted 
capitation. purchasers and providers struggled 
to deal with the problems the new contracting 
s),stem imposed (see table 3). They faced five new 
challenges, 
Handling Logistics 
The overriding problem faced by both purchasers 
and providers was handling the complexities of 
the new system including the type of contract 
used. the lack of routine information on which to 
ba~ contracts and the appropriate organizational 
level for purchasing cardiac services. Block 
contracts were high risk for providers and many 
found that their actual level of activity exceeded 
the anticipated level. leading to a financial loss. In 
contrast.costandvolumecontractscau~dwaiting 
lists to grow becau~ as the number of emergencies 
rose elective cases were usurped. Meanwhile. 
block contracts gave no guarantee to pUTch~rs 
as to the volume and type of work that would be 
carried out and cost and volume contracts were 
difficult to define due to the inability of providers 
to price their ~rvices according to case-mix. Lack 
of information on which to base contracts was a 
limiting factor for both parties. Providers were 
concerned about. the expense they faced in 
collecting data on the cost, activity and quality of 
services. Purcha~rs. unable to male comparisons 
between providers on the basis of quality due to a 
lack of uniform indicators. were having to base 
theirchoiceon priceaJone. Even whenapurchaser 
had placed a contract. monitoring the ~rvice was 
again hampered by lack of data. 
The appropriate organizational level for 
purchasing was a concern both for providers and 
purchasers. Providers found it easier to negotiate 
contracts which covered more than one district as 
this avoided the time and expense ofnegotiating 
lots of small volume contracts with theirinevitable 
risks. On the purchasing side. there was a conflict 
between regions and districts about who should 
be responsible for purchasing. The former argued 
that districts did not have the necessary skills and 
that if these services were purchased on a regional 
basis equality of access could be ensured . However. 
the districts argued that they were in a better 
position both to assess the needs of their resident 
population and to c.hoose between competing 
demands. 
Monoging Dtmand 
Providers faced difficulties in managing demand 
for their services because they were uncertain 
about the actual number of patients that would be 
referred to them. This. in turn. both reflected the 
difficulties purchasers faced in coming to terms 
with their new function. which sometimes led to 
contracts being agreed after the financial year 
had begun. and the impact of the introduction of 
weighted capitation. The new funding formula 
meant that some provider units situated in per 
capita losing districts suffered a reduction in 
income which in tum caused problems for their . 
purchasers who. as a consequence. had to cover a 
higher proportion of the provider's fixed costs. 
,Achieving Equalil)' of ,Access 
Providers became aware of their inability to 
provide a fair and equitable ~TVice to their various 
purchasers. They found that the clinical priority 
of patients was being distorted by the amount of 
resources purchasers were allocating for these 
services. Providers often completed a contract fo\' 
a purchaser who still had urgent patients waiting 
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to be treated. Meanwhile contracts with other 
purchasers were continuing in which patients in 
less need of urgent attention were being treated. 
Providers were frustrated with their powerlessness 
for treating patients according to clinical need. 
Unfair CompetuUm 
Some providers considered the basis of 
competition unfair. Well-established providers 
were thought to be able to compete more effectively 
than those who were trying to develop their 
service. Some providers also felt there was too 
much central control over the market. which 
tended .to favour certain providers over others. 
F tJCing Conflicts 
Purchasers found they were coming up against 
several conflicts. First. in setting priorities for 
health care. they felt that involving clinicians 
from the provider units in discussions about how 
to choose between competing needs for health 
care would result in setting specialties against 
each other. Second. purchasers found that 
contracting could be in direct conflict with Thl 
Ht4l.th of the Nation policies as contracting rewarded 
purch~rs who achieve maximum efficiency gains 
as measured by the Efficiency J ndex (Donaldson 
tI aI .• 1994; Clarke tt aI .• 1993). As the definition 
of efficiency was based on maximizing patient 
activity from the resources available it followed 
that purchasers achieved higher efficiency gains 
by increasing hospital activity rather than by 
moving resources from treatment to prevention. 
a strategy that was believed to be more likely to 
meet the goals set in Thl Health ofthl NaJUm. 
Obstacles During the ThiTd YeOT (J99J/94) 
Two years later. when contracting had become 
better established. some of the early problems 
had resolved. some remained and some new ones 
had emerged (see table !I). 
Problems Solved 
Handlingthe logistics of contracting was no longer 
seen to be as serious a problem for purchasers and 
providers due to the skills that had been developed 
over the preceding three years. Routine data on 
costs and activities of cardiac services were being 
collected so that more sophisticated contracts 
could be used. This. to a large extent. had taken 
much of the uncertainty out of contracting. 
Problt1ll5 Remaining 
Providers were still concerned about how to 
manage demand for cardiac services. They were 
experiencing problems with contractual volumes 
being exceeded because of an increase in the 
number of emergencies and an overall increase in 
referrals. They were also still concerned about 
their inability to treat patients solely according to 
clinical need. 
Purchasers had also become increasingly 
concerned about the dramatic increase in demand 
for CABG and PTCA by their resident population 
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over the previous few years. Reasons for the 
increase were that: 
-Cardiologists from specialist centres had set up 
more clinics in district general hospitals, 
particularly in districts with traditionally low 
referral rates. 
-Out-patient sessions were being conducted by 
cardiologists in fund holding general practices. 
- Diagnostic facilities, including angiography, had 
been dt'veloped in some district general 
hospitals. 
The resulting increase in demand from 
traditionally low referring districts had not been 
offset by a decrease in districts with historically 
high referral rates. Purchasers who were losing 
resources under weighted capitation were finding 
it difficult to reduce their commitment to these 
services in view of increasing demand. As a result, 
greater pressure was puton reducing expenditure 
on other services. 
uck of fair competition was still causing a 
problem for providers, although the nature of 
their concern had changed to that of pricing. 
Many felt that they were put at a competitive 
disadvantage as a result of being efficient and 
pricing their services at true average cost. Other 
providers with much lower prices were felt to be 
distorting the market in a variety of ways including 
using cardiac services as a 'loss leader' to auract 
business for other services, subsidizing the service 
through monies received from research functions, 
cross-subsidizing between services (which had 
been banned by the N HS Management Executive), 
or charging local purchasers the full cost while 
allowing other purchasers to use their services at 
marginal cost. 
Lack of data on the quality of the service 
remained a problem for purchasers who were 
continuing to select providers on the basis of 
price. However, they found it was almost 
.impossible to make meaningful comparisons of 
prices becau.se providers did not all use the same 
cost accounting systems, apportionment rules 
and methods of product specification. They felt 
that price alone could not be used as an indication 
of efficiency unless all providers used the same 
method of pricing and achieved the same outcome. 
Purchasers were also still finding that 
contracting sometimes conflicted with the 
objectives of TIlL Health of tIlL Nation . Purchasers 
argued that the more of their patients that were 
treated, the more credibility they received because 
treating patients was easily quantifiable while 
promoting health was not. 
Nnu Problnns 
Several new problems had emerged for providers. 
First, providers became increasingly concerned 
about the future development of their .services. 
Demand for the service had risen with no increase 
in the amount of resources available. Providers 
therefore found that their ability to carry out 
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service developments was limited. Second, growth 
in the number offundholding CPs added to the 
existing equity problems. Although providers 
generally did not have an explicit policy of giving 
the patients of fund holding CPs a better service, 
several found that as a result of market pressures 
and the need to maintain their share of the ever 
increasing market controlled by fundholdingCPs, 
they had to provide a quicker, cheaper and 
. sometimes better quality service than that 
provided for district purchasers. Third, although 
target waiting times were welcomed by providers, 
many found that they were either having to 
distort clinical priorities in order to achieve them 
or refer non-urgent cases back to their CPs rather 
than put them on a waiting list. This problem had 
arisen because many purchasers were still buying 
services on a historical basis and were not basing 
their decisions on the Deed to achieve the 12 
month in-patient waiting time target. 
Discussion 
There has been a complex web of inter -connected 
problems which, in general, caused more 
problems for purchasers than providers initially, 
but which appear to be of increasing concern to 
providers. Clearly, the purchasing function has 
developed considerably over the last four years 
and the contracting process has become more 
sophisticated . The majority of regions have now 
relinquished their control over the market for 
specialist services and have devolved the 
responsibility to districts, district consortia and 
CP fundholders whose purchasing skills have 
developed. There still exists a lack of appropriate 
data on activity and costs on which to base 
contracts; however purchasers have dealt with 
this problem by creating sophisticated block 
contracts, where an agreement is set between the 
two parties on a target level of activity to be 
carried out for a fixed sum which does not require 
perfect information. 
Despite the development of contracting, 
purchasers and providers continue to express 
misgivings about the way specialist services are 
commissioned. Purchasers found that the increase 
in demand for CABC and PTCA. in part brought 
about by initiatives set up by providers, was putting 
an everincreasingburden on their limited budget 
and more efficient use of resources was made 
difficult by their inability to make meaningful 
comparisons between the quality and cost of 
providers' services due to the paucity of accurate 
and comparable information. 
Providers' concerns seem to have become 
more acute since the introduction of a market 
economy. In the first year of the reforms their 
main concern was how to deal with the contracting 
process. By the third year, providers were more 
concerned about the future. Some providers have 
experienced an increase in demand for their 
services with no concurrent increase in the 
resources available. This problem has been 
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over the previous few years. Reasons for the 
increase were that: 
-Cardiologists from specialist centres had set up 
more clinics in district general hospitals, 
particularly in districts with traditionally low 
referral rates. 
-Out-patient sessions were being conducted by 
cardiologists in fund holding general practices. 
- Diagnostic facilities, including angiography. had 
been dt'veloped in some district general 
hospitals. 
The resulting increase in demand from 
traditionally low referring districts had not been 
offset by a decrease in districts with historically 
high referral rates. Purchasers who were losing 
resources under weighted capitation were finding 
it difficult to reduce their commitment to these 
services in view ofincreasing demand. As a result, 
greater pressure was puton reducing expenditure 
on other services. 
Lack of fair competition was still causing a 
problem for providers, although the nature of 
their concern had changed to that of pricing. 
Many felt that they were put at a competitive 
disadvantage as a result of being efficient and 
pricing their services at true average cost. Other 
providers with much lower prices were felt to be 
distorting the market in a variety of ways including 
using cardiac services as a 'loss leader' to attract 
business for other services, subsidizing the service 
through monies received from research functions, 
cross-subsidizing between services (which had 
been banned by the N HS Management Executive), 
or charging local purchasers the full cost while 
allowing other purchasers to use their services at 
marginal cost. 
Lack of data on the quality of the service 
remained a problem for purchasers who were 
continuing to select providers on the basis of 
price. However. they found it was almost 
.impossible to make meaningful comparisons of 
prices because providers did not all use the same 
cost accounting systems. apponionment rules 
and methods of product specification. They felt 
that price alone could not be used as an indication 
of efficiency unless all providers used the same 
method of pricing and achieved the same outCome. 
Purchasers were also still finding that 
contracting sometimes connicted with the 
objectives ofTM Health o//M Na/ilm . Purchasers 
argued that the more of their patients that were 
treated. the more credibility they received because 
treating patients was easily quantifiable while 
promoting health was not. 
N t'UJ Problems 
Several new problems had emerged for providers. 
First. providers became increasingly concerned 
about the future development of their services. 
Demand for the service had risen with no increase 
in the amount of resources available. Providers 
therefore found that their ability to carry out 
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service developments was limited. Second. growth 
in the number of fundholding CPs added to the 
existing equity problems. Although providers 
generally did not have an explicit policy of giving 
the patients of fundholding CPs a better service, 
several found that as a result of market pressures 
and the need to maintain their share of the ever 
increasing market controlled by fundholding CPs. 
they had to provide a quicker, cheaper and 
. sometimes better quality service than that 
provided for district purchasers. Third. although 
target waiting times were welcomed by providers, 
many found that they were either having to 
distort clinical priorities in order to achieve them 
or refer non-urgent cases back to their CPs rather 
than put them on a waiting list. This problem had 
arisen because many purchasers were still buying 
services on a historical basis and were not basing 
their decisions on the need to achieve the 12 
month in-patient waiting time target. 
Discussion 
There has been a complex web ofinter-connected 
problems which, in general , caused more 
problems for purchasers than providers initially, 
but which appear to be of increasing concern to 
providers. Clearly. the purchasing function has 
developed considerably over the last four years 
and the contracting process has become more 
sophisticated. The majority of regions have now 
relinquished their control over the market for 
specialist services and have devolved the 
responsibility to districts. district consortia and 
CP fundholders whose purchasing skills ha\'e 
developed. There still exists a lack of appropriate 
data on activity and costs on which to base 
contracts; however purchasers have dealt with 
this problem by creating sophisticated block 
contracts, where an agreement is set between the 
two parties on a target level of activity to be 
carried out fora fixed sum which does not require 
perfect information. 
Despite the development of contracting, 
purchasers and providers continue to express 
misgivings about the way specialist services are 
commissioned. Purchasers found that the increase 
in demand for CABC and PTCA. in part brought 
about by initiatives set up by providers. was putting 
an ever increasing burden on their limited budget 
and more efficient use of resources was made 
difficult by their inability to make meaningful 
comparisons between the quality and cost of 
providers' services due to the paucity of accurate 
and comparable information. 
Providers' concerns seem to have become 
more acute since the introduction of a market 
economy. In the first year of the reforms their 
main concern was how to deal with the contracting 
process. By the third year, providers were more 
concerned about the future . Some providers have 
experienced an increase in demand for their 
services with no concurrent increase in the 
resources available. This problem has been 
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exacerbated in some districts by the effects of the 
new resource allocation fonnula . Although some 
providers have attempted to secure longer term 
contracts to create greater stability and thus enable 
service developments to be carried out, purchasers 
have been reluctant to commit themselves for 
longer than 12 months. Providers have also been 
subject to unfair competition in the market place 
and an ability to maintain clinical need as the basis 
of selecting patients. 
Control over the future of specialist services is 
to a large extent in the hands of purchasers and 
the Government. Insufficient resources have 
always been, and probably will always be, a 
problem both for purchasers and providers. The 
key, therefore, is for both parties to ensure that 
resources are used efficiently. Purchasers could 
start to base resource allocation decisions on 
indicators other th,!-n just the price of the service, 
though infonnation on the quality of care could 
prove to be expensive. In addition, they could 
start to request providers to supply information 
on pricing strategies in order to understand why 
prices difTer between providers. Purchasers could 
also require their main providers to manage and 
monitor waiting lists using a nationally agreed set 
of guidelines, including a standard urgency rating 
system to ensure that equality of access isachieved . 
Even this, however, would not solve the providers' 
problem of uncertainty about future dellJands 
that arises because purchasers are operating with 
short·term goals . They make decisions on a year· 
to· year basis, taking into account their financial 
situation and the relative strengths of competing 
demands. Thus, until such time as purchasers are 
prepared to enter into longer term contracts, 
pro\'iders will continue to experience difficulties 
in developing their services. Achieving a balance 
between a pro\'ider-Ied and a purchaser. led 
market seems a long way ofT. • 
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Is a discussion of the measurement of outcomes to set priorities for cardiac 
surgery in the United Kingdom National Health Service, and its ramifications. 
Provision of coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) services in the British National Health Service takes 
place at an average rate of 278 per million populationl, 
but varies significantly across the country2. This is a 
much lower provision than in many other countries3. 
The reason for the surprisingly wide variations in 
rates is due to the uncertainty surrounding what consti-
tutes the right rate of use. and the lack of robust criteria 
lor assessing the appropriate overall level of provision. 
The waiting list sometimes determines 
who gets treatment, 
and not simply 
when treatment is offered 
In some parts of the country a large proportion of cases 
put on the waiting list are treated only as they become 
emergencies, with few elective cases being treated5• 
For some patients, therefore, being put on the waiting 
list means that no surgery is provided, since a propor-
It is of particular importance 
to ensure that 
the limited service available 
is put to the best use 
tion of these patients may die belore treatment is 
offered. In this way the waiting list system sometimes 
determines who gets treatment, and not simply when 
treatment is offered. A prioritisation system therefore 
needs to be developed to identify those who will benefit 
greatly from treatment, and those for whom the expected 
benefits are relatively small, and for whom the decision 
not to provide surgery will have little effect on health. 
Given the relatively low levels of provision of revas-
cularisation procedures, it is of particular importance to 
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ensure that the limited service available is put to the 
best use. This paper reports on progress towards using 
outcome measures to set priorities in a study which 
aims to develop a system for prioritising patients on 
cardiac surgery waiting lists. 
Methods 
Methods exist both for stratifying the operative risk of 
patients undergoing coronary revascularisation6 and for 
prioritising patients waiting for surgery'. They are 
based on analysis of short term outcomes and consen-
sus of treating physicians. Their objectives are to min-
imise risk of sudden death, and to give a basis for audit 
of the quality of surgery by giving surgeons data on 
expected outcomes. The extent to which this kind of 
The first stage of this project 
was to apply 
an adapted urgency scoring system, 
based on the 
Canadian Consensus Study Approach 
activity can be based on outcome data is dependent pri-
marilyon the quality of that datal. 
The first stage of this project was to apply an 
adapted urgency scoring system, based on the 
Canadian Consensus Study approach1, to data on car-
diac surgery in three hospitals to see how the current 
pattern of prioritising patients compared with that 
which is implied by the score. 
The adaptations made were to allow the use of vari-
ables routinely available in the UK, and to reflect the 
normally longer waiting times. The results of this exer-
cise show that there is very little relationship between 
the urgency score and the length of time spent waiting 
by the patient. Some patients with an urgency score 
indicating high risk of adverse coronary events and 
therefore requiring urgent revascularisation were wait-
ing longer than other patients with a score indicating 
low risk. If the use of the urgency scoring system is 
accepted as an appropriate method for prioritising 
patients waiting to be admitted for cardiac surgery, it 
would appear that waiting for cardiac surgery in the 
UK is not as safe as it could be. 
The urgency scoring system 
has its limitations, 
the main problem being that a system 
developed in Canada 
may not be appiicable 
to UK clinical practice 
The urgency scoring system has its limitations, the main 
problem being that a system developed in Canada may 
not be applicable to UK clinical practice. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that outcomes will be better if 
cases at high risk of sudden death, and cases likely to 
show improvement in the short term are given priority 
over those who can wait more safely. It is intended to 
calculate the urgency score for all new referrals and to 
monitor the effects of this change. 
The second part of this project 
is attempting to identify 
the combination of factors 
which best predict health gain. 
Data are being collected 
from several sources 
It is hoped that this first phase of the project will 
improve outcomes by ensuring that those at most 
immediate risk are given higher priority. It is not clear 
whether being at high risk as defined by the score is 
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closely correlated with potential to benefit signiJicantJy 
in terms of health gain. In this context, health gain is 
best defined in terms of improvement in life expectancy 
and relief of symptoms. 
Conceptually this is simple - the priority should go 
to those likely to show the greatest increase in life years, 
the greatest reduction in symptoms or some combina-
tion of the two. Some attempts have been made to put 
these together into utility scores (eg Quality Adjusted 
Ute Years9). 
There is significant debate about the use of utility 
scores for priority settinglO, and especially about practi- . 
cal issues of measurement. However, there is less dis-
pute about the appropriateness of giving priority to 
services which do the most good, however defined. 
The second part of this project attempts to identify 
the combination of factors which best predict health 
gain. Data are being collected from several sources, 
including long term follow-up of patients based in 
Leeds. The aim of this exercise is to move towards a pri-
ority index which identifies those most likely to benefit 
in the longer run. 
The exercise will inevitably require refinement as 
better data on long term survival and quality of life are 
collected. However, for improving the overall effective-
It is not clear 
whether being at high risk 
as defined by the score 
is closely correlated with 
potential to benefit signIficantly 
in terms of health gain 
ness of cardiac surgery, it is important to be able to set 
priorities on the basis of contribution to health gain. As 
in any such exercise, attention will need to be paid to 
the changes in the success of treatments as techniques 
change and develop, so that sensible conclusions can be 
drawn about the eCfectiveness of current treatment. 
Given the likelihood that the two exercises will pro-
duce different prioritisation indices, the question arises 
about how the commissioners of health services should 
choose. It has been argued above that a prioritisation 
system based on health gain is the appropriate method 
Better use of current services 
can increase health gain 
and reduce the risk 
of adverse events 
for those waiting 
for treatment 
to maximise the benefits from treatment. However, 
some of those most able to benefit in the long run may 
be in little danger of sudden death. This suggests that it 
is important to distinguish between two questions - who 
should be allocated the surgery, and of those who will 
gain sufficiently to merit treatment, how should the tim-
ing be determined. Put another way, an important 
objective is to make waiting for surgery safer for those 
who have to wait. 
A single scoring system is unlikely to achieve both 
of these. A two-stage scoring system will be needed 
which selects first those for whom the benefits of treat-
ment are likely to justify surgical intervention, and a 
second which allocates an urgency score related to risk 
of immediate adverse events. 
The need to prioritise access to CABG in the UK 
National Health Service is very visible and scores which 
help to decide who should be given priority are usefuL 
There are various guidelines on the appropriate use of 
CABG which have been published by the British 
Cardiac Societyl!. An audit undertaken by the Trent 
region using appropriateness criteria found that 16% of 
CABGs were inappropriatel2. Competition for treatment 
is therefore likely to occur between people who would 
be expected to gain from surgery. 
There are good arguments against long waits as a 
rationing mechanism. The reason for this is that total 
health gain from the interventions is less when long 
waits are involved. Since revascularisation procedures 
are typically performed on relatively old people, the 
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number of years over which benefits can be enjoyed is 
reduced by waiting for treatment. 
Summary 
Given the relatively low levels of CASG in the UK there 
may be a strong case for expansion of the service. 
However, better use of current services can increase 
health gain and reduce the risk of adverse events for 
those waiting for treatment. The two parts of this study 
should help to do both of these. 
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letter 
Dear Sir /Madam 
While I welcome the advent of 'Focus on Outcome 
Analysis' and strongly support the growing interest in 
outcomes research, I would like to take issue with 
Carol Orchard's acceptance of the concept that results 
of clinical outcomes evaluation should be made avail-
able for public scrutiny. Ms Orchard of course under-
stands that randomised controlled trials provide the 
only way of studying outcomes 50 that truly valid 
comparisons can be made between providers or treat-
ments, and that results of any other studies will be 
confounded by copious casemix variables as well as 
bias, inaccuracy and chance. However to assume that 
this point is understood by members of the public who 
have not been trained in scientific method (the huge 
majority) is naive and inaccurate in the extreme. 
Releasing uncontrolled results from observational 
studies of outcome to those who cannot interpret them 
properly will attract public criticism of some first-rate 
providers and adulation of those whose main concern 
is only to 'play the numbers game' to their own advan-
tage. What is to be gained from that? 
Yours sincerely 
Rowena M Ryan FRCS 
Senior Registrar in ENT Surgery 
Royal National1hroat Nose and Ear Hospital 
Grays Inn Road, London, England. 
focus on outcome analysis invites comment from read-
ers on the issues covered in the journal and on other 
important outcomes issues. 
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